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WHY LIBERALS SHOULD CHUCK
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Christopher Slobogin*
In this article, Professor Christopher Slobogin makes a com-
pelling new case against the exclusionary rule, from a "liberal" per-
spective. Moving beyond the inconclusive empirical data on the
efficacy of the rule, he uses behavioral and motivational theory to
demonstrate why the rule is structurally unable to deter individual
police officers from performing most unconstitutional searches and
seizures. He also argues, contrary to liberal dogma, that the rule is
poor at promoting Fourth Amendment values at the systemic, de-
partmental level. Finally, Professor Slobogin contends that the rule
stultifies liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, in large
part because of judicial heuristics that grow out of constant expo-
sure to litigants with dirty hands. He also explains why noninstru-
mental justifications for the rule, even when viewed from a liberal
bias, fail to support a broad policy of exclusion.
In place of the exclusionary rule, Professor Slobogin proposes
an administrative damages regime in which actions for Fourth
Amendment violations would be brought directly against police of-
ficers and departments. The proposed regime includes: (1) liqui-
dated damages for all constitutional violations, (2) personal
liability for officers who knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth
Amendment, (3) departmental liability for all other violations, (4)
state-paid legal assistance for all Fourth Amendment claims, and
(5) a judicial decisionmaker. Professor Slobogin demonstrates how
this regime would be superior to the exclusionary rule not only in
deterring individual Fourth Amendment violations, but also in en-
couraging use of warrants, invigorating judicial review, diminish-
ing racism on the beat, curbing perjury, improving hiring and
training practices, and promoting respect for the system. Why Lib-
erals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule adds considerable in-
sight to the Fourth Amendment debate and promises to challenge
the way both liberals and conservatives think about the exclusion-
ary rule.
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida School of Law. A.B.,
Princeton University; J.D., LL.M., University of Virginia Law School.
I would like to thank David Baddley, Jerold Israel, John Jeffries, Rick Matasar, Lars Noah,
William Stuntz, and the participants in the University of Florida Levin College of Law faculty
workshop series for their help on this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment "exclusionary rule" is one of the main-
stays of liberal ideology. Among those who place themselves some-
what left of center, a stance against using unconstitutionally seized
evidence is as de rigueur as being anti-death penalty or pro-choice. As
a liberal (yes, I admit it) who grew up with the exclusionary rule, I
resisted questioning its preeminence as a Fourth Amendment remedy
for some time. Today, however, I have come to believe that the rule
actually disserves the liberal cause. In this article, I argue that the rule
ought to be limited dramatically and that an administrative damages
regime should take its place.
The liberal creed, in Justice Holmes's oft-cited language, is that
without the exclusionary rule the Fourth Amendment would be a
[Vol. 1999
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 364 1999
DUMPING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
mere "form of words."' In modern parlance, the argument is that the
rule does a good job at deterring illegal searches and seizures, or at
least a better job than any other realistic alternative. In case it does
not, however, liberals hold in reserve a whole series of noninstru-
mental arguments on behalf of the rule, all of which conclude that
criminal defendants have a personal constitutional right to exclude ev-
idence regardless of exclusion's real-world effects. Convinced of some
or all of these propositions, most liberals (or at least most academics
who have considered the Fourth Amendment remedy issue)2 cling to
the exclusionary remedy despite its costs-not just of lost prosecu-
tions, but of truncated Fourth Amendment law, corrupted police,
prosecutors, and judges, and public disrespect for the criminal justice
system.
Contrary to our wishful thinking, the utilitarian argument for the
rule does not wash. The exclusionary rule is significantly flawed as a
deterrent device, especially when compared to more direct sanctions
on the police and police departments. Such sanctions would do a
much better job than the exclusionary rule at deterring police misbe-
havior, motivating police departments to take the Fourth Amendment
seriously, and ensuring the Fourth Amendment is fairly construed by
the courts. Indeed, the greatest concern with a direct remedy is that it
could overdeter the police, a consequence which, for many liberals,
might well be preferable to the underdeterrence of the rule. Nor do
the noninstrumental arguments for the rule fare much better. Even
1. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). In its original con-
text, this language may merely have stood for the proposition that courts must provide judicial
review of Fourth Amendment claims. See infra text accompanying notes 307-09. Today, it has a
much broader meaning. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (linking Holmes's
statement with the proposition that "[t]he occasional suppression of illegally obtained yet proba-
tive evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving overriding constitutional
values").
2. Among those who have indicated support for the rule (perhaps not all of whom would
refer to themselves as "liberals") are the following: Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for
Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 309; Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 429 (1974); Donald
A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 622-24 (1990); William C.
Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1193, 1242-43; Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than
an "Empirical Proposition?", 16 CREIGH rON L. REV. 565, 665-67 (1983); Wayne R. LaFave,
"The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984
U. ILL. L. REv. 895; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1994); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring
the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (1998); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C.
Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MrNN. L.
REV. 251 (1974); William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1983); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 847-52 (1994); Daniel
B. Yeager, From the "Gatehouse" to the "Mansion": Throwing Out Evidence in Criminal Cases,
CRIM. L. BULL., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 118.
No. 2]
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from a liberal's perspective, the arguments that have been derived
from the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due
Process Clause do not support more than a shadow of the present
rule.
This article makes the liberal's case for significantly limiting the
scope of the exclusionary rule and developing another way of enforc-
ing the Fourth Amendment. It argues that evidence should still be ex-
cluded when police flagrantly abridge Fourth Amendment rights or
illegally seize private papers. Except in those rare instances, however,
the primary judicial remedy for illegal searches and seizures should be
monetary penalties, preferably exacted from the searching officers
when they knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment,
and from the police department in all other cases of illegality. This
regime is most likely to accomplish the liberal's twin goals of enforc-
ing the Fourth Amendment and maintaining the overall integrity and
constitutional viability of the criminal justice system.
Part II, which begins the body of the article, is a relatively de-
tailed attempt at examining the individual and systemic effects of the
rule and its best alternatives. The discussion presents new theoretical
reasons, based on behavioral and motivational theory, as to why the
rule can't work in the normal scheme of things. The rule is a poor
deterrent because it imposes only weak punishment and confers even
weaker rewards on the individual officer, and because it actually en-
courages disrespect for the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, tradi-
tional tort damages and other remedies are no better (and are
probably worse) as individual deterrent devices. Yet the theoretical
insights of Part II suggest that if several structural changes are made,
among them the adoption of an independent entity for bringing dam-
ages claims, a judicial hearing process, and a liquidated damages
scheme, the damages action-or, more accurately, an administrative
penalty system that has elements of a damages action-would be
much more effective than the exclusionary rule as an enforcement
mechanism.
Part II also looks at the effects of the rule and its alternatives at
the organizational level. Sociological research indicates that the rule's
much-vaunted effect on police departments leaves much to be desired.
In contrast, economic and empirical analysis suggests that adoption of
straightforward respondeat superior liability on the department would
have a felicitous systemic effect. Furthermore, primarily because it
would expose judges to innocent as well as guilty plaintiffs, such a
regime would be superior to the exclusionary rule as a way of ensuring
the courts pay fair heed to the Fourth Amendment.
[Vol. 1999
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While the literature abounds with thumbnail sketches of how var-
ious remedial alternatives would work,3 few authors have explored the
complexities of motivating police and police departments to comply
with the Fourth Amendment. Part II ends with a closer examination
of the proposed alternative to the rule. Because it contemplates direct
liability on both individual officers and their departments, the princi-
pal potential drawback of such a system is overdeterrence. At the
same time, such a system poses a threat of underdeterrence when the
pressure to obtain incriminating evidence makes the police or their
employers willing to pay the cost, literally, of their unconstitutional
acts. Both threats are manageable, however. The overdeterrent effect
of direct liability is a legitimate concern in most government contexts,
but there are reasons to believe that neither the police nor their em-
ployers will be overly self-protective in a liability regime; indeed, such
a regime should coax them to resort to more productive law enforce-
ment. The threat of underdeterrence can also easily be overstated,
but, in any event, responsive adjustments to its potential can be made.
With less certainty, the article also addresses the extent to which com-
peting regimes can shape judicial behavior, particularly that of magis-
trates, and concludes, once again, that monetary penalties are
preferable to exclusion.
Part III looks at the nonconsequentialist reasons that have been
put forward in favor of the rule. The Fifth Amendment theory, based
on an analogy between searches and compelled testimony, is largely
incoherent, but a liberal might be able to salvage from it a rule of
exclusion for private papers. The property theory, which relies on the
individual's ownership interest in the seized property, at best provides
the same protection. The status quo ante and judicial review theories
both seek to nullify not only the illegal search but its consequences;
they fail as bases for the exclusionary rule because they legitimately
succeed only in the former goal. Finally, an argument that the intro-
3. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger,
J., dissenting) (quasi-judicial tribunal that would award damages); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184(a)(3) (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. 1961) (contempt citations); Akhil Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 811-16 (1994) (damages regime
allowing suit against both officers and entities using juries); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the
Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY
L.J. 937, 969-80 (1983) (damages regime, providing more detail than most other proposals); Rob-
ert Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 245, 252-56 (1976) (internal disciplinary system); Robert P. Davidow, Criminal
Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982) (ombudsman sys-
tem using juries); Carl McGowan, Rule Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972)
(internal rulemaking); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1999) (administrative damages proceeding); Virgil W. Peter-
son, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 46, 62 (1957) (civil rights
office that investigates police violations of the Constitution); Malcolm R. Wilkey, The Exclusion-
ary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 231-32 (1978) ("mini-trial" con-
ducted after criminal trial with penalties imposed on individual officers plus a civil remedy for
nonprosecuted cases).
No. 21
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duction of illegally seized evidence shocks the conscience sufficiently
to violate due process can be sustained, at least from the liberal per-
spective, but only in a narrow category of cases involving egregious
actions.
Part IV concludes the article with an attempt to assess the rela-
tive costs of the current regulatory system and the system that would
exist if we were to follow through on the implications of parts II and
III. The costs of exclusion are greater in number and extent than
many perceive. The costs of the proposed system are likely to be sig-
nificant as well. But a true liberal never shies away from reform just
because it might involve a little money.
II. UTILITARIAN CONCERNS: THE RULE AND THE DAMAGES
ACTION AS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The traditional concept of "deterrence" does not adequately en-
compass the potential utilitarian benefits of the exclusionary rule.4
Although deterrence of individual police misconduct has been the pri-
mary focus of the Supreme Court's exclusion jurisprudence,5 the im-
pact of the rule on police institutions may also be a significant
consideration to the extent police bureaucracies can affect police be-
havior. Furthermore, the rule's efficiency as a procedural mechanism
might facilitate litigation of Fourth Amendment issues, thus promot-
ing the law's development. In other words, to evaluate fully the bene-
ficial impact of the rule, one has to assess its effect on the behavior of
the police, the behavior of police institutions, and the behavior of the
courts. Further, the ultimate utilitarian worth of the rule cannot be
fairly analyzed unless the impact of its alternatives is evaluated.
This part of the article carries out this comparison in each of the
three areas just noted. It concludes that a damages regime, albeit one
significantly different than today's, is far superior to the exclusionary
rule as a method of ensuring that individual officers, police depart-
ments, and the courts abide by the Fourth Amendment. This part then
explores the extent to which such a damages regime might be too ef-
fective at suppressing the police's investigative urges; it also discusses
the occasional scenarios in which it might underdeter police. It specu-
lates how a damages regime might solve these various problems and
concludes with a brief description of some competing models.
A. Impact on the Police: Specific and General Deterrence
No one is going to win the empirical debate over whether the
exclusionary rule deters the police from committing a significant
4. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 394.
5. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the rule as "a judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
[Vol. 1999
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number of illegal searches and seizures.6 Most of the studies of the
rule suggest that it forces police to pay more attention to the Fourth
Amendment than they would without any sanction for illegal
searches.7 At the same time, virtually all the studies also suggest that,
for many police officers, concern over the rule is not a significant in-
fluence when contemplating a search or seizure.8 In short, we do not
know how much the rule deters, either specifically (by deterring those
whose searches result in exclusion) or generally (by deterring other
officers).
We probably never will. General deterrence research is particu-
larly difficult to carry out. Ideally, the deterrence researcher would
compare the behavior of two populations, one of which operates
under the desired disincentive, one of which does not, with all other
variables held constant.9 Because, as a result of Mapp v. Ohio,1° the
exclusionary rule is now imposed nationwide, no such study is possible
6. A sampling of studies includes the following: NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982); GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:
IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS (1979) [hereinafter REPORT
BY THE COMPTROLLER]; Ronald L. Akers & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Exclusionary Rule: Legal
Doctrine and Social Research on Constitutional Norms, 2 SAM HOUSTON ST. U. CRIM. JUST.
CENTER RES. BULL. 1 (1986); Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1973-74) [herein-
after Canon, Failing Health]; Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Poli-
cies at the State and Federal Level: The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977)
[hereinafter Canon, Testing]; William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 311 (1991); Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp
v. Ohio in North Carolina: The Study and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1966); Stuart S.
Nagel, Law and Society: Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 283; Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor. An Exclu-
sionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992) [hereinafter Orfield,
Heater Factor]; Perrin et al., supra note 3; James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Craig D.
Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases": The Ef-
fects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034 (1991);
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) [hereinafter Orfield, An Empirical
Study]; Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 87 (1968) [hereinafter Effect of Mapp v. Ohio].
7. For instance, although hostile to the rule and believing it should be abolished, one
group of authors that conducted its own study of the rule's effects admitted "that Mapp has
probably made officers more aware of the Fourth Amendment, and has increased the number of
warrants they obtain." Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 710-11.
8. For example, one of the early proponents of the rule had to concede, after his second
empirical study of the issue, that "Mapp had seemingly little or no impact in the majority of
cases." Canon, Testing, supra note 6, at 75.
9. For instance, much of the deterrence research concerning the death penalty employs
this methodology, although there, too, third variables made the results of the research suspect.
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITA-
TIVE EFFECTS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 8-9 (Alfred Blumquistien et al. eds., 1978) (concluding that inter-
state comparisons still failed to control adequately for the variety of demographic, cultural, and
socioeconomic factors other than the death penalty that influence murder rates, and that this
No. 2]
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today (although an intercountry study is theoretically feasible)." In
principle, comparing practices in the same jurisdiction prior to and
after Mapp was decided in 1961 could have produced useful informa-
tion, but the pre/post research that was actually carried out suffered
from significant methodological flaws,' 2 and in any event was incon-
clusive. 3 Moreover, even proving a significant decrease in illegal ac-
tions after 1961 would mean little, given that no meaningful remedy
existed before Mapp.14 Observations of police in action,' 5 interviews,
fact, combined with the fact that homicides and executions are rare events, made all current
studies suspect).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. As a practical matter, however, differences between cultures (e.g., crime rates, gun con-
trol, police and court organization) would make quantitative comparisons of police behavior
virtually impossible. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 318-19 ("Cross-national compari-
son ... is not meaningful given the major differences between American and foreign police.").
12. As Davies points out, studies based on search warrants issued, arrest and conviction
statistics, recovered stolen property statistics, and seized contraband statistics, although theoreti-
cally useful in comparing pre-Mapp and post-Mapp search and seizure practices, could be af-
fected by a host of factors other than those practices. See Thomas Y. Davies, Critique: On the
Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 740, 756-64 (1974). Another problem with the
pre/post studies is that record keeping before Mapp was extremely poor. See United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1976) ("Record keeping before Mapp was spotty at best, a fact which
... severely hampers before-and-after studies.").
13. See, e.g., Canon, Testing, supra note 6, at 75 (reporting findings that, in the author's
words "do not come close to supporting a claim that the rule wholly or largely works"); Oaks,
supra note 6, at 709 ("The foregoing findings represent the largest fund of information yet as-
sembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule, but they obviously fall short of an empirical
substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule."); Spiotto, supra
note 6, at 248 (finding a marked increase in suppression motions in cases involving narcotics and
guns, but a decrease in the percentage of motions granted); Effect of Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 6,
at 103 ("Police practices in New York City narcotics enforcement ... have not changed substan-
tially as a result of Mapp ... [but] [t]he data show that convictions have been harder to obtain
since Mapp.").
14. See Katz, supra note 6, at 119, 132 (reporting that 90% or more of prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges surveyed in North Carolina in 1965 had never heard of a civil suit or criminal
suit being brought against officers for illegal search and seizure); Nagel, supra note 6, at 302
(reporting that of 113 judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police chiefs, and ACLU lawyers
surveyed nationwide as to the state of affairs during the five years between 1958 and 1963, 76%
said they knew of no civil actions against the police for illegal searches and seizures, and 92%
said they knew of no criminal actions against the police for such actions).
This point also undercuts the relevance of pre/post research using another methodology,
asking those affected by Mapp about its effects. In these studies, police chiefs, attorneys, and
judges typically reported greater adherence to the Fourth Amendment since Mapp, although
some reported no changes and some reported a decrease in adherence. See Nagel, supra note 6,
at 286-87. See generally Katz, supra note 6, at 149-50. Such reports are of limited usefulness to
the extent they merely represent the difference between a regime with no remedy and one with
the exclusionary rule. Virtually no one disputes that the rule has some effect on police behavior.
See supra note 7. The important issue is the extent of its effect, as compared with other
possibilities.
15. See generally JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973) (observations of a journalist/
sociologist from 1969 to 1971 of Philadelphia police in the academy, the police station, and on
the streets); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSa1CE WrrHour TRIAL (1975) (observations of a sociolo-
gist in 1962 and 1963 of police in "Westville," a midwestern city of approximately 400,000, and
two weeks of observation of police in "Eastville," a city of comparable size); Milton A. Loewen-
thal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 29 (1980)
(study of New York police between 1971 and 1974 involving 90 interviews of police commanders,
[Vol. 1999
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and questionnaires' 6 are probably the best source of data we have.
Even here, however, there are significant problems. Observational
studies to date have been anecdotal in nature, 7 interviews may be
tainted by underreporting of misbehavior, 8 and conclusions drawn
from hypothetical questions are plagued by the external validity prob-
lem familiar to all social scientists who try to draw generalizations
about actual behavior from laboratory studies.'9 Specific deterrence
research is, by comparison, somewhat easier, because we can look at
the number of repeat "offenses" for those who are caught, but even
here other influential variables are hard to factor out.20
Given the limitations of empirical inquiry, 21 we must rely on spec-
ulation. Most of the speculation has, to date, been unaided by any
theoretical underpinning; thus, one is left with two plausible points of
view without any way of evaluating their relative merits. Those who
favor the rule can reasonably assert that officers who know illegally
seized evidence will be excluded cannot help but try to avoid illegal
"countless conversations" with police officer students he trained, and observation of 40 tours of
duty).
16. See generally Akers & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 6 (interviewing officers from two
southeastern jurisdictions); Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6 (posing hypotheticals to police
officers from four departments in the northeast); Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 27-32 (posing
hypotheticals to officers in Southern California); Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6 (in-
terviewing narcotics officers from Chicago).
17. Neither Loewenthal, Rubinstein, nor Skolnick, whose studies are cited supra note 15,
attempted to quantify their observations. Rather their information consists of descriptions of
individual police behavior and generalizations drawn from them.
18. See, e.g., Akers & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 6, at 4 ("There is probably underreporting
reflected in these figures, and the actual level of illegal search behavior may be higher.").
19. Cf. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 345-55 (reporting a study in which researchers
described a situation to officers and then asked them whether they would conduct a search or
seizure). On the general issue of the extent to which hypothetical situations can produce general-
izable findings, see Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in
Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 39 (1979).
20. For instance, an officer who has evidence excluded may never "reoffend" for any
number of reasons other than exclusion, including fear of other sanctions or simply because he
never again is confronted with a difficult search scenario. Comparing knowledge of Fourth
Amendment law among those who have been subject to suppression and those who have not, as
Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 734, have done, is another methodology for measuring specific
deterrence. The same type of problems occur, however, because a failure of those who have had
evidence suppressed to know more Fourth Amendment law than those who have not (which is
what Perrin et al. found) could be due to a number of factors, including the precise questions
asked, the training available, and overall intelligence. Consider also that, "unless they are very
precisely worded and extensively pre-tested," such test questions have serious internal validity
problems (i.e., they may not measure what they purport to measure). See Nagel, supra note 6, at
305 & n.35.
21. After considering the methodological difficulties inherent in the research, Davies con-
cluded "[w]hen all factors are considered, there is virtually no likelihood that the Court is going
to receive any 'relevant statistics' which objectively measure the 'practical efficacy' of the exclu-
sionary rule." Davies, supra note 12, at 763-64; see also Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule,
Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647, 656 (1982) ("No
research design yet conceived is capable of distinguishing between the number of nonoccurring
illegal searches that can be attributed to police policies and the number of nonoccurrences cor-
rectly attributed solely to the effect of the exclusionary rule .... The actual research task is
factually hopeless.").
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searches because they will have nothing to gain from them; propo-
nents can also note that police are often bitter or confused when the
fruits of their searches are excluded and therefore must be deterred
from facing that prospect again. Just as reasonably, those who oppose
the rule can point out that its most direct consequence is imposed on
the prosecutor rather than the cop, that police know and count on the
fact that the rule is rarely applied (for both legal and not-so-legal rea-
sons), and that the rule cannot affect searches and seizures the police
believe will not result in prosecution.
There are more structured ways of thinking about the problem.
For instance, Richard Posner has used economic theory to argue
against the exclusionary rule.22 Unfortunately, his argument, as is true
of much economic argument,23 is based on highly suspect assumptions
about how humans behave.24 While police bureaucrats may make the
kinds of dollars-and-cents calculations that Posner hypothesizes, the
individual officer in the street is unlikely to do so.
If the goal is to analyze the effects of the rule on conduct by indi-
vidual police, we need theories that describe, rather than assume, how
people are motivated. Behavioral theory,25 which has proven success-
ful at constructing means of suppressing unwanted behavior,26 is one
such theory. Tom Tyler's work studying how the perceived legitimacy
of legal institutions affects compliance with the law also provides use-
ful food for thought in this regard.27 Application of either one of these
theories to the exclusionary rule suggests that it is not a particularly
effective way of motivating police to obey the Fourth Amendment.
22. See Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49
[hereinafter Posner, Rethinking]; Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Mis-
conduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638-641 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, Excessive
Sanctions].
23. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions: The Limits of
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986).
24. Posner argued that the exclusionary rule "overdeters" based on the assumption that the
cost of "cleaning up" after a search (which he sets hypothetically at $100) is one one-hundredth
of the cost of a lost conviction (which he sets at $10,000) and that therefore all that is needed for
"optimal" deterrence of the search is a $100 fine, not exclusion. See Posner, Excessive Sanctions,
supra note 22, at 638. The flaws in this set of assumptions about how police think are described
later in this article. See also Morris, supra note 21, at 659-63 (arguing that many of Posner's
assumptions are arbitrary).
25. The phrase "behavioral theory" or "behaviorism," as used in this article, refers to that
body of psychology that focuses on the study of observable behavior rather than on conscious-
ness. See generally GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 40 (7th
ed. 1997). It includes theory developed from studies of classical conditioning (the connection
between stimuli and behavior), as well as operant conditioning (the relationship between behav-
ior and its consequences). See id. at 39-42.
26. Much of the original success was with animals and children, although today behavioral
theory is widely used with adults as well. See id. at 40-45.
27. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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1. Behavioral Theory
Based on the theories of Edward Thorndike28 and B.F. Skinner,29
behaviorists have identified a number of responses to a particular act
that might condition future acts. With some significant simplification,
these responses can be reduced to four: (1) punishment presentation;
(2) reward presentation; (3) punishment withdrawal; (4) reward with-
drawal.3" To extinguish unwanted behavior and replace it with desired
behavior, the optimal approach employs all four responses.3' For in-
stance, if the goal is to get underachievers to improve their grades,
one cannot only punish for bad grades (e.g., by "grounding" the of-
fender) and reward for good grades (e.g., by conferring a new boom-
box), but also withdraw punishment after good grades (e.g., by
restoring freedom of movement) or withdraw rewards after bad
grades (e.g., by taking away the boombox).
At first glance, the exclusionary rule might seem to fare well as a
behavior-changing mechanism. It appears to punish the officer who
engages in illegal conduct (by preventing conviction or making it more
difficult), reward the officer who obeys the Constitution (by permit-
ting prosecution to go forward), and withdraw reward from the misbe-
having officer (by taking away illegally discovered evidence). In fact,
however, the exclusionary scheme does not feature reward withdrawal
at all, and is both a weak punishment and a weak reward.
As a technical matter, reward withdrawal only occurs with the
withdrawal of a previously conferred positive response to the desired
behavior. Because evidence that is excluded is fruit of a search, rather
than a benefit that preceded the search, it is not a "reward" in behav-
ioral parlance. An example of reward withdrawal in the search and
seizure context might be removal of a salary increase previously con-
ferred for constitutional behavior. Thus, a behaviorist would concep-
tualize exclusion of evidence as a punishment response, if anything.
The rule is a punishment, but only minimally so from the behav-
ioral perspective. To understand why, consider the principles set out
by Professor Jon Williams summarizing the optimal means of extin-
guishing behavior through punishment.32 He describes several "Con-
28. See, e.g., EDWARD L. THORNDIKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEARNING (1932).
29. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953).
30. See JOZEF COHEN, OPERANT BEHAVIOR AND OPERANT CONDITIONING 9 (1969). Co-
hen describes how these four basic responses can be subdivided into eight "training procedures."
See id. at 9-12. It should also be noted that the simple description in the text does not accurately
represent modem developments in behaviorism, which are usually classified as "cognitive beha-
viorism" and which focus less on effecting changes in behavior per se and more on changing a
person's thought processes through modeling, behavior rehearsal, aversive conditioning, and the
like. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 25, at 44-45.
31. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 9.
32. See generally JON L. WILLIAMS, OPERANT LEARNING: PROCEDURES FOR CHANGING
BEHAVIOR (1973).
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ditions for Maximum Effectiveness of Punishment," which are
paraphrased and reordered here to fit the search and seizure setting:
(1) "Unauthorized escape responses" should be avoided, mean-
ing that all of the undesired conduct should be detected.
(2) The frequency of the punishing stimulus should be as high as
possible; ideally it should be given after every incident of
misconduct.
(3) The punishing stimulus should be delivered "abruptly and im-
mediately" after the occurrence of the misconduct.
(4) The punishing stimulus should be "intense," i.e., clearly be a
punishment to the subject.
(5) Incidental rewards for performing the undesired conduct
should be kept to a minimum.33
A key defect of the exclusionary rule from the behavioral per-
spective is that it is not applied in the vast majority of illegal searches
and seizures, thus failing both conditions #1 and #2. In a large number
of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the police do not
make an arrest, either because they never intended to do so 34 or be-
33. See id. at 154-55. Williams's six points, in the order in which he gives them, are as
follows:
1) The punishing stimulus should be arranged in such a manner that no unauthorized es-
cape responses are possible ....
2) The punishing stimulus should be intense and should be delivered abruptly and immedi-
ately after the occurrence of the "incorrect" response.
3) The frequency of the punishing stimulus should be as high as possible; ideally it should
be given after every response.
4) The level of motivation for making the undesired behavior should be low ....
5) An alternative response should be available for the subject to perform ....
6) Care should be taken to ensure that a punishing stimulus is not inadvertently followed by
a positive reward ....
The summary in the text reverses conditions 2 and 3 and makes the first part of 2 condition 4. It
eliminates 5 (because there is almost always an acceptable alternative response in our context-
e.g., a constitutional search or no search) and combines 4 with 6.
34. See, e.g., Neil A. Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 467, 476-78 (1971) (describing searches and seizures conducted solely
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining authority, self-protection, information attain-
ment, and harassment). Similarly, data from New Orleans from the late 1960s indicated that less
than 1 out of every 100 people stopped by police were prosecuted, strongly suggesting that stops
and frisks in that jurisdiction were pursued for ends other than arrest or prosecution. See AL-
BERT J. REIss, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 92 (1971). Skolnick also remarks that police
often conduct searches they know to be illegal for purposes other than arrest. According to him,
the officer's reasoning is as follows:
By failing to make the putatively "unreasonable" search, the policeman would not only
have failed to gain a conviction but would also have missed collecting objects or substances
regarded as dangerous. In the policeman's view, only good can come out of a search legally
defined as "unreasonable," provided the search jibes with normative assumptions of the
police organization about reasonableness.
SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 220. Finally, Professor LaFave, a proponent of the rule, concluded
that "arrests for purposes other than prosecution are common." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST:
THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 437 (1965). One such purpose that is becom-
ing increasingly prevalent is seizure of items pursuant to forfeiture laws. See generally William
Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compli-
ance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309
(1992).
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cause they find nothing,35 so the exclusionary rule never has a chance
to come into play. Even when an arrest occurs, the search issue fre-
quently is not litigated because the police don't pursue the case,3 6 or
because the case is resolved through a plea or in some other fashion
that avoids or undermines a hearing on the Fourth Amendment is-
sue.37 The number of cases in the latter category is enormous; plea
bargains dispose of ninety to ninety-five percent of all criminal
actions.38
Even when the search issue is litigated, illegal searches may not
result in exclusion. Set aside the fact that today's swiss cheese exclu-
sionary rule is a mere shadow of what it could be.39 Even given its full
35. The error rate on searches is unknown, but it is certainly well over 10% and may be
over 50% for some types of searches. See infra note 174. Of course, the rule might deter illegal
searches in these situations if the police intended to arrest had they found something. But the
knowledge that nothing will happen to them if they do not find anything undercuts that deter-
rent effect, especialy when combined with the facts, discussed below, that they can decline to
push the case if they do find something and that" even if the case is prosecuted, exclusion is rare.
36. See Milner, supra note 34, at 476-78 (explaining that an officer may arrest: (1) "not so
much because he hopes that successful prosecution will result but because he believes that the
demeanor of the citizen may warrant this use of the police officer's power"; (2) to "obtain evi-
dence for a more important case"; or (3) because he does "not like the life style or political
views" of the people he arrests).
That many cases involving illegal searches and seizures never get to the prosecutor explains
why statements from prosecutors to the effect that the rule deters are suspect. See, e.g., Stephen
H. Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall
1982, at 28, 30 ("I have watched the rule deter, routinely, throughout my years as a prosecu-
tor."). Such statements are not intentionally misleading; they are just not based on the full
picture.
37. According to reports from students of mine who have been involved in externships in
Jacksonville, Florida, many Fourth Amendment issues never get raised because of the pressure
to resolve cases quickly through plea bargaining. Skolnick explains:
That incriminating evidence is found is a fact not lost on the defense attorney .... For him
... operating in a context of "reasonableness," as understood in the administrative sense,
the defendant comes to represent a less defensible client.... In the routine minor case...
evidence may influence the defense attorney to persuade his client to plead guilty. This
tendency is pronounced when, as so often happens, the reasonableness of the arrest is a
borderline judgment.
SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 223.
Even when suppression motions are made, plea bargaining is still likely to produce a convic-
tion and thus undermine deterrence of the police. One study of 31 plea negotiations in which
there was a pending motion to suppress found that in some cases prosecutors would only offer a
bargain if the motion were dropped (although in many others the bargaining proceeded indepen-
dently of the motion). See J.A. Gilboy, Guilty Plea Negotiations and the Exclusionary Rule of
Evidence: A Case Study of Chicago Narcotics Courts, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 93-95
(1976). Unfortunately, the study does not indicate how many of the 31 cases resulted in convic-
tion for some crime. Elsewhere in the report, however, the author indicates that the overall
conviction rate was 80%, see id. at 96 tbl.III, suggesting that the rule had negligible effect. The
author also noted that discovery was difficult at the plea-bargaining stage and thus that "it is
possible that the plea bargaining process-by compelling the litigation of evidentiary issues at a
stage where the means to deal with them are unavailable-may have a significant effect on the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 98.
38. See ABA PROJECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 1-2 (1998).
39. As it stands now, illegally seized evidence is not excluded when it is introduced in any
of the following manners: (1) in a proceeding other than the criminal trial; (2) against someone
whose rights were not violated; (3) for impeachment purposes; (4) when the search was con-
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 375 1999
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
potential breadth, exclusion's punch is reduced considerably by police
facility in lying about their actions,4" the hindsight biasing effect of
judicial knowledge that criminal evidence was found,4 ' and judicial
reticence in excluding dispositive evidence.42 In combination, these
various realities mean that, under the exclusionary rule regime, illegal
searches and seizures often remain undetected by the official punish-
ing entity (the suppression court), thus violating condition #1, 4 and
never come close to being routinely or consistently punished even
when detected, in violation of condition #2.
Even when exclusion results, it is not a particularly strong punish-
ment. First, in violation of condition #3, exclusion often occurs well
after the misconduct," is never communicated to the offending party,
ducted in good-faith reliance on a statute, warrant, or computer printout; or (5) the evidence
would inevitably have been discovered anyway or bears only an attenuated connection to the
illegality. See generally CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS §§ 2.03-.04 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998).
40. For a general description of the nature and extent of perjury in suppression hearings,
see Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 COLO. L. REV.
1037, 1041-48 (1996) ("Whether it is conjecture by individual observers, a survey of criminal
attorneys, or a more sophisticated study, the existing literature demonstrates a widespread belief
that testilying is a frequent occurrence."). As an example, in one pre-Mapp, post-Mapp study,
the number of "dropsy" cases (i.e., cases in which the officer testified that the defendant dropped
the contraband to the ground or had it in hand or in plain view) increased from 27.5% prior to
Mapp to 72.7% in 1964. See Effect of Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 6, at 95. The authors of the
study, supporters of the exclusionary rule, conclude that uniform police "have been fabricating
grounds of arrest in narcotics cases in order to circumvent the requirements of Mapp." Id.; see
also Perrin et al., supra note 6, at 735 (concluding, after surveying most of the exclusionary rule
studies, that "[tihe responses are consistent with the widely-held belief that the exclusionary rule
imposes a substantial cost on society in the form of police officer deception").
41. Many have speculated that hindsight bias influences judicial decisionmaking about
Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 221 ("The illegality of a search
is likely to be tempered-even in the eyes of the judiciary-by the discovery of incriminating
evidence on the suspect."); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77
VA. L. REV. 881, 912 (1991) ("It must be much harder for a judge to decide that an officer had
something less than probable cause to believe cocaine was in the trunk of a defendant's car when
the cocaine was in fact there."). There is some empirical support for this point of view. Using 50
search and seizure scenarios, one study compared a group that was told evidence was found in
each search to a group that did not know the action's outcome. The former group was much less
likely than the latter to find a given investigative technique "intrusive." See Christopher
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Soci-
ety," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 765-68 (1993).
42. See MALCOLM RICHARD WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 18-19 (1982) (discussing trial-court hostility to the exclu-
sionary rule); Orfield, Heater Factor, supra note 6, at 115, 121 (reporting that 9 of 12 judges, 9 of
14 prosecutors, and 14 of 14 public defenders expressed belief that judges sometimes did not
suppress evidence when they knew police searches were illegal, either because they felt suppres-
sion would be unjust, did not want the adverse publicity, or were facing reelection).
43. Thus, from a behavioral perspective, the fact that the exclusionary rule does not deter
police conduct aimed at goals other than conviction is not "beside the point," as Mertens and
Wasserstrom have argued. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 397. To the extent police
aren't punished for illegal searches and seizures, whatever the reason, behavior-changing effects
are diminished.
44. In cases that go to trial, suppression hearings usually take place well after arrest. See,
e.g., United States v. Campbell, No. 97-1446, 1998 WL 432958, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1998) (one
year); State v. Staton, 924 P.2d 127, 130 (Colo. 1996) ("some" months); State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d
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or both.45 More importantly, when all is said and done, even exclusion
communicated to the offending officer is not experienced as much of a
punishment, and thus violates condition #4. This is not just the oft-
repeated point that the pain of exclusion is visited most directly on the
prosecutor,46 but the recognition that the objective of police who con-
duct searches is, first and foremost, evidence to support an arrest, not
a conviction. Yes, police want convictions. But the sociological litera-
ture strongly suggests that the primary goal of officers in the field in
the average case is to get a "collar. ' 47 If they do, they've done their
971, 973-74 (Mont. 1998) (approximately five months); Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350
(Pa. 1998) (six months); State v. Chouinard, No. 03C01-9311-CR-00357, 1995 WL 50752, at *1,
*5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 1995) (three months); State v. O'Connor, No. 20083-0-II, 1997 WL
74618 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1997) (three months). In cases that are resolved through plea,
those suppression hearings that do occur take place early in the process. See supra note 37. But
suppression in the latter cases apparently is rarely communicated to officers. See infra note 45.
45. See, e.g., Francis A. Gilligan, The Federal Torts Claims Act-An Alternative to the Ex-
clusionary Rule?, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1975) ("Neither the judge nor the prose-
cutor adequately explains a court ruling on the exclusionary rule so that it might be understood
by the police officer."); Eugene Michael Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary
Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAG. L.J. 33, 42 (1979) ("Seldom will individual officers
learn of trial problems occasioned by their faulty searches and seizures."); Oaks, supra note 6, at
730 (referring to the comments of Wayne LaFave and Frank J. Remington that police whose
conduct leads to suppression are not "well informed about the trial judge's decision or its legal
basis"). For plea-bargained cases, the lines of communication may be much worse. One former
prosecutor asserts that even where a plea agreement reflects the "uncertainty [on the Fourth
Amendment issue] in a lower sentence, it is extremely rare for the police officer responsible for
the error to be informed of his or her responsibility for the reduced sentence." Barnett, supra
note 3, at 956 n.46.
Orfield concludes otherwise in his study in Chicago, although his data are somewhat more
equivocal than his conclusion. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1033, 1035 n.85
(reporting that 85% of officers surveyed stated that they "always" learned the outcome of a
suppression hearing in which they testified and, at the same time, reporting that a little over half
"usually" understand the basis for the ruling).
46. See Oaks, supra note 6, at 726.
47. Rubinstein's observations of police in Philadelphia led him to conclude that conviction
rates were unimportant to both the police and their immediate supervisors. See RuBINsrEIN,
supra note 15, at 45 ("Arrest activity is computed from what the patrolman 'puts on the books'
and not by the disposition of his cases in court. Since activity is a measure of his work, his
sergeant has no interest in what eventually happens to the cases."). Based on his observations of
New York City police (both on the beat and in training programs), Loewenthal reached a similar
conclusion: "[T]hese policemen, especially those who are assigned to narcotics and gambling
investigations, are evaluated almost exclusively on their arrest records, and pressures for arrests
dominate their working lives." Loewenthal, supra note 15, at 33. He continued:
Some individual police officers, particularly detectives, may be concerned about convictions,
especially where heinous crimes are involved. However, most police officers feel that they
have little control over convictions, since failure to convict may occur for myriad reasons
which are unrelated to the police officer's efforts. Moreover, in view of the fact that cases
are frequently delayed for long periods of time, police often feel remote in both time and
place from the final determination. At the same time, command pressures tend to focus on
numbers of arrests, since arrests are easy to calculate, do not require lengthy follow-up in
court and can be readily used to demonstrate police effectiveness to the public. Thus, ar-
rests, not convictions, constitute the primary indicia of success in police work.
Id. at 34 n.29.
Skolnick notes that "[f]or detectives, clearance rates are the most important measure of
accomplishment," SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 167, and that the "designation 'cleared' merely
means that the police believe they know who committed the offense .... It does not indicate...
how the crime was cleared." Id. at 169. As a telling example of the latter point, Skolnick cites an
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job.48 It is the prosecutor's job to convict.4 9 Furthermore, if the prose-
cutor manages to convict in any event (which occurs a good propor-
tion of the time),50 even this tenuous aversive impact may disappear.
The usual response to these points is that the prosecutor whose
case is lost or damaged by exclusion will in all likelihood lean on the
offending officer's superiors, who in turn will punish the offending of-
ficer.5 ' That brings us to condition #5, that incidental rewards for the
undesired behavior should be kept to a minimum. While domino sanc-
tioning of the type just described does take place, 52 most of the litera-
ture suggests that any punitive effect of the rule is usually more than
offset by the approbation received by officers who meet their arrest
quotas, clear the streets of criminals, and in other ways demonstrate
efficiency at crime control. As Jerome Skolnick has observed, "Superi-
ors within the police organization will ...be in sympathy with an
officer, provided the search was administratively reasonable, even if
the officer did not have legal 'reasonable' cause to make an arrest.
53
When the illegality is not egregious, police chiefs are as likely to pro-
tect their own as to sanction them.54 If superiors react in this way,
article in which O.W. Wlson's work as head of the Chicago police force was lauded by the public
for the "improvement in police efficiency measured by the percentage of offenses cleared by
arrest." Id. at 167 n.8 (emphasis added). Skolnick does state that clearance rates can also be
defined by convictions, but implies that this is rare. See id. at 167-69.
48. It is true that some number of searches follow arrest and searches incident thereto,
presumably with an eye toward obtaining evidence to convict. Additionally, some police agen-
cies, especially at the federal level where the connection with the prosecutor (the Department of
Justice) is strong, may well be much more oriented toward securing convictions. In these situa-
tions, the rule will presumably have its strongest effect, particularly in terms of providing an
incentive to obtain a warrant. Overall, however, these situations represent a very small propor-
tion of all searches and seizures. Cf. RicHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES 17 (1985) ("[T]he overwhelming ma-
jority of criminal investigations are conducted without recourse to a search warrant.").
49. To be more specific about the assertion, the police goal at the time of arrest will usually
be the arrest. At some later point in time (e.g., the suppression hearing), the goal may become
securing a conviction. Like most of us, police set relatively short-range goals.
50. See REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 6, at 13 (reporting that in federal cases,
a successful suppression motion only reduces probability of conviction from 84% to 54%); VAN
DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, at 42 (reporting that convictions were obtained in at least 12 of
17 cases-70%-in which a motion to suppress was granted).
51. See Yale Kamisar, How We Got the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and Why We
Need It, 1 CRIM. JUsT. EmIcs, Summer-Fall 1982, at 4, 11 ("[T]here is reason to think that
'prosecutorial screening' may be the most effective way of enforcing the Mapp rule.").
52. Sometimes it does not even require involvement of the prosecutor. Orfield reports that
in the narcotics division he studied, officers with two or more suppressions were demoted or
transferred by the department. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1046-47.
53. SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 223.
54. See id. at 224 (reasoning that superiors will be sympathetic to patrolmen so long as they
act "in conformity with administrative norms of police organization."); Gerald M. Caplan, The
Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 303, 306 n.13 (1967) (describing
memorandum from Superintendent O.W. Wilson of Chicago that stated: "I will always support
the police officer who, in the performance of his assigned tasks, exercises what he believes to be
his legal authority in a reasonable manner"); Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 350 (describ-
ing one police executive who stated "he was reluctant to invoke internal discipline against delib-
erate violators who do not act in a clearly arbitrary fashion and do not cause substantial harm").
There are even reports of police supervisors teaching their officers how to lie in order to ensure
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peers are likely to be even more sympathetic, if not laudatory, toward
a collar well done.55 In behavioral language, the reward of an arrest
will often undermine the punitive aspect exclusion brings.
Perhaps if exclusion is not particularly strong punishment, admis-
sion of constitutionally seized evidence at least offers a positive rein-
forcement that will change behavior in many cases. Unfortunately,
just as exclusion is not much of a punishment, admission of evidence is
not much of a reward. If the Fourth Amendment issue is not con-
tested, the exclusionary regime does not even associate the "reward"
(e.g., admission of the evidence and conviction) with the good con-
duct, a fundamental requirement of behavioral theory. In this situa-
tion, to the extent a conviction is viewed as a positive reinforcement it
will probably be seen as a reward for solving a case, not for solving a
case in a constitutional manner. If the issue is contested and the state
prevails, the proper association between constitutional conduct and
reward is made, but the reward is a strange one: in order to claim it,
one must go through an adversarial hearing, an experience which is
often not very pleasant. 56 Furthermore, given the officer's arrest ori-
entation, the reinforcement of a conviction is as attenuated as the
punishment visited by exclusion. Although behavioral theory suggests
that rewards, in contrast to punishments, need not be meted out after
every deserving incident57 (thus minimizing the lack of association
problem noted above), it does suggest, as with punishments, that when
rewards are given they be unalloyed and direct.58
evidence is not suppressed. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
(July 7, 1994), reprinted in 4 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMIS-
SIONS 1894-1994, at 40-41 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1994).
55. Cf. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, COMMUNITY POLICING: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD 49, 50 (Nat'l Inst. Justice 1988) (describing "solidarity or
brotherhood" as a central feature of police culture). It is well documented that police are even
willing to cover-up or lie for one another. See, e.g., ANTHONY V. BoUzA, THE POLICE MYS-
TIQUE: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT CoPs, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 72 (1990)
(describing, from the perspective of a police commander, the natural tendency to follow a "code
of silence" and commenting that "[t]he similarities of the value systems of the police culture and
the underworld can be striking").
56. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1042-43 (noting that police reported
distaste at being berated by defense lawyers and judges and "indicated that suppression hearings
themselves were a form of punishment").
57. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 42 ("People will continue to engage in goal-directed
behavior, sometimes for years, because they have been told or know that they will eventually
receive reward."). Indeed, to be effective, rewards probably should not be granted after each
desired event. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 55 ("Operant conditioned responses which were
acquired by partial reinforcement have far greater resistance to extinction than operant condi-
tioned responses which were acquired by continuous reinforcement.").
58. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 34-37 (discussing how variations in quality and quan-
tity of reward correlates with performance). In any event, when the goal is suppression of behav-
ior, punishment tends to be preferred to reward. See id. at 169 ("The punishment procedure,
primarily because of its known effectiveness, is the method most frequently used to suppress
behavior."). Note, however, that punishment has significant drawbacks as a behavior modifier,
see id. at 169-70 (discussing problems with excessive punishment), and that positive reinforce-
ment is often at least as effective, see id. at 174 ("Positive reinforcement is by far the most
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In deterrence terms, the foregoing discussion has only directly ad-
dressed the rule's specific deterrence of the offending officer. It has
not addressed what behaviorists call the possibility of "vicarious ex-
tinction,"59 or what criminal law theorists would call general deter-
rence of those who have not yet offended. From a behavioral
perspective, there is even less reason to believe the rule is effective as
a general deterrent. Vicarious punishment or general deterrence only
works when there is the perception of real punishment.6 ° As already
noted, for many officers the threat of exclusion is very low on the
horizon, at least up through the time of the arrest. When police do
think about the rule, observational evidence suggests its impact is mit-
igated by police awareness of the biasing effects of judicial hindsight,6 '
the success of perjury,62 and the inapplicability of the rule to a large
number of situations.63
Perhaps imagining the police officer's incentive structure in a dif-
ferent setting will help make the point. Suppose you are an associate
in a large law firm. You receive a salary rather than a case-by-case fee.
You principally serve one client, for whom you bring several suits a
year against various debtors. It often happens in such suits that the
debtors can be enticed to settle quickly through information-gathering
practices that verge on the unethical. You know several fellow associ-
ates who routinely engage in such practices. Some have been forced to
testify in court about their conduct and, in a few cases, the court has
found a particular action to be unethical. But in those cases the court
commonly employed procedure in behavior modification."). The implications of these points in
the police context are briefly discussed infra note 109.
59. See ALBERT BANDuRA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 175-92 (1969).
60. See id. at 203 ("The occurrence of ... disinhibitory effects is mainly determined by
actual or inferred response consequences to the [modelled event].").
61. See SKOLNICi, supra note 15, at 221:
[w]hen a suspect turns out to possess narcotics, the perception of surrounding facts and
circumstances about the reasonableness of the arrest can shift in only one direction-against
the defendant and in favor of the propriety of the search-even if the facts might have
appeared differently had no incriminating evidence been discovered.
62. Several commentators have pointed out that police have little to fear if they lie at a
suppression hearing. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to Per-
jury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A17 (relating that he has "seen trial judges pretend to believe
officers whose testimony is contradicted by common sense, documentary evidence and even un-
ambiguous tape recordings," and that "[s]ome judges refuse to close their eyes to perjury, but
they are the rare exception to the rule of blindness, deafness and muteness that guides the vast
majority of judges and prosecutors"); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8,
1967, at 596 ("[Tlhe policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prose-
cutor, as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven."); cf. Orfield, An
Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1049 (reporting that 86% of officers stated that it was "unusual
but not rare" for a judge to disbelieve an officer).
63. See Hefferuan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 351 (concluding, based on empirical evidence
assessing officers' attitudes, that "exclusion poses so weak a threat to officers that one must
conclude that the more interesting [fact is the] consistent unwillingness of some officers ... to
depart from the Constitution's requirements"); cf. Stephen Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE
L.J. 1405, 1414 (1986) (detailing the myriad ways the "deterrent threat" of the rule is minimized
by the courts' limitations on the rule).
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did nothing to the associate; it simply declared that the information
obtained through the unethical practice could not be used on behalf of
the client. In a couple of those cases, the client went on to win in any
event.
Your superiors have never explicitly condoned -such practices, but
you notice that, outside of one case where the associate actually physi-
cally harmed a debtor, they have never sanctioned anyone. In fact, the
most well-respected associates in the firm are those who dispose of
cases quickly; their methods of doing so are not of much interest to
the brass. The few associates who make a point of avoiding unethical
actions are viewed as chumps by others in the firm. After all, there is
virtually no doubt that the debtors have failed to pay what they owe;
why should they get any solicitude? You also know that many of the
debtors will have no way of knowing whether any particular informa-
tion-gathering technique is unethical, that the associate who works
with you will protect your backside, and that lawyers who represent
debtors often avoid bringing ethics claims because the facts or law are
unclear and they have so many cases to handle that they would just as
soon use the claim as a bargaining chip to reduce their clients' pay-
ment. You are now confronted with a case in which you could follow a
route that is ethically questionable but expeditious, and you have
other cases backing up. What would you do?'
Again, the argument is not that exclusion has no effect on police
behavior. It clearly does affect some police some of the time, probably
most commonly in "big" cases.65 If the exclusionary rule were abol-
ished and nothing were substituted in its place, police misconduct
would undoubtedly burgeon because no system of punishment and re-
ward would counteract the tendency to cut investigative corners.
Rather, the point is that, as a theoretical matter, exclusion is not a
strong behavior-shaping mechanism in the typical search and seizure
setting.
2. Legitimacy-Compliance Theory
One criticism of behavioral theory is that, because it was devel-
oped through studies of animals, it is only fit to be applied to them. As
thinking beings, the argument goes, humans do not necessarily need
immediate, consistent punishment to be dissuaded from pursuing bad
64. Note that the "exclusionary rule" in this hypothetical is likely to provide more deter-
rence than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because in the latter situation police de-
partments are not as directly harmed as the superiors in the example (who may lose some
business if enough cases are lost due to ethics claims), nor is the prosecutor usually as closely
connected to the officer as the client is with the hypothesized lawyer.
65. This is the conclusion of both Skolnick and Orfield. See SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at
225 ("[T]he rule seems to control police almost in direct relation to the gravity of the crime of
the suspect."); Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1043 ("It is less clear that the rule
deters misconduct in 'small pinch' cases in which . the vast majority of suppressions occur
. .
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conduct. In the search and seizure context, this stance might lead one
to conclude that the threat of exclusion is a more powerful behavior-
shaping mechanism than indicated by the previous discussion of be-
havioral theory's implications.
A second, more cognitively based theoretical approach to the
problem of motivating law-abiding behavior suggests otherwise. The
legitimacy-compliance theory developed by Tom Tyler grew out of re-
search on why people obey the law.66 He asserts that deterrence is not
the only, and may not be the primary, reason people follow legal man-
dates. Rather, people comply with the law for a complex set of rea-
sons that include cost-benefit analysis (i.e., deterrence), the norms of
peers, one's own norms, and the perceived legitimacy of the authori-
ties.67 For Tyler, the last reason is the most important for policymak-
ers. Because achieving deterrence is often problematic, and because
individual and group norms are hard to change, compliance with the
law is often best achieved by assuring respect for it and those who
implement it.68
Not surprisingly, the best way to reach the latter goal is for legal
authorities to appear "fair" to those with whom they interact. Tyler's
research suggests that perceptions of fairness hinge on what he calls
"procedural justice," which loosely involves whether disputants feel
they have been given a voice in the process and are treated with dig-
nity,69 but is also closely related to whether people perceive outcomes
as fair over time.7 ° Voluntary compliance with the law, even law that
goes against personal or group norms, is likely if the process of impos-
ing the law is seen as legitimate in these ways.71
66. See generally TYLER, supra note 27,
67. See id. at 56.
68. See id. at 67-68. According to Tyler:
In trying to understand why people follow the law.., we should not assume that behavior
responds primarily to reward and punishment (as do traditional theories of deterrence).
Instead, we should recognize that behavior is affected by the legitimacy of legal authorities
and the morality of the law. Similarly, the literature on implementing policy should not
focus simply on manipulating penalties and incentives: it should also be concerned with
creating a normative climate that promotes the acceptance of law and public policies.
Id. at 168-69.
69. See generally id. at 115-57.
70. Tyler's work suggests that if procedures are viewed as fair, unfavorable outcomes do
not necessarily affect compliance with the law. See id. at 107. However, he also notes that proce-
dural fairness only insulates the authorities from perceptions of illegitimacy up to a point. See id.
at 165 ("Fair outcomes are one thing that people expect from a fair procedure, and a procedure
that consistently produces unfair outcomes will eventually be viewed as unfair itself."). See gen-
erally DANIEL KATZ ET AL., BUREAUCRATIC ENCOUNTERS (1975); H. ANDREW MICHENER &
EDWARD J. LAWLER, Endorsement of Formal Leaders: An Integrative Model, 31 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 216 (1975) (finding that both absolute outcomes and judgments of fairness
influence trust in government and its leaders).
71. See TYLER, supra note 27, at 63 ("Respondents are almost equally likely to comply with
the law because they view it as legitimate, whether they think the likelihood of their being
caught is high or low, whether or not they think their peers would disapprove of law breaking,
and whether or not they think law breaking is morally wrong.").
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Under Tyler's framework, therefore, the extent to which the ex-
clusionary rule can bring about compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment depends significantly upon its ability to promote a positive view
of the judiciary's legitimacy in its endeavors to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. Unfortunately, the rule appears to have the opposite ef-
fect. Myron Orfield's study describing the reaction of twenty-five of-
ficers to suppression of their evidence, although presented in support
of retaining the rule, is instructive in this regard.72 Three of the of-
ficers talked about exclusion as a "learning experience" or in moral
terms. But most simply stated they were "upset," "frustrated," "disap-
pointed," or "pissed off" at the exclusion, or were simply fatalistic
about the outcome (e.g., "It is part of the job"). Very few sounded
contrite or apologetic.73 All also appeared to advocate some type of
good-faith exception,74 a refrain found in the only other survey that
obtained information about this issue.75
These types of comments suggest that police perceive the present
exclusionary regime to be illegitimate.76 Exclusion of probative evi-
dence that allows clearly guilty people to go free undoubtedly causes
some resentment among the police. Disregarding the degree of officer
culpability is likely to exacerbate that sense of unfairness considerably
because then the rule exacts its penalty not only when the officer turns
out to be right about the suspect, but even when there was no reason
to believe that the collar was bad. Contrary to the assertion of some
writers that bitterness about these effects of the rule will have a deter-
72. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1066-67.
73. See id. Moreover, while most stated they would never make the same mistake again,
apparently many of them had experienced several exclusions, suggesting that the rule did not,
for whatever reason, change their overall Fourth Amendment behavior. See, e.g., id. at 1034
(noting that officers found out "90 percent of the time when [their] evidence had been
suppressed").
74. See id. at 1051 ("When asked whether the exclusionary rule should be kept as is,
scrapped, modified to include an across-the-board 'good faith' exception, or modified in some
other way, all of the officers responded that the rule should be preserved with a good faith
exception.").
75. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 732 & n.453 (noting that, although not specifically
given the option to do so, many officers hedged their support for the exclusionary rule by indi-
cating that a good-faith exception should apply).
76. See J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIorrs 83-89 (1979) (empirical study
indicating that many police, prosecutors, and even defense counsel-but especially the first-
view exclusion as excessive compensation); SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 228 ("[Police] do not...
feel morally blameworthy at having [evidence excluded]; nor do they even accept such injunc-
tions with good grace and go about their business. On the contrary, the police typically view the
court with hostility for having interfered with their capacities to practice their craft."). In possi-
ble contrast, Loewenthal's interviews and observations of officers, conducted more recently than
Skolnick's and at about the same time as Hirschel's, lead him to conclude that police "apparently
could not respect courts or a legal system where evidence was accepted no matter how it was
obtained." Loewenthal, supra note 15, at 30. At the same time, however, he says that "most
police are disturbed by cases where defendants benefit from apparent 'technicalities,"' id., and
that construing the warrant and probable cause requirements more flexibly "would be likely to
evoke considerably more understanding and respect from police officers," id. at 39.
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rent effect,77 Tyler's work suggests the opposite: that under these cir-
cumstances police compliance with Fourth Amendment strictures will
suffer proportionately. To the extent perceptions of judicial legitimacy
diminish, the police's personal and group norms-which usually are
hostile to the Fourth Amendment-will come to the fore as influences
on police behavior and, given the rule's otherwise weak deterrent im-
pact, may often be dispositive.78
3. The Implications of Theory for Alternatives to Exclusion
The liberal's typical response to the kind of argument just made is
the teenager's refrain: So what's your point? The exclusionary rule
may not work all that well, but when the goal is corralling the natural
urge of the police to solve crime as efficiently as possible, what works
better? The usual proposed alternatives to the exclusionary rule are
some type of damages action and internally imposed sanctions. Many
writers have argued that there are significant flaws in both types of
remedies.79 They are right. Police-imposed sanctions, while in theory
perhaps the best way of ensuring compliance,80 in practice have foun-
dered for reasons already suggested: police superiors have a hard time
punishing hard-working cops for mistakes made at the margin, at least
when there is no external pressure to do so. 81 Damages actions, at
least as presently constituted, also are not much of a deterrent, given
their paucity and low likelihood of success. The major contention of
this part of the article, however, is that, with significant modifications
borrowed from an administrative law model, a damages remedy is far
77. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1042-46; Mertens & Wasserstrom,
supra note 2, at 395.
78. Perhaps Skolnick's observation sums up this point best:
[The police] culture sees the [exclusionary] rule as something to be observed rather than
obeyed; it is an unpleasant fact of life, but not a morally persuasive condition. The police-
man, as a tactical matter, recognizes an obligation to appear to be obeying the letter of the
law, while often disregarding its spirit.
SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 228.
79. The classic description of the inefficacy of tort remedies is Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies
for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN,. L. REv. 493 (1955). Many have repeated his
points and added to them. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 429-30; Macin, supra note 2, at 65;
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 283-86 (1988); William A.
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEo. L.J. 1361, 1386-96 (1981); Yeager, supra note 2, at 139-52. Critics of police sanctions in-
clude Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of Police Misconduct,
59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 5 (1981), and Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S. C.
§ 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 787-94 (1993) (detailing
failures to discipline police despite clear evidence of misconduct).
80. Professor Amsterdam has made the best argument in this regard. See Amsterdam,
supra note 2, at 423-49.
81. It has even been suggested that police supervisors prefer an external sanction system as
a way of maintaining authority over their officers. See SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 226 ("[T]he
principal effect [of giving greater authority over searches and seizures to supervisors] might be
reduction of cohesion and morale in the police organization itself.").
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superior to the exclusionary rule from both the behavioral and legiti-
macy-compliance perspectives.
Beginning with the behavioral perspective, consider the potential
advantages of a damages remedy as compared to the exclusionary
rule. Because a damages suit can be brought even when no prosecu-
tion occurs or when the prosecution ends in a plea bargain, it permits
a more consistent response to illegal actions than does the exclusion-
ary rule. Because damages can be imposed directly on the offending
officer or on his or her employer, the punishment is always communi-
cated to the culprit, and the punishment is significantly more powerful
than exclusion. In theory, then, a damages remedy implements behav-
ioral principles much more efficaciously than does the exclusionary
rule.
Unfortunately, the potential advantages of civil suits are seldom
realized. Such suits are few and far between,82 and therefore relatively
punchless as punishing mechanisms, for a number of reasons: poten-
tial plaintiffs' ignorance of their rights and fear of police reprisals; the
expense of civil litigation; the obstacles created by incarceration; and
the inchoate nature of the injury (which deters lawyers as well as po-
tential plaintiffs from bringing suit).83 Those suits that are brought are
seldom completely successful,84 again for a number of reasons: the
good-faith defenses available to officer-defendants;85 the unsympa-
thetic nature of many plaintiffs (who are often criminals, or at least
associated with criminality);86 the biases of juries;87 and, as with exclu-
82. A suit for a violation of the Fourth Amendment may be brought directly under the
Constitution for federal officers, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
and against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). According to a survey of civil actions in
1976, there were approximately 10,200 suits against police officers, or 19.6 per 1,000 officers,
5.4% (about 600) of which involved illegal searches or invasions of privacy (affecting 1 in every
1,000 officers). See Wayne W. Schmidt, Section 1983 and the Changing Face of Police Manage-
ment, in WILLIAM A. GELLER, POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 226, 228 (1985). In 1986, the
Justice Department found "fewer than three dozen reported fourth amendment cases [under
§ 1983] over the past 20 years." OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, reprinted in 22
MICH. J.L. REF. 573, 630 (1989). In the first 10 years of litigation under Bivens, reportedly only
13 plaintiffs out of 13,000 secured judgments. Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on S. 1775
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Agency Admin., 97th Cong. 137, 142 (1982)
(statement of Donald Devine, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management).
83. See Meltzer, supra note 79, at 284, for a summary of these problems.
84. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and An Empirical Study,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 550-51 (1982) (success rate of 21%); Note, Suing the Police in Federal
Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 790 tbl.1 (1979) (defendants successful in 20 of 28 suits).
85. See generally Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (good-faith exception under
§ 1983); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (good-faith exception under Bivens).
86. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., The Tort Remedy in Search and Seizure Cases: A Case
Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 279, 282-303 (1988) (controlling for
other variables, juror knowledge of plaintiff's guilt or innocence had a significant effect on puni-
tive damage award and on whether any compensation was awarded at all).
87. See Note, supra note 84, at 791-802, 814 (describing, based on a survey of 149 § 1983
cases, biases against plaintiffs based on their race, financial resources, sexual orientation, past
record, and lifestyle, as well as biases in favor of police; the authors concluded that "jurors
disfavored plaintiffs who were nonwhite or nonmiddle class, or who had previous brushes with
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sion, the efficacy of police perjury. 88 Even if the officer loses, he or
she is often indemnified, judgment proof, or both, minimizing the im-
pact of the verdict on the officer.
89
Virtually all of these problems are correctable, however. Behav-
ioral theory would suggest that a workable damages remedy should
have, at a minimum, three attributes: (1) a process that facilitates
bringing all legitimate claims; (2) an adjudicative procedure that en-
sures legitimate claims will prevail; and (3) a remedy sufficiently non-
trivial to constitute a meaningful punishment. An outline of a
damages regime that possesses all three attributes will be sketched out
here for the purpose of comparing it to the exclusionary rule; further
elaboration of the proposal and variations on it will come later. Be-
cause the proposal has some elements of tort law I will continue to
refer to it as a "damages" system, although in many respects it more
closely resembles an administrative fine process.
How can we make sure that most viable search and seizure claims
are litigated? As we have seen, the exclusionary rule is inadequate
because it is only triggered by prosecution and even then does not
ensure the Fourth Amendment issue gets to court. But it at least pro-
vides a strong incentive for criminal defendants to raise the issue in
those cases not resolved through an early plea, as well as a lawyer to
help when, as is often the case, the claimant is indigent. In contrast,
mounting a civil action seeking damages based on vague claims of pri-
vacy or autonomy violations can be a task that seems daunting, futile,
or both, to both victims and their potential (contingent fee?) lawyers.
If, on the other hand, the action were brought by a state-paid
lawyer in a bench trial that could impose liquidated damages for in-
choate constitutional violations (as well as compensatory damages for
physical or property injury), these obstacles are largely overcome. The
lawyer could be part of an administrative agency, as proposed by Pro-
fessor Perrin and his colleagues,90 or come from a "fourth-branch"
ombudsman's office that has larger oversight functions, as proposed
by Professor Robert Davidow.91 Such an entity would both solicit and
the law" and "favored police officers because they were viewed as respectable people perform-
ing a difficult and necessary job"); see also Steiker, supra note 2, at 850 ("Juries will often fear
the robbers more than the cops because the robbers tend to be mostly poor and/or members of
minority groups and because the cops tend to focus their attentions on just such disfavored
groups.").
88. See generally Patton, supra note 79, at 763-64 (describing the difficulties of bringing suit
under § 1983, including overcoming code of silence).
89. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litiga-
tion, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (in no cases studied in one federal jurisdiction did the
individual officer bear the cost of an adverse verdict); Note, supra note 84, at 811 (indemnifica-
tion in 147 of 149 cases).
90. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 743-54.
91. See generally Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for
the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 317 (1973) (proposing an ombudsman
to enforce constitutional restrictions on the actions of both state and federal law enforcement
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evaluate Fourth Amendment claims; more importantly, it would pur-
sue nonfrivolous claims regardless of the claimant's financial straits or
criminal status.92 The efficiency of a bench trial would curtail litigation
and time costs, further facilitating suits.93 And the availability of liqui-
dated damages should provide incentive to sue in at least some cases
in which "only" constitutional injury occurs (although even in those
cases where the victim is uninterested in a suit, the state-supported
agency could initiate one, thus ensuring that a large number of legiti-
mate claims will be brought).94
To ensure the consistent punishment demanded by behavioral
theory, however, the action must not only be brought but must also be
successful in legitimate cases. As noted above, there are three princi-
pal obstacles to achieving this goal in the typical civil action against an
individual officer-police perjury, unsavory plaintiffs, and the good-
faith defense. The impact of the first two can be minimized, while the
third probably will not undercut the punishment effect.
Many have plausibly asserted that a damages regime, where the
officer's own finances are on the line, is at least as likely to encourage
perjury as the exclusionary rule.95 But note that the only person who
benefits from "testilying" in a damages action is the offending officer.
When exclusion of evidence is the likely outcome, on the other hand,
judges, prosecutors, and fellow police all have some independent
"stake" in the result, and subtle or not-so-subtle collusion with a
agencies). For similar proposals, see Barnett, supra note 3, at 969-80; Peterson, supra note 3, at
62.
92. It would also avoid another practice that undermines the efficacy of civil damages ac-
tions today: dismissal of charges in return for an agreement not to sue. Cf Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 390, 397-98 (1987) (sanctioning such agreements so long as the defendant
is not coerced); Dripps, supra note 2, at 628-29. The agency would have no authority to dismiss
charges and presumably could not be importuned by the prosecutor to do so.
93. Whether punishment would be as immediate as that imposed by a suppression hearing
will depend upon two factors. First, an argument might be made that, when the complainant is
also charged with a crime, the civil proceeding must await the outcome of the criminal trial to
avoid violation of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Barnett, supra note 3, at 976. A rule similar to that
governing suppression hearings, to the effect that statements made during the suit are not admis-
sible at trial, should take care of this problem. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 392-
94 (1968). The second factor is whether discovery and other preliminary matters will take longer
than is usual with a suppression hearing. As noted earlier, suppression hearings in cases that go
to trial often occur months after arrest, see supra note 44, while those suppression hearings that
take place during plea negotiations often occur too early to permit good discovery. See supra
note 37. In the latter cases, the "punishment" exacted by a civil suit might not be as immediate,
but will be more likely to occur.
94. The thousands of mostly unheeded complaints that are currently made to police depart-
ments would now go to the agency. Cf Littlejohn, supra note 79, at 43 (noting that only 15% of
over 1,750 complaints per year about arrest, entries, searches, harassment, and property damage
brought any disposition from the police department).
95. See, e.g., Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1055; Kevin R. Reitz, Testilying
as a Problem of Crime Control: A Reply to Professor Slobogin, 67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1061,1071
(1996); William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1383 & n.175 (1981).
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cover-up is thus more likely to occur.9 6 Most importantly, the judge
presiding in the civil action, in contrast to the suppression hearing
judge, will not be worried that crediting the plaintiff's story will result
in a guilty person going free; indeed, complainants may not even be
charged with a crime, which will enhance their overall credibility vis-d-
vis the police. Under such circumstances, police perjury will be less
successful and thus less likely to occur. It may also be curbed because
prosecutors no longer dependent upon perjury to make their cases
may feel less constrained in prosecuting it.
That the proposed decisionmaker is a judge, rather than a jury,
should also mitigate the second drawback of the typical civil action-
the difficulty juries have in providing damages to people accused of
crime.97 Although, as just noted, judges are not immune from biasing
effects, their legal training is likely to make them better than laype-
ople at ignoring the plaintiff's status. Furthermore, judges are repeat
players under the proposed system, and thus will be delivering ver-
dicts both in cases involving criminals and those uncharged with
crime. Not only will judges know their probity will be questioned if
the guilty receive less justice than the innocent; they may view the
former group more favorably once they see concrete evidence of
Fourth Amendment violations harming the innocent. 98 The additional
fact that, under the proposed procedure, plaintiffs will be represented
by a state-paid attorney rather than a contingent-fee lawyer will prob-
ably further undercut bias against those plaintiffs who have tangled
with the law.99
Even with these modifications, many officers who have violated
the Constitution will avoid liability if the good-faith defense recog-
nized in the typical civil action is maintained. This escape from liabil-
ity is not fatal to the relative efficacy of the damages action, however.
First, of course, elimination of the good-faith defense would not deter
illegal actions officers believe to be legitimate any more than the ex-
clusionary rule does. Furthermore, if behavioral change is the goal,
elimination of the good-faith defense would be a bad idea for two
reasons, both of which stem from the intuition that officers should not
be "punished" for inadvertent violations of the Constitution. First,
behaviorists recognize that to be effective, punishment must be modu-
96. See Slobogin, supra note 40, at 1045-48; see also Orfield, Heater Factor, supra note 6, at
109-11 (reporting that 52% of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys surveyed believed that
at least "half of the time" the prosecutor "knows or has reason to know" that police fabricate
evidence during suppression hearings, and 93%, including 89% of the prosecutors, stated that
prosecutors had such knowledge of perjury "at least some of the time"; about half thought pros-
ecutors "tolerate" such lying and 15% thought prosecutors "encourage" it).
97. See supra note 87. As to whether this approach violates the Seventh Amendment, see
infra note 244.
98. For elaboration on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 174-79.
99. See Casper et al., supra note 86, at 293-95 (finding that replacing the private attorney
with a government lawyer had a small effect on damage awards).
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lated; it should not create feelings of low self-worth, resentment to-
ward the punisher, or emotional distancing.100 These may well be the
effects of "punishing" officers for every inadvertent constitutional vio-
lation they commit. 101 Second, as developed below in the discussion of
legitimacy-compliance theory, retention of the defense, in and of it-
self, should have a positive impact on compliance.
The final goal of a workable damages action from a behavioral
perspective is ensuring that punishment of individual officers who act
in bad faith is meaningful (without being, as indicated above, demor-
alizing). If the punishment imposed on the officer can be shrugged off,
little good will come of it. The liquidated damages aspect of the pro-
posal plays an important role here. While proponents of a liquidated
damages remedy usually advance it as a means of encouraging victim
cooperation in the civil action, 102 this motivation plays only a secon-
dary role in the regime proposed here, because the system relies on
state-paid advocates. The more important function of liquidated dam-
ages from a behavioral perspective is to ensure that the miscreant of-
ficer experiences a potent penalty. For this reason, the extent of such
damages should be proportionate to the typical officer's salary,0 3
rather than based, as some have suggested, on the purported "worth"
of a constitutional right or a schedule of minimum liquidated damages
based on some other abstract calculus.1°4
The primary threat to assuring liquidated damages and other
damages are effective as punishment is not difficulty of measurement,
but indemnification. If the department routinely covers officers' liabil-
100. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 42 ("Punishment is moderately useful for the practical
control of behavior; it is acceptable completely only in circumstances where its emotional and
suppressive side effects are tolerable."); WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 169-70.
101. Recall that behavioral theory also recommends that incidental rewards for bad behav-
ior be avoided. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 52-55. One might argue that retention of a
good-faith defense allowing officers to avoid direct liability, combined with both departmental
pats on the back of the type described earlier and the fact that conviction is more likely, could
produce a reward system that would be inimical to punishment. Both of the hypothesized re-
wards are likely to be nonexistent or very incidental, however. Under the system proposed here,
departments would still be liable for good-faith violations of the Constitution. Departments are
less likely to explicitly reward a violator who has cost them money (although, to ensure they do
not do so, additional limitations on indemnification, etc. can be adopted, as discussed infra text
accompanying notes 225-26). Further, a conviction's attenuated connection with the officer's job,
see supra note 47, suggests it is unlikely to undercut substantially the punitive effect of being
sued individually, albeit unsuccessfully, and being responsible for one's department having to
pay money damages.
102. See Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 22, at 639 ("The minimum damages figure
should optimally be set at the level that would induce just enough people to sue to make the
total damages obtained equal to the total social costs inflicted by the police misconduct.").
103. See Davidow, supra note 3, at 963 (recommending that the officer would be liable for
up to "1.5% of the annual gross income of someone working fifty weeks and earning the mini-
mum wage, for each offense").
104. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 117 (1983); supra note 102.
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ity, 10 5 the punishment and deterrent effect of civil actions may be di-
minished considerably. Professor John Jeffries has asserted that the
mere pronouncement by a court that one knowingly violated the Con-
stitution imposes a stigma that officers find aversive.10 6 At the same
time, the impact of such a verdict may not be "intense" enough if the
department immediately foots the bill. Accordingly, elimination of in-
demnification, or creation of a mechanism that has a similar effect, °7
may be necessary. 0 8
Behavioral theory thus suggests a number of modifications to the
typical damages scheme that, if adopted together, should produce an
enforcement system far superior to the exclusionary rule.0 9 Legiti-
macy-compliance theory's principal contribution to modelling an al-
ternative damages remedy has already been alluded to and can be
much more quickly stated. Again, the important insight of that theory
is that the best path to compliance is to maximize the perception
among police that the authorities administering the sanction system
are fair. The exclusionary rule fails in this regard because it sanctions
all unconstitutional conduct, whether in good faith or bad. The dam-
ages action advocated here, on the other hand, sanctions only the lat-
ter. Thus, according to Tyler's theory, police should accord the
outcome of the verdicts in civil actions more respect. That respect, in
turn, should increase willingness to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment's dictates. 110
4. Summary
Behavioral theory suggests that the exclusionary rule is not very
effective in scaring police into behaving. Legitimacy-compliance the-
105. Commentators are in conflict over the frequency of indemnification. Compare John C.
Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1998)
(reporting indemnification of police is routine), with SC-UcK, supra note 104, at 85
("[Ilndemnification ... is neither certain nor universal.").
106. See Jeffries, supra note 105, at 51 n.17.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 225-26 for a suggestion in this regard.
108. A separate problem is the indemnifying effects of insurance. It is not clear that govern-
ment officials can buy insurance to cover their discretionary actions. See ScRucK, supra note
104, at 85. Even if they can, analogous to the approach to intentional torts, most policies presum-
ably would not cover knowing or reckless violations of the Constitution. See id.
109. The behavioral focus in this article has been and will be punishment. Behavioral theory
also strongly suggests that rewards for constitutional behavior can be even more effective at
changing behavior. See supra note 58. Whatever regime is chosen, occasional reinforcement of
conduct that respects Fourth Amendment values, through bonuses, promotions, etc., will likely
have a positive effect on compliance. See generally Batey, supra note 3, at 252-54; Albert T.
Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 Am. J. CRIM. L.
25 (1978) (describing reinforcement techniques in the police context).
110. Of course, the exclusionary rule could be partially salvaged with a good-faith exception
as well. But then its systemic effect would be reduced to virtually nothing, because departments
would have no incentive to provide any but the most nominal training. See Stanley Ingber,
Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable Good Faith," 33 VAND. L. REV.
1511, 1551 (1983) ("The good faith exception ... is inconsistent with the goal of systemic
deterrence.").
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ory suggests further that the police are likely to believe the rule (and
the Fourth Amendment doctrine it serves) deserves to be circum-
vented. In other words, the rule not only is bad at discouraging viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment but may in an indirect way encourage
them. These theories also suggest that a judicially administered dam-
ages regime that combined legal assistance with liquidated damages
and individual liability for bad faith violations would fare significantly
better at changing behavior at the individual officer level. Such a re-
gime would exact more consistent punishment without appearing un-
fair to the people we hope will want to abide by constitutional
mandates.
As noted earlier, empirical attempts to verify or rebut these vari-
ous points have foundered for a number of reasons, including the diffi-
culty of developing an objective criterion for measuring the number of
illegal searches and the impossibility of conducting meaningful com-
parison studies."' But we do have useful information from the most
well-informed source on these topics-the police themselves. That
source suggests both that the rule is an ephemeral punishment and
that more direct sanctions would be less so.
One study that directly asked police how much unconstitutional
activity occurs under the present exclusionary regime provides power-
ful support for the assertion that the rule is not very effective. The
study asked over 200 officers from a city police department and a
county sheriff's office in the southeastern United States how often
they had conducted illegal searches. 112 Of the officers who had con-
ducted searches, nineteen percent said they conducted searches of
"questionable constitutionality" at least once a month, and four per-
cent said they conducted searches they knew to be unconstitutional
at least once a month." 3 As the authors of the study indicate, these
numbers likely underreport the amount of illegal activity." 4 Even
taken at face value, they reveal that, in just these two modest-sized
jurisdictions (out of over 15,000 nationwide"15), several hundred
(perhaps over 600116) constitutionally suspect searches take place
111. See supra text accompanying notes 6-21.
112. See Akers & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 6, at 3.
113. See id. at 4 & tbl.1.
114. See id. at 4.
115. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, there were 17,000 federal, state, special,
and local police agencies in the United States in 1994. U.S. DEP'T LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUT-
LOOK HANDBOOK 304 (1996).
116. If each of the confessing officers worked alone, the monthly numbers reported in the
text would add up to 636 clearly illegal or questionably legal searches and seizures. Because it is
likely at least some of the officers were teamed with one another, that number would be inflated,
however. At the same time, the fact that a few of the officers said they conducted bad or ques-
tionable searches more than once a month would ratchet the number up again. Further, for
obvious reasons, this type of survey cannot determine the number of searches and seizures in
which the officers unknowingly violated the Constitution, which is likely to be high as well. See
infra note 130. It is possible that many of the constitutional violations reported in this study
resulted in exclusion, but the authors provide no information on this point, and the fact that
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each year. That is not good news for advocates of the exclusionary
rule. 11
7
Of'course, this finding does not tell us whether things would be
different under alternative systems. In this regard, another set of find-
ings based on surveys of the police is instructive. This research indi-
cates that, when asked what type of remedy they prefer, police
consistently state they want the exclusionary rule, not a damages rem-
edy, internal sanctions, or other forms of direct sanction;" 8 indeed,
one study found that for most officers exclusion is even preferred over
more training."9 Apparently, police feel that, of all possible sanctions
for Fourth Amendment violations, the rule imposes the fewest restric-
tions on their actions (while at the same time many of them feel re-
sentful about it on the few occasions it does apply). That type of
finding is reminiscent of suggestions that Miranda v. Arizona 2 ° has
been co-opted by the police because it represents only a minor obsta-
cle to obtaining confessions while at the same time providing a legiti-
mizing cover for suspect police practices. 12 1 In both cases, liberals
might do well to reconsider whether their panaceas are achieving their
instrumental goals.
B. Impact on Police Institutions: Systemic Deterrence
Many proponents of the exclusionary rule appear to concede that
it is not a particularly good general or specific deterrent but argue that
it has been successful at encouraging police departments to worry
about Fourth Amendment law, a concern which inevitably permeates
officers were willing to state they engaged in illegal or questionable searches on a monthly basis
suggests an ongoing, undeterred problem.
117. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 348 (reporting that 15% of the officers sur-
veyed indicated they "deliberate[ly] disregard" the Fourth Amendment despite the exclusionary
rule).
118. See Orfield, An Empirical Study, supra note 6, at 1051-53 (all of the narcotics officers
interviewed opposed elimination of the exclusionary rule and preferred it to a damages system);
Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 65, tbl.7 (reporting that 57% chose exclusion above all alternatives,
while 36.5% chose education, and the rest chose criminal prosecution, fines, police discipline, or
damages).
119. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 733 tbl.7.
120. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
121. The statements of one commentator about the effects of Miranda might well be appli-
cable to the exclusionary rule:
While Miranda appears to be partly responsible for the dramatic decline in coercive ques-
tioning practices in the 20th century [just as Mapp has undoubtedly curbed the most egre-
gious evidence-gathering practices], American police have responded to the Miranda
requirements by developing sophisticated interrogation strategies that are grounded in ma-
nipulation, deception, and persuasion. These new methods appear to be just as effective as
the earlier ones that they have replaced.... Not only have the Miranda warnings exercised
little or no effect on confession rates [just as a only a small percentage of convictions are lost
due to exclusion, see infra note 364] but police have also embraced Miranda as a legitimat-
ing symbol of their professionalism. Miranda warnings symbolically declare that police take
individual rights seriously.
Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 259, 284-85 (1996).
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through the ranks.12 2 As Professors William Mertens and Silas Was-
serstrom describe this latter point:
[E]ven if a particular constable is indifferent to whether his ar-
rests and seizures result in convictions, those who run the police
department are concerned with successful prosecutions. Further,
although individual officers might entertain hostility toward
fourth amendment rights, police departments are not likely to
share such a view, at least officially. Thus, at least the more pro-
fessional police forces can be expected to encourage fourth
amendment compliance through training and such guidelines as
the department provides for conducting searches, seizures and
arrests.
123
Mertens and Wasserstrom coined the phrase "systemic deterrence" as
a way of describing this concept of osmosis. 12 4
The exclusionary rule is undoubtedly responsible for some degree
of systemic deterrence, as evidenced by the post-Mapp advent of
training programs on the Fourth Amendment where none previously
existed. 1 25 But whatever the "official" view of the "professional" po-
lice department is, in reality training and follow-up administrative
rules are generally not effective in implementing the Fourth Amend-
ment. For instance, after surveying a large number of training pro-
grams in the heyday of the exclusionary rule, Stephen Wasby
concluded that "[r]ecruit training is sadly lacking in criminal proce-
dure content" and that "[t]he picture concerning in-service training is,
if anything, worse than that for pre-recruit and recruit training.' 1 26 He
also noted that "[t]he spirit and tone of communication about the law,
particularly when the law is favorable to defendants' rights, is often
negative, with the need for compliance stressed only infrequently.' '127
Other research has arrived at similar conclusions.128
122. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
[Tihe deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a
form of "punishment" of individual police officers for their failures to obey the restraints
imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its
tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the
part of law enforcement agencies generally.
See also Yale Kamisar, Remembering the Old World of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor
Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 559 (1990) (arguing that primary effect of exclusionary
rule is systemic deterrence); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Ori-
gins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1400 (1983) ("[Tlhe exclusionary rule is intended to create an incentive for law
enforcement officials to establish procedures by which police officers are trained to comply with
the fourth amendment.").
123. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 399.
124. See id.
125. See Kamisar, supra note 122, at 557-59.
126. Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inade-
quate, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 461, 464-65 (1978).
127. Id. at 466.
128. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT REVIEW COM-
MiTEE 75 (Jan. 1992) ("Many officers admitted to the Committee that they have stopped going
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Even if good programs existed, their impact would be scuttled by
behavior in the field. Once out on the streets, the officer is often told
to forget what was learned in the academy. 129 The result, as indicated
in several studies, 130 is that the police are not very well versed in
Fourth Amendment law and are generally apathetic about or hostile
to what they do know. This type of finding is the death knell for en-
forcement of the Fourth Amendment.
In short, the systemic deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
just not powerful enough to overcome a police culture that is unsym-
pathetic to rules that restrict investigative power. But would alterna-
tives to the exclusionary rule fare any better at changing this deeply
ingrained resistance to learning and applying constitutional doctrine?
Putting the question another way, would other sanctions be more
likely to provide the incentive for police departments and govern-
ments to seek the hiring policies, leadership skills, and organizational
structure that will facilitate systemic deterrence?
Internal sanctions are a poor candidate for this job, for obvious
reasons. Damages actions, on the other hand, might be effective if the
department were made liable for Fourth Amendment violations. De-
partmental damages could be calculated in a number of ways. One
scheme is to hold the department liable only if the individual officer is
not liable (because of good faith) and to limit the amount of entity
liability to what the individual officer would have had to pay (had
there been bad faith) . 31 Another is to mandate departmental liability
even in bad-faith cases, with the department either sharing liability
with the officer or providing an additional sum. The rationale for
these arrangements, as well as a few variations on them, are explored
below.1 32
to in-service training, which indicates, among other things, that many officers patrolling the
streets of Boston do not know recent changes in the law."); Quick, supra note 109, at 30 ("The
law enforcement officer is trained to acquire attitudes reflecting the primary emphasis of the
training-crime control.").
129. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 125 (1991) (describing "the much-reported statement to probationary officers: 'For-
get everything you learned at the Academy"'); Quick, supra note 109, at 30 ("Once outside the
academy, those officers who may feel a duty to safeguard individual rights will encounter a po-
lice environment that discourages that duty.").
130. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 333 (reporting study involving over 450 of-
ficers in which subjects gave correct answers to four out of six Fourth Amendment questions
only slightly more frequently than chance would dictate and that for only one question did "a
substantial majority" correctly evaluate the legality of the intrusion); Hyman, supra note 45, at
47 (finding, based on a test on Fourth Amendment rules, that the "average officer did not know
or understand proper search and seizure rules" and that "supervisors or senior officers only
achieved slightly improved scores"); Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 727 ("The responses [of 296
officers] to the questions demonstrate the participants' widespread inability to apply the law of
search and seizure or police interrogation.").
131. See Davidow, supra note 91, at 339.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58; 225-26.
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Whatever the specific entity liability system, there are several rea-
sons to believe it would create a powerful incentive for police depart-
ments to ensure compliance with Fourth Amendment law through
more vigorous training programs, systematic rules, and other bureau-
cratic admonitions to take Fourth Amendment rights seriously. First,
such a system is based on the time-tested theory underlying liability of
organizations in tort, administrative, and criminal law. Although en-
tity liability has by no means demonstrated consistent deterrent ef-
fects, 33 these sanctioning regimes have had some successes in
motivating organizations to change behavior.1 34
Second, economic analysis, which is more apposite in the institu-
tional setting discussed here than when trying to predict the behavior
of individual officers in the field, suggests that organizational liability
should work relatively well in connection with police departments.
Professors Larry Kramer and Alan Sykes note, for instance, that com-
pared to many government agencies, police bureaucracies face rela-
tively low transaction costs in initiating and enforcing effective
incentives to abide by the Fourth Amendment. 135 Because most police
officers are wedded to their jobs and care about their departmental
status, they respond to standardized rewards and punishments. 136 Fur-
ther, these officers are well understood by their supervisors, "making
it easy to design training programs and police manuals that establish
detailed guidelines for line officers to follow."'1 37 Accordingly, "vicari-
ous liability will likely motivate municipalities to adopt a variety of
cost-effective devices to reduce the incidence of police
malfeasance.'1 38
Finally, there is some patchy empirical evidence directly support-
ing the assertion that entity liability can affect police institutions. Two
of the best indicia of systemic deterrence are quality training and the
133. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Govern-
ment Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1295-1300 (1980); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 568, 572 (1985).
134. According to the ALI's examination of empirical studies in 1991, the tort system alone
"appears to fail badly" as a prevention device, but entity liability imposed through administra-
tive regimes similar to that proposed here can be moderately successful at reducing some types
of accidents. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY, 441-43 (1991). This combination has been most successful at preventing
workplace accidents, see id. at 428-31, and least successful at reducing environmental pollution,
the latter primarily because of difficulties in proving scientific causation and in showing that a
particular defendant caused the injury, see id. at 441-43. "Causation" problems normally do not
afflict search and seizure adjudication, and identifying the offending officer is rarely a problem.
135. See Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 249, 287-94.
136. See id. at 290-91.
137. Id. at 291.
138. Id. In contrast, Kramer and Sykes conclude, such liability will do little to ameliorate
illegal hiring and firings by municipal lawyers because their occupational mobility and the diffi-
culty nonlegally trained supervisors experience in determining the basis of their personnel deci-
sions significantly raises the transactions costs of establishing an incentive system. For further
analysis of this issue along economic lines, see Posner, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 64-68.
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existence of departmental rules that result in sanctions.139 As noted
earlier, for most aspects of Fourth Amendment law, neither exist.
There is one exception, however. The single area in which most police
departments have both rigorous training and systematic administra-
tive rules is in the use of force, which happens to be one of the few
domains where the police are successfully sued for large sums of
money.140
Unfortunately, the current damages regime is not likely to catch
the attention of the typical police department because, as with individ-
ual officer liability, adverse verdicts against the government are rare
(at least outside the use of force context).' 4 ' The changes already pro-
posed, including state-provided legal assistance, liquidated damages,
and bench rather than jury trials, should go a long way toward improv-
ing this situation.142 But two other modifications to the current dam-
ages regime are necessary if such actions are to have a fighting chance
at effecting systemic deterrence.
The first change concerns the vicarious liability standard. One
such standard makes departmental liability contingent on proof that
the department somehow endorsed the illegality, as Monell v. Depart-
139. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 135, at 291; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at
399.
140. See SAMUEL WALKER, TAmNG THE SYSTEM 25-28 (1993) (stating that "[tihe control of
deadly force is arguably the great success story in the long effort to control police discretion" and
that "[elach change in a police department shooting policy was the result of conflict .. . in-
volv[ing] a highly questionable shooting, community protests, and often a lawsuit"); Samuel
Walker, Controlling the Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. L. REV.
361, 362-63 (1986) (noting that while "[mlany police departments have detailed rules governing
the use of deadly force, a handful have rules regarding the handling of domestic violence, and
some have rules covering intelligence-gathering activities," rules governing other areas are rare;
further, "most of the existing rulemaking is the result of some external compulsion: litigation,
political pressure, or a combination of the two").
In arguing against a damages regime, Professor Macin has noted that the Los Angeles
Police Department paid millions of dollars from 1986 to 1990 to settle 300 excessive force law-
suits, and rhetorically asked: "Did such large sums stop LAPD officers from brutalizing Rodney
King... ?" Maclin, supra note 2, at 62. Apparently the LAPD made a decision that it was willing
to pay for what it believed was "effective law enforcement." With that kind of lawless attitude,
no sanctioning system will work in excessive force cases; clearly the exclusionary rule will not be
successful (because often, as in the King case, there is no evidence to exclude). But most police
departments are not like the LAPD of the late 1980s. Writing in 1985, Schmidt concluded that
civil liability for use of force was the "primary factor" behind increased use of risk prevention
techniques, including: (1) increased employment of "risk managers and loss prevention consul-
tants" such as "police legal advisers," who were associated with more than 300 departments; (2)
better screening of police recruits through psychological tests; (3) enhanced recruit training pro-
grams beyond state-mandated minimum levels; and (4) increased supervisor accountability for
the negligent actions of their subordinates, which "reduces favoritism or bias and cover-ups and
promotes certainty in the disciplinary process." Schmidt, supra note 82, at 232-33.
141. See supra note 82.
142. See SCHUCK, supra note 104, at 184 (arguing that, under a damages regime involving
counsel fee awards and minimum damages, government "[aldministrators would ... be pressed
to anticipate and respond to low-level misconduct by deploying their stock of behavior-shaping
resources-rules, training, discipline, incentives, information, organization support, and the
like-in more imaginative and powerful ways").
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ment of Social Services'43 requires in section 1983 cases by immunizing
municipalities for actions of their agents not approved by a "policy or
custom.""' Alternatively, the standard could be one of simple negli-
gence on the part of the department (e.g., proof of inadequate train-
ing, supervision, and the like). Finally, vicarious liability might be
based on a respondeat superior, or strict liability, theory. Adoption of
either of the latter two standards obviously runs afoul of significant
Supreme Court and lower court precedent restricting government lia-
bility for the actions of federal, state, and local officials under current
remedial statutes.145 As several commentators have argued, however,
many of these decisions are based on questionable interpretations of
the relevant statutory and constitutional law,146 and in any event Con-
gress could pass a statute that removed such restrictions. 147
On the assumption these obstacles can be removed (if appropri-
ate to do so), the more important question is which vicarious liability
standard is best as a matter of policy. Clearly, Monell's approach is the
weakest in deterrence terms. As construed by the Court, Monell's pol-
icy and custom defense permits police departments to escape liability
in virtually every Fourth Amendment case; only searches and seizures
approved by a policy-making body, ordered by an upper level govern-
ment official,'148 or caused by intentionally inadequate training14 9 sup-
port a damages action against the department.
143. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
144. Id. at 694 (holding government liable under § 1983 only when pursuant to the "execu-
tion of a government's policy or custom... made by... lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy").
145. Monell, for example, substantially limits the liability of municipalities. See 436 U.S. at
694; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (requiring "deliberate indiffer-
ence" toward the need for training for municipal liability under § 1983). State liability under
§ 1983 is nonexistent. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (holding that § 1983 is not a
sufficiently clear expression of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in fed-
eral court); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) (holding that states
are not "persons" within the meaning of that statute even when sued in state court). The federal
government is only liable for constitutional violations to the extent Congress decides to waive
sovereign immunity. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
146. Attacks on Monell's interpretation of § 1983 have been particularly vociferous. See,
e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 755, 765 (1992) ("[N]either the language nor legislative history of § 1983 support the
Court's 'policy' barrier to the liability of local entities."); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 566-67
(1987) (arguing that § 1983 was meant to impose respondeat superior liability).
147. Clearly Congress could both amend § 1983 as well as waive federal sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court has held, for instance, that Congress could pass a new statute holding state
officers liable under § 1983 in federal or state court. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976). Further, Congress has waived federal sovereign immunity under limited circumstances.
See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994). Professor Bandes has
argued that the courts also have the authority to provide an effective remedy against both fed-
eral and state governments, especially if Congress fails to do so. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing
Bivens: .The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 336-61 (1995).
148. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 485 (1986).
149. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 392.
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The choice between the negligence and strict liability standards is
more difficult. The department will undoubtedly experience more un-
favorable verdicts under a respondeat superior standard than under a
negligence test. But, given the uncertainty as to what constitutes a
"reasonable" amount of training or supervision, it may experience just
as many suits under a negligence regime, and that may be the determi-
native factor for risk-averse organizations. Furthermore, behavioral
theory suggests that punishment is not as effective when there is no
legitimate alternative to the punished behavior, 5 ° and legitimacy-
compliance theory likewise counsels against disproportionate penal-
ties.' 5 ' Strict vicarious liability would impose liability on departments
completely blameless in terms of training and supervision.
The relevance of the behavioral and legitimacy-compliance theo-
ries to "institutional" behavior is tenuous, however. Furthermore, the
difficulty of proving (as opposed to alleging) negligence as to training
or supervision may be almost as formidable as proving a policy or
custom under Monell.'52 Many other, largely imponderable, aspects of
police, agency, litigant, and judicial temperament may affect whether
the deterrent effect of a strict liability regime would differ significantly
from one requiring negligence.'53 Ultimately, considerations other
than deterrence may determine which standard is best.'54
150. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 155 ("An alternative response should be available for
the subject to perform. The suppression of the punished response will be greatest under condi-
tions where the alternative response is never punished but instead produces greater reinforce-
ment than the punished response.").
151. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
152. Cf Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Stan-
dards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REv. 591, 591 & n.1 (1983)
(noting that, through 1982, once suits "dominated by elements of fraud or self-dealing" were
eliminated, there were only seven successful shareholder cases for negligent management, mak-
ing them "rare to the point of becoming an endangered species").
153. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Lia-
bility for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611, 664-71 (1998) (discussing
effects of inadvertent or irrational actions of employees or supervisors, entity miscalculations of
risk, liability insurance, judicial overenforcement and underenforcement of a negligence stan-
dard, and miscellaneous factors such as fear that risk of liability will injure the entity). Geistfeld
ultimately concludes that a negligence standard is just as efficient as a strict liability standard as a
means of deterring dangerous activities, if those activities are common in the community, of
largely public (as opposed to private) benefit, and cannot be relocated (all factors which would
seem to apply to searches and seizures). See id. at 654.
154. Kramer and Sykes address some of these other issues. They note that a "negligence-
based approach to vicarious liability might be more effective than strict vicarious liability at
motivating cost-effective monitoring, training, and similar measures: negligence cases would gen-
erate a body of information about required precautionary measures for the guidance of other
municipalities." Kramer & Sykes, supra note 135, at 285. But they also point out that "the negli-
gence approach places the court in the position of second-guessing municipal officials about
what measures should be taken to guard against constitutional torts, a process that may intro-
duce significant error costs." Id. Furthermore,
[sitrict vicarious liability automatically redistributes the risk of loss from typically inefficient
risk-bearers (victims and municipal employees) to a typically superior risk bearer that can
distribute the risk broadly among the taxpaying public. Under the negligence approach, by
contrast, losses are redistributed only when the municipality is shown to have been
negligent.
[Vol. 1999
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 398 1999
DUMPING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Although the appropriate vicarious liability standard is not en-
tirely clear, the substantive liability standard must be based on strict
liability if deterrence is the goal. In other words, departments should
be liable for their officer's inadvertent violations of the Fourth
Amendment as well as for negligent ones. Adoption of this substan-
tive standard is crucial for at least two reasons. First, given the amor-
phousness of many Fourth Amendment standards such as probable
cause and exigency, a negligence standard would leave far too many
illegal searches and seizures unremedied, thereby creating little incen-
tive on the part of the department to improve its hiring, training, and
supervision. Because we are seeking to extinguish violations of a fun-
damental constitutional provision, 155 the maximum amount of deter-
rence is warranted. 156 Second, a negligence standard might well
truncate development of Fourth Amendment doctrine. As the
Supreme Court has demonstrated in its application of the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, 5 7 courts are quite capable of pro-
nouncing an officer's actions reasonable without bothering to clarify
the relevant constitutional standard. 158
Further implications of these suggested changes are explored
later in this article. 159 The important point for now is that subjecting
police departments to liability for constitutional violations perpetrated
by their officers would create a far greater incentive to improve hiring,
Id. at 285-86. Kramer and Sykes also discuss the transaction costs of the two vicarious liability
regimes and conclude that the "choice is a close one." Id. at 292-93. Other authors have stressed
the compensatory advantages of the respondeat superior approach. See, e.g., Lewis & Blumoff,
supra note 146, at 829-38.
155. As Justice Harlan noted in Bivens, "injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of
law.., are substantially different in kind [from those inflicted by private parties]." Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. While the Court has insisted on a narrow vicarious liability standard in § 1983 actions, it
has been willing to adopt a strict substantive liability standard, in large part for the reasons given
in the text. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court stated:
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct, whether
committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for officials who harbor doubts
about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' con-
stitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat that damages might be levied against the city may
encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed
to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Such pro-
cedures are particularly beneficial in preventing those "systemic" injuries that result not so
much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several
government officials, each of whom may be acting in good faith.
Id. at 651-52. However, the courts have not adopted the same strict substantive liability ap-
proach in suits against the federal government. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1972)
(holding federal government liable under Federal Tort Claims Act [FTCA] only for "negligent or
wrongful" acts); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963) (liability under FTCA only
exists for actions that would be torts under the relevant state law); Norton v. United States, 581
F.2d 390, 397 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding government not liable under the FTCA for misconduct
committed in good faith).
157. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981 (1984), for instance, the Court resolved the case through application of the good-faith excep-
tion without addressing the probable cause issue in Leon or the particularity issue in Sheppard.
158. See Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-35 (1991).
159. See infra text accompanying note 222.
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training, and supervision than the exclusionary rule does. This is so
not just because of the fiscal impact such a rule would have on the
department, but because of its potential impact on the public. When a
criminal goes free because of excluded evidence, the courts are usually
blamed.160 When the citizenry discovers that police malfeasance
means distributing tax dollars to search and seizure victims (criminal
as well as innocent), it is more likely to finger the police depart-
ment.'61 In addition to the loss of money is the loss of popular good
will, which might be the ultimate motivating force for the department.
C. Impact on the Courts: Development of the Law
Any system that purports to implement constitutional dictates
must afford adequate occasion for developing the nuances of the law.
In this country, those nuances have come from the process of judicial
review. The exclusionary rule clearly facilitates appellate perusal of
Fourth Amendment claims because it provides a strong incentive to
bring a claim (dismissal of criminal charges), and the claim can be
brought within a setting that is tailor-made for resolving such issues-
judge-run suppression hearings at which criminal defense attorneys fa-
miliar with the case refine the issues. The traditional damages action,
on the other hand, fails miserably in this regard, partly for the lack-of-
litigation reasons already noted and partly because, even if litigation
were more routine, juries are particularly ill-equipped to devise black-
letter rules that provide police the guidance they need.16 2
Once again, however, the proposed changes, in particular the
provision for a bench trial initiated by state-paid litigators (who might
well be hired from the defense bar), offer assurance that Fourth
Amendment claims will be raised and vigorously litigated. Providing
for appeal of the damages action to the appropriate appellate court
would assure continued judicial review. Indeed, such a damages action
is likely to increase opportunities for judicial development of the
Fourth Amendment, in three ways that liberals, in particular, are
likely to appreciate.
160. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 949-50 ("Given judicial discretion in findings of fact and
law, the judge who excludes evidence is perceived to be the person most directly responsible for
sustaining a constitutional challenge. Because of this, the judge and not the police will most often
be blamed by both the public and the prosecutor for scuttling the prosecution."); cf. OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, supra note 82, at 611 n.99 (reporting poll showing that the percentage of respon-
dents who believed that the "courts are 'too easy' on criminals jumped from 52% in 1967 to 83%
in 1981").
161. See Patton, supra note 79, at 800-02 (noting, based on interviews with police and gov-
ernment officials and newspaper accounts, that one of the few ways § 1983 suits occasionally do
have an impact on the police department is when the lawsuits "bring political attention to the
issue ... because of the high cost to taxpayers").
162. Perhaps judicial instructions plus some sort of special verdict system would help clarify
jury thinking, but a judge is much better equipped to explain decisions, in writing if need be.
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First, because it encourages litigation of illegal actions by inno-
cent individuals and those who are not prosecuted, it will multiply the
types of issues raised in court. For instance, stops and frisks, which
often devolve into pure harassment, racial and otherwise, 63 would be
subject to far more judicial oversight than occurs under the exclusion-
ary regime. 164 Other relatively low-profile types of police actions
would likewise receive more oversight. Mertens and Wasserstrom as-
sert that, because of the "nominal" injury involved, the 1979 ruling in
Delaware v. Prouse1 65 prohibiting random traffic stops would have
been "improbable" without the exclusionary rule.1 66 Yet, had a dam-
ages regime of the type proposed here existed in 1961 (when Mapp
was decided), far fewer than eighteen years would have elapsed
before a Prouse-type case would have been adjudicated, because any
driver who was randomly stopped, not just one with drugs in the car,
could have brought such a case. Because the exclusionary rule de-
pends upon the fortuity of finding evidence of crime (and on the fur-
ther fortuity of prosecution), it forecloses or delays litigation of many
such issues.
The second reason an effective damages remedy is better able
than the exclusionary rule to flesh out Fourth Amendment doctrine is
the rule's poor remedial "fit" with many types of cases, which has lead
to judicial reticence about refining certain aspects of the law. If there
is any logic to exclusion as a remedy other than its supposed deterrent
effect, it is that the government should not get to use evidence it never
would have found had it abided by the Constitution. 67 To many
judges, excluding evidence found in violation of the probable cause
requirement may make sense under this rationale, on the theory that
lack of probable cause means the government would not have discov-
ered the evidence had it acted constitutionally. But this characteriza-
tion is hard to apply to exclusion of evidence in other situations in
which the Fourth Amendment is relevant, such as when a search is
163. See supra note 34; infra note 214; see also Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue En-
counters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Mat-
ter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243, 253 (1991) ("Black men know they are liable to be stopped at
anytime [sic], and that when they question the authority of the police, the response from the
cops is often swift and violent.").
164. As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry v. Ohio, "[tihe wholesale harassment by
certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, fre-
quently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial."
392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968); see also David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of
Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 32-36 (1994) (noting the ineffectiveness of the rule as a device
for regulating low-level police activity).
165. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
166. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 404-07.
167. For further development of this contention, and an argument that it too is ultimately
flawed, see infra text accompanying notes 295-306.
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unnecessarily conducted late at night, 68 a postsearch inventory is im-
proper, 69 or an arrest involves excessive force. 170 Because probable
cause, by hypothesis, exists in these situations, the government did not
need to violate the Constitution to get the evidence at the time it did;
the "punishment" of exclusion does not seem to fit the "crime."
Thus, it is not surprising that judicial pronouncements about the
latter aspects of searches and seizures are less developed. 171 William
Stuntz's complaint that the courts have done a poor job regulating the
use of investigative coercion may, in large part, be a result of the ex-
clusionary remedy's dominance. 172 A system in which compensatory
and liquidated damages were the preeminent remedy, on the other
hand, could easily countenance any type of Fourth Amendment claim,
including police use of excessive force.
The final reason a damages remedy is preferable to the exclusion-
ary regime in its impact on judicial decisionmaking is that it would
encourage fuller development of all Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. This is not the argument, made by some opponents of the ex-
clusionary rule, 73 that decisionmakers are more likely to give the
Fourth Amendment a fair reading when the specter of freeing a crimi-
nal is removed from the calculus. Judges in a damages regime will
know that an expansive rule, if effectively implemented, will make the
detection and apprehension of some criminals more difficult. They
also will know that such a rule will allow liability to be more easily
imposed both on individual officers and on police institutions, and
168. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (deciding whether a nighttime search
made without a special showing violated statutory rights, without considering Fourth Amend-
ment issues).
169. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448-50 (1973) (suggesting that an inventory is
not required by the Fourth Amendment).
170. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (leaving unclear whether evidence
obtained through the misuse of deadly force must be excluded).
171. See supra notes 168-70; cf. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 937 & n.4 (1995). In that
case, the Court declined to address the argument that "any evidence seized after an unreasona-
ble, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation and that exclu-
sion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the
constitutional violation." Id.
172. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MicH.
L. REv. 1016, 1068, 1077 (1995) (labelling "backward" that "we have a large and detailed body
of law to tell police when they may open paper bags or the trunks of cars" and very little law on
"the level of force that may be used in making an arrest or conducting a search"). Stuntz cites
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), as an example of his point. In Anderson, the police
allegedly viciously assaulted Creighton (who was not a suspect), cursed at his three daughters,
and badly injured one of them. Stuntz criticizes the trial and appellate courts for focusing solely
on whether there was probable cause for the entry and wonders why they failed to find damages
liability under the Fourth Amendment. The answer may be simple: the courts were worried that
a contrary result would lead to exclusion of evidence in such situations. Cf. People v. Hanna, 567
N.W.2d 12, 15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding application and threat of further application of
"Do-Rite sticks," which cause an intense temporary pain, to subdue a person who refused to
allow blood test).
173. See Amar, supra note 3, at 799 ("Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they
distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated."); Barnett, supra note
3, at 959-66 (discussing incentives for judges not to exclude evidence).
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that in many such cases the executive branch will have to pay money
to criminals. Many judges may find these possibilities just as unpalat-
able as the dismissal of meritorious cases. As noted earlier, removing
the threat of exclusion should make judges who hear Fourth Amend-
ment claims more willing to discredit factual assertions made by the
police. But, in the abstract, a damages regime will probably not make
them more willing to orient the law in a more liberal direction.
What will have a liberalizing effect on judges, however, is the ava-
lanche of claims from noncriminals that an effective damages remedy
should bring.' 7 4 To understand this point, further explication of the
decisional dynamics at work in typical Fourth Amendment litigation is
necessary. The predicate for these dynamics is that, under the exclu-
sionary regime, the Fourth Amendment is virtually always associated
with a criminal; only people who have been found in possession of
evidence of a crime seek exclusion. In this setting, social science tells
us that two heuristics will often operate 175 in a way that will always
result in decisionmaking irrationally biased toward the government.
The first heuristic is "representativeness"-the common human
tendency to reason by anecdote and stereotype rather than through
the use of group-based knowledge.' 76 Just as the image of the welfare
queen has come to permeate popular perceptions of our entitlement
174. The number of claims that might be brought by "innocent" people is difficult to esti-
mate, but a very conservative guess is that one out of ten claims would fit that categorization.
According to a seven-jurisdiction study of the warrant process by the National Center for State
Courts, warrant-based searches "turned up something worth seizing" in less than 90% of their
searches in two jurisdictions, in "at least" 90% of their searches in three of the jurisdictions, and
in "nearly" 100% of their searches in the remaining two. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, at
40. However, these figures are based on "cases for which returns were filed." Id. It would not be
surprising to learn that police do not file returns when they find nothing. Cf id. at 36 ("[A]
sizeable percentage of returns [in three cities] were not in the files."). Furthermore, what the
officers do find is often different from what is listed in the warrant. See id. at 38, 40 tbl.21 (stating
that evidence seized was listed in the warrant between 75% and 93% of the time). As one com-
mentator noted about the NCSC study, "[t]he fact that material was seized has no bearing
whatever on the existence of probable cause. As one policeman [in the study] put it, they usually
seize 'something,' if only to 'protect the 'reliability' of an informant."' Duke, supra note 63, at
1411.
The error rate for warrantless searches is likely to be much higher than that reported in the
NCSC study, given that warrants must be obtained from a magistrate and are usually preceded
by more investigation than occurs with a warrantless search. Indeed, there is some evidence that
the error rate is quite a bit higher. One survey reported that 22% of black and 6% of white
interviewees randomly sampled from 15 cities reported being frisked or searched without-in
their opinion-good reason. See Wayne A. Kerstetter, Who Disciplines the Police? Who
Should?, reprinted in GELLER, supra note 82, at 157 (citing ANGUS CAMPBELL & HOWARD
SCHUMANN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN FIFTEEN AMERICAN CITIES (1969)); see also LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN ET AL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, THE KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT 6 (1995)
(relating a campaign to seize guns in one area of Kansas City, in which police seized only one
gun in every 28 traffic stops; roughly one-fifth of the seized guns were legally carried).
175. The idea for this point comes from Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, OHIO
ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 49-57, on file with author).
176. For further description of this heuristic and its implications for decisionmaking, see
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1124-27 (1974).
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system despite data to the contrary, drug dealers and their like repre-
sent the typical searched person to the suppression hearing judge, de-
spite the likelihood that many people who are searched have no
association with drug dealing or any other crime. With that faulty pic-
ture in mind, it is difficult to maintain allegiance to high-minded con-
stitutional values in making the decision between a defendant-
oriented rule and a government-oriented one.
The second heuristic is "availability"-the tendency to make pre-
dictions about whether an event will occur based not on the actual
frequency of the event but on one's memory of how often it occurs.1 77
In the Fourth Amendment context, this translates into a judicial
penchant for affirming police pronouncements that sufficient suspi-
cion of crime existed. In the official "judicial memory," comprised
solely of data from suppression hearings, everyone searched or
stopped is guilty; thus, the heuristic tendency will be to assume that
police are right when they say guilt was clear at the time of the search
or seizure.
Of course, these heuristics do not completely dominate judicial
thinking; suppression motions are granted, albeit rarely. 178 But the
amorphous nature of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and exi-
gency determinations-the bread and butter of Fourth Amendment
law-often allows subtle influences of this type to have dispositive ef-
fect. The perfect antidote to the representativeness and availability
processes (in the sense that "anecdata" is fought with anecdata) is
provided by a damages regime: experience with innocent people who
have been illegally stopped by the police. Judges are more likely to
acknowledge the true base rate of unconstitutional actions when they
see before them multiple people who were arrested, stopped, or
searched and found to have no evidence of crime in their pockets,
cars, or homes; accordingly, they are more likely to evaluate accu-
rately the overall societal impact of progovernment findings.
The ultimate effect of the proposed damages regime on the judici-
ary, then, should be less cynicism about the Fourth Amendment and a
more critical attitude toward the police. Judges faced with claims from
noncriminal plaintiffs will be more likely to internalize the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment-the privacy and autonomy interests of the
innocent as well as the guilty. They will also be less willing to assume,
177. See id. at 1127-28.
178. According to the NCSC study, see VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, judges granted
only 12% of suppression motions in warrant-based cases. See id. at 42. The percentage of suc-
cessful motions in warrantless cases is roughly the same. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost
of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. R s. J. 585, 597 tbl.7
(14.6% of evidence suppression motions granted). Furthermore, according to the latter study,
80% of the successful suppression motions were in cases involving possession of small amounts
of drugs or other minor crimes, see infra note 195, suggesting that when the stakes are high,
judges shy away from suppression for the reasons suggested in the text.
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contrary to the Supreme Court's current tendency, 79 that police can
be trusted to protect constitutional values. In short, the harsh reality
of crime which inevitably permeates even into the most august court-
room will be counterbalanced by the grim truth about the power po-
lice wield, not only over criminals but over people not very much
different from the judges themselves.
A final, and more speculative, impact of an effective damages re-
gime is that it may make Fourth Amendment law simpler. There is no
doubt that the exclusionary rule creates a huge incentive to litigate
even the most trivial Fourth Amendment issue and has thus contrib-
uted to the complication of search and seizure law.'8 ° While the pro-
posed regime would also provide a significant incentive to raise many
such issues, its state-paid attorneys are much less likely to overlitigate
than defense attorneys and their clients enticed by the prospect of dis-
missal. More importantly, judges in a damages regime are more likely
to be concerned that vague doctrine will exacerbate overdeterrence of
police (a topic discussed in more detail below), which should influence
courts in the direction of making their pronouncements more digesti-
ble for the average officer. That is not to say Fourth Amendment law
would become more liberal or more conservative; rather, judges
would simply strive harder to produce bright-line rules to the extent
possible. 18 1
D. The Proposed Damages Regime: Overdeterrence
and Underdeterrence
Perhaps it would be useful to summarize the principal tenets of
the proposed alternative to the exclusionary rule that have been ad-
vanced to this point. An administrative agency would be responsible
for bringing and assessing Fourth Amendment claims. The claims
would be heard by a judge in proceedings that are streamlined in
much the way most administrative proceedings are. Plaintiffs who pre-
179. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 809 (1984) (assuming that police will not
illegally enter premises to secure evidence pending arrival of a warrant); Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 445-46 (1984) (reasoning that police will not knowingly violate Constitution merely
because they think sought-after evidence will be discovered in any event).
180. See Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy,
22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 412 n.81 (1989) ("The defense attorney in a criminal case has
every incentive to raise hair-splitting distinctions and rather trivial search and seizure issues, for
exclusion of crucial evidence is the reward for success regardless of the scope of the wrong.
Many of the issues litigated in criminal cases would not be pursued in civil litigation, and we
would be better off for this."); Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 357 ("By providing defend-
ants with a strong inducement to litigate the legality by which evidence against them was ob-
tained, the exclusionary rule has led to a vast increase in the complexity of the rules of search
and seizure and has thereby contributed to officers' difficulty in determining what the law
permits.").
181. Currently the courts waver in their eagerness to produce such rules. See generally
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith", 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307, 320-33 (1982).
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vail would receive liquidated damages amounting to a percentage of
the typical field officer's salary (say, somewhere between one percent
and five percent). The individual officer would be personally liable for
the damages unless he or she acted in good faith, in which case the
police department would be financially responsible. Variants of the
damages remedy, such as class actions and injunctions, would also be
available through the court. Appeals could be taken to the normal
appellate court.
The thesis of the foregoing discussion has been that this damages
regime, or one substantially similar to it, would provide greater spe-
cific, general, systemic, and judicial deterrence than the exclusionary
rule. Indeed, several writers have suggested that a damages remedy is
a poor substitute for the exclusionary rule not because it is an inferior
deterrent but because it might tempt government agents to refrain
from doing their job. 82 Police, worried about personal liability, might
significantly limit their investigative work; agencies, concerned about
their budget, might stop funding certain law enforcement practices;
courts, deluged with claims from innocent people, might put too many
restrictions on the police. The fight against crime, never easy, could be
stultified.
Conversely, there is the possibility that in some high-proffle or
idiosyncratic cases individual officers and police departments might be
willing to pay the price of violating the Fourth Amendment. They may
calculate, in effect, that a conviction or arrest is worth the financial
loss that will come from a damages suit. In at least one circumstance-
the warrant issuance process-judges also may be left inadequately
cabined by a damages regime. The proposal's potential for overdeter-
rence of individual officers and police departments and for un-
derdeterrence of officers, departments, and courts leads to some
suggestions for fine-tuning the system.
1. Overdeterrence of Individual Officers
The possible ill effects of personal liability have been described
by Richard Posner:
Police and other law-enforcement personnel are compensated on
a salaried rather than piece-rate basis, so that even if they per-
form their duties with extraordinary zeal and effectiveness they
do not receive financial rewards commensurate with their per-
formance. At the same time, if their zeal leads them occasionally
to violate a person's constitutional rights, then the tort remedy
will impose on these officers the full social costs of their error.
There is thus an imbalance: zealous police officers bear the full
social costs of their mistakes through the tort system but do not
182. See Loewenthal, supra note 15, at 31-32; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 408-
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receive the full social benefits of their successes through the com-
pensation system. 1
83
Based on this assumption, Posner proposed that individual officers be
absolutely immunized, with the department bearing full liability under
a respondeat superior theory."8 Peter Schuck, whose 1982 book on
suing the government is still the leading authority on the issue,
reaches the same conclusion out of fear that imposing liability on indi-
vidual government agents will chill "vigorous" decisionmaking. 185
These concerns are exaggerated in search and seizure cases, how-
ever, even assuming that indemnification is not a routine practice.
Posner and Schuck are obviously correct that tort liability creates dif-
ferent contingencies for government officials than for private profes-
sionals. Whereas lawyers and doctors have a financial incentive to
generate clients and patients despite the threat of malpractice claims,
police, given their payment on a salaried basis, do not have an analo-
gous incentive to generate arrests in the face of tort exposure. Be-
cause police will be paid in any event, the reasoning goes, they are
more likely to choose the do-nothing option. But whatever may be
the case for other government officials, there are many currencies be-
sides money for police involved in investigation.
The first is the enormous pressure to fight crime. Perhaps the
public's general desire for disciplined school children, caring mental
hospitals, and aggressive child protection, to use some of Schuck's fa-
vorite examples, 86 is not sufficient to overcome an official's fear of
liability for being a strict schoolmaster, a pioneer of mental health
treatment, or an antiabuse crusader. The government's duty to pre-
vent crime is of a different specie, however. No other function outside
of regulation of the economy is perceived to be as important an indi-
cator of good government; "law and order" has been one of the most
politically potent domestic issues in modern times.18 7 Responding to
the resulting pressure, police organizations have developed arrest
quotas (which dominate the officer's world in at least some depart-
183. Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 22, at 640.
184. See id. at 641 ("[The] rule would essentially be one of respondeat superior without the
employer's usual right to indemnification: the agency would be fully liable though its employees
would not.").
185. See ScHUcK, supra note 104, at 98 ("[T]he damage remedy against individual officials
chills vigorous decisionmaking, and none of the incremental compensating adjustments of that
remedy-contract, free legal defense, indemnification, insurance, or 'good faith' immunity-can
restore that vigor entirely.").
186. See, e.g., id. at 70, 72, 75, 95.
187. According to the Gallup poll, in recent times either "crime/violence" or "drugs" has
consistently been rated first or second in response to the question: "What do you think is the
most important problem facing this country today?" with "unemployment/jobs" being the only
competitor. See The Gallop Organization, Most Important Problem (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:/
/www.gallup.com/Gallup-PollData/mood/problem.htm>; see also Roper Reports, Crime Fears,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July 8,1997, at 35 ("Crime is the number-one problem most often cited by
people of virtually all ages and household incomes.").
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ments),18 8 promotion schemes based on investigative success, and
even some financial rewards; 189 few other public agencies have analo-
gous motivation systems. 190 In other words, because of the over-
whelming public interest in crime control, there are a number of
concrete incentives that counteract the individual police officer's po-
tential concern about personal liability.
There is also professional pride. More so than most government
officials, police and detectives define themselves as craftsmen-with
their craft being the apprehension of criminals.' 9 1 It would violate
norms prevalent throughout the police world to demonstrate a fear of,
or lack of interest in, practicing that craft.'" Indeed, at the same time
a damages regime is unpleasant as a source of personal sanction, its
association with other professions, such as law and medicine, would
reinforce the image of "professionalism" so long sought by the
police. 93
188. Even if only half true of other departments, Rubinstein's account of Philadelphia police
makes the point. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 50 ("Arrest quotas are rigidly enforced for
vice arrests .... Regardless of their success in fulfilling other departmental goals, any failure to
produce the necessary vice arrests means trouble for the captain, the lieutenants, the sergeants,
and all the men in the district who have assignments they want to keep." (emphasis added)); see
also id. at 47 ("Whenever there is an increase in the weekly totals of crimes reported, the men
are urged, but not ordered, to be more 'aggressive' on patrol and to 'increase the number and
quality of vehicle and pedestrian stops' they make."); id. at 46 ("The production of... activity is
so important to the district that the supervisors are willing to violate departmental regulations to
assure it." (emphasis added)); see also Quick, supra note 109, at 30-31 ("In law enforcement, the
so-called 'clearance rate' is one of the primary methods of evaluating both the personnel and the
department. For example, an individual's performance may be evaluated on the percentage of
crimes known to the police which the police believe have been 'solved."'); supra note 47.
189. See Quick, supra note 109, at 50-52 (describing various reward programs developed by
police departments).
190. See SCHUCK, supra note 104, at 77-79 (describing lack of "countervailing incentive sys-
tems" within government agencies). Jeffries elaborates on this phenomenon:
For government workers, the risk of job loss is overwhelmingly linked to bad performance,
to the provable act of misconduct or neglect that will justify a civil service termination....
[T]o the extent that this characteristic of the civil service is recognized by prospective em-
ployees, there may be psychological self-selection. Persons willing to take risks in pursuit of
gains may gravitate toward private industry [while those] who place a premium on job se-
curity may be... drawn to government work.
Jeffries, supra note 105, at 76. Police do not fit this description. See infra note 192.
191. See SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 196 ("[T]he policeman tends to emphasize his own
expertness and specialized abilities to make judgments about the measures to be applied to ap-
prehend 'criminals'. . . . He sees himself as a craftsman, at his best, a master of his trade."); see
also id. at 231 (speaking of "the policeman's stake in maintaining his position of authority, espe-
cially his interest in bolstering accepted patterns of enforcement").
192. See BouzA, supra note 55, at 71 ("Cops are physically brave and live with the absolute
certainty that this is the prime value of their existence. Coward is such a powerful epithet that,
even in a profession accustomed to the rawest language, it is a word that is used very spar-
ingly."); RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 268 ("[W]hatever style he uses, [the police officer] is
motivated by his need to keep whole his notion of himself as an effective and capable worker.");
id. at 336 ("He will do whatever he must to maintain his place on the street; whatever is essential
to preserve the police as an institution.").
193. The reinforcement may be more than symbolic. Mark Moore argues that the profes-
sionalization of the police has been hindered by two factors. See Mark Harrison Moore, Prob-
lem-Solving and Community Policing, in MODERN POLICING 99, 116-20 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1992). The first factor "is the continuing inability of [the police] to establish
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Finally, there is the personal factor. Schuck speaks of the "asym-
metry" in incentives caused by the fact that "[i]dentifiable victims of
affirmative official wrongdoing are far more likely to seek and obtain
remedies for their harms ... than the invisible victims of official self-
protection, who suffer in silence, unaware that they have been injured
or ignorant that their injury is the consequence of some official's self-
regard."' 94 That asymmetrical incentive structure is significantly di-
luted where the police are concerned, given the reactive nature of
much of police work. Those who have been injured by crime may not
have a claim in tort against lackadaisical investigators, but they cer-
tainly are not invisible. Just as lawyers and doctors normally do not
allow liability concerns to constrain them in helping people who come
to them in need, police committed to crime control are unlikely to
neglect a hapless victim's case solely because of a threat of damages.
It is true that, when the crime is victimless, as involved in a drug
transaction, for instance, police will not experience the same face-to-
face pressure to solve the crime. Here, however, there are at least two
reasons for thinking that the "asymmetric threat" to law enforcement
that a damages action might pose is not altogether a bad thing. First,
the lion's share of constitutional abuse occurs in connection with drug
investigations.'95 Second, low-level drug investigations are probably a
waste of resources and may even foster crime.196 To one who agrees
with this point of view, a regime that strongly deters questionable
searches for drugs would accomplish a desirable result, without caus-
ing the political uproar decriminalization would bring. 197
In addition to a different incentive structure, police work differs
from other private and public contexts in one other significant way-
the existence of the warrant process. While some public officials might
appropriate mechanisms of accountability linking them to the overall structure of city govern-
ment and to the citizens." Id. at 116. The lack of such mechanisms has "cut off [the police] from
the aspirations, desires, and concerns of citizens," Moore states. Id. at 117. "The second major
impediment to legitimacy and enhanced professional standing for policing was that the police
never seemed fully to embrace the constitutional values that were the only sure path for accom-
plishing these goals." Id. at 118. Both of these problems could be substantially mitigated by an
effective damages regime.
194. ScHUCK, supra note 104, at 80.
195. Cf Nardulli, supra note 178, at 602 (reporting that over 80% of cases dismissed due to
exclusion involve either possession of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine, obscenity, or petty
larceny).
196. • One commentator has argued that "searches and convictions can accomplish very little
in dealing with this essentially victimless activity and may even be counterproductive by decreas-
ing supply, raising prices and thereby pressuring addicts to commit victim crimes in order to pay
for their habits." Loewenthal, supra note 15, at 38.
197. The same type of argument can be made about the undoubted fact that the threat of
individual liability will occasionally be enough to nudge even the most aggressive officer into
passivity when a "victimless" situation might involve danger. For instance, the officer who spots
a suspicious-looking individual might opt for inaction if the possibility of a damages action is
added to the danger posed by a seizure or subsequent frisk. Presumably stops based on hunches
are precisely what we want to deter. See CAMPBELL & ScHuMANN, supra note 174, at 157 (re-
counting numerous reports of frisks of allegedly innocent people).
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be able to "self-immunize" through obtaining authorization from their
superiors, 98 only police officers have the ability to obtain what is in
effect an advisory opinion from a judge. Liberals have often
bemoaned the fact that police so rarely seek ex ante review, even with
the advent of telephonic warrants, which vastly facilitate the pro-
cess.199 An effective damages remedy would provide a strong incen-
tive to seek this unique form of self-immunization, an incentive the
exclusionary rule apparently does not provide.2 0 Officers who are at
all anxious about a prospective search and seizure can weigh the cost
of seeking a warrant against the insecurity of not having one and act
accordingly.20
In short, individual liability is not per se antithetical to good po-
lice work. Moreover, there are independent reasons for thinking that
relying solely on entity liability in this context, as Posner and Schuck
do, is misguided. As this article has already explained, without direct
punishment of miscreant officers, individual deterrence is minimal. A
system consisting solely of entity liability either entirely removes that
punishment, rendering it useless as a deterrent, or reintroduces it in
the form of internal sanctions, in which case the "chilling" problem (to
the extent one exists) merely resurfaces in another guise. 2  In con-
trast, a process that imposes direct liability on those officers who act in
bad faith not only implements potent specific deterrence, but also pro-
vides a clear judicial pronouncement of egregiousness that separates
out the truly bad actors from the bumbling ones, and thus identifies
for the department those whose behavior most needs chilling. 0 3 That
198. An interesting question in this regard is whether there should be a "Nuremberg de-
fense" when police receive orders from their superiors. At one time, it was apparently the "pol-
icy" of the New York City Police Department to conduct warrantless home arrests in violation of
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), in the hopes of avoiding New York's rule, based on the
state constitution, requiring counsel at interrogation of any person arrested on a warrant. See
Harris v. New York, 495 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1990). Clearly the department should be liable in this
situation. Assuming that the officer was aware that the policy violated Payton and was an end
run around New York's rule, the officer should also be liable, in the same way an officer is liable
when he or she has reason to know a warrant-based search is invalid. See infra note 201. Individ-
ual liability would also provide an incentive to break the code of silence.
199. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 512-13 (1991) (calling for a vastly expanded warrant
requirement in light of technological advances such as the telephonic warrant)..
200. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, at 17 ("[T]he overwhelming majority of crimi-
nal investigations are conducted without a warrant."); see also SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., POLICE
POLICYMAKING: THE BOSTON EXPERIENCE 102-03 (1979) (reporting an average of under 700
search warrants issued in Boston annually between 1961 and 1976).
201. Of course, if the officer lies to the magistrate, there is no immunity. See Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) ("[Liability exists if] a reasonably well-trained officer [in the
officer's position] would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that
he should not have applied for the warrant.").
202. Cf. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 135, at 300 ("[Ilnefficient self-protective behavior is by
no means unique to a regime of personal liability .... ").
203. Every major department has rogue officers or officers who are very likely to scoff at
due process concerns. For instance, the New York Police Department's Knapp Commission dis-
tinguished between "meat eaters" and "grass eaters," with the meat eaters, although comprising
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pronouncement is essential, given a police culture that tends to close
ranks around those who are punished by outsiders.2 °4
All of this is not meant to deny that individual liability can have a
deleterious effect on the law enforcement efficacy of field officers if it
is too broad in scope. Officers should only be deprived of immunity in
search and seizure cases if they knowingly or recklessly violate a per-
son's Fourth Amendment rights (i.e., they are at least aware of a sub-
stantial risk of unconstitutionality). 2 5 Negligent violation should not
be grounds for individual liability.206 Only subjective mental states are
likely to correlate with the ability to deter in those situations, like the
typical warrantless action, that do not allow for long-term delibera-
tion. Furthermore, as noted earlier, limiting liability to knowing and
reckless violations resonates with legitimacy-compliance theory's ad-
monition that willingness to comply with the Fourth Amendment will
be undercut by decisions perceived as unfair.20 7
only about 2% of the force, setting the prevailing atmosphere. See BOUZA, supra note 55, at 72.
The meat eaters can "be sadistic leaders who set a tone that virtually coerces the timid majority
into going along with them." Id. Yet, without some outside pressure to do otherwise, police
departments have a significant incentive to keep these individuals, because they do the "dirty
work." See id. at 71; see also SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 55, at 52 (distinguishing between
"street-wise" cops, who are "apt to approve of cutting corners, of throwing weight around on the
street, [and] of expressing the qualities of in-group solidarity," and "management cops" who
"tend to be more legalistic, rule oriented [and] rational"). If the illegal actions of these more
aggressive police are to be curbed, particularly stiff punishment is needed. The suggestion here is
that, at the least, there should be personal liability in addition to a judicial holding designed to
embarrass the department into doing something about the officer. Later it is suggested that the
department should be held presumptively liable in such situations unless it shows it has taken or
will take significant action against knowing violators. See infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
204. See Kerstetter, supra note 174, at 164 (discussing the tendency of police supervisors left
out of the sanctioning process (by civilian review boards) to "align[ ] with their nominal subordi-
nates in a conspiracy to resist the resented 'others"').
205. This language is borrowed from the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1994).
206. However, violation of a rule that is clearly established ought to create a presumption of
recklessness; a claim of ignorance of such a rule is suspect. Cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818-19 (1982) (allowing no immunity for violation of a clearly established rule of which the
officer was unaware). If this were the test, the officers in the Akers and Lanza-Kaduce study who
stated that they conducted searches they knew to be illegal or highly questionable would be
liable. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16. The officers in the Perrin et al. and Heffernan
and Lovely studies, see supra note 130, who appeared to be ignorant of the Fourth Amendment
law would presumptively be liable (to the extent the questions they missed were based on well-
established Supreme Court law), but that presumption could be overcome if they can show that
they were truly unaware of the rule (e.g., because it was not covered in training) or believed the
rule was otherwise (e.g., because of bad training or comments from colleagues or superiors).
Although these outcomes are similar to those that would pertain under Harlow, note one differ-
ence: the officer whose conduct is objectively "reasonable" but who is aware that it is nonethe-
less unconstitutional would not be immune from suit. See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 619-20 (1989).
207. Basing individual liability on proof of at least recklessness also makes sense from the
two other commonly accepted bases of tort liability (besides deterrence): corrective justice and
distributive justice. Only one who is aware of the risk of wrongdoing deserves punishment. See
Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REv. 583, 668-69
(1998) (arguing for individual liability only in cases where the official is on notice of the act's
unconstitutionality, because "individual damages liability for constitutional violations serves a
role that is analogous to the moral blaming function of criminal law"). And for those violations
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Two other procedural steps should be taken to ensure against
overdeterrence. Because the threat of litigation can inhibit even the
most upright officer, government entities should indemnify their po-
lice employees for the cost of defending the damages action.2 °8 Fur-
thermore, to avoid actual and feared conflicts of interest between the
individual (who will argue good faith) and the government (which
may argue otherwise), the individual should be allowed to use a pri-
vate attorney, rather than a government-supplied one.20 9 Also rele-
vant here are two other aspects of the proposal: actions will be
screened by an administrative agency, which should keep frivolous or
vexatious claims to a minimum, and procedure will be streamlined
(most importantly, through reliance on judges rather than juries), thus
minimizing overdeterrence caused by fear of prolonged litigation.
2. Overdeterrence of Police Departments
William Stuntz has put most succinctly the assertion that a dam-
ages regime that imposes significant liability on governmental entities
will have a major negative impact on law enforcement.
Most police work for local governments, and most local govern-
ments operate under serious budget constraints. . . . Because
crime tends to be concentrated in poor neighborhoods, the peo-
ple who get the biggest benefits from police work do not pay the
biggest bills .... Just as a government faced with large damages
liability for running a municipal pool, which serves poor residents
but is paid for by rich ones, may simply close the pool, a govern-
ment faced with large damages liability for the police may simply
reduce the police presence in areas likeliest to give rise to law-
suits. This is overdeterrence writ large.211
This is a plausible scenario. Unlike a private business, which may
be able to pass the costs of increased liability on to consumers in the
form of increased prices, a police department generally has little con-
trol over its pricing input (the government-determined budget) and
thus may compensate for damage losses or try to avoid them by reduc-
ing production output (its commitment to law enforcement). Further,
as Stuntz suggests, adjustments are most likely to affect the communi-
ties where searches and seizures most often occur.
of the Fourth Amendment that are not knowing or reckless, the employing entity-the govern-
ment that must act constitutionally-is the most appropriate "loss-spreader" from the distribu-
tional perspective. See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 146, at 828 ("[F]or the compensatory goal to
be met, limitations on the liability of the agent, driven by concerns about fairness and untoward
stifling of initiative, demand correlative enlargement of the liability of the entity.").
208. The federal government and many state governments provide such representation. See
SCHUCK, supra note 104, at 83-85.
209. Federal and state practice is variable in this regard. See id.
210. William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 443, 446 (1997).
[Vol. 1999
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 412 1999
DUMPING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Stuntz's analysis relies on three questionable assumptions, how-
ever. The first is that concerns about damages will outweigh the de-
partment's perceived duty to the public. As already discussed, if the
perception develops that the police are abandoning certain locales,
the political process may well exert a countervailing pressure on mu-
nicipal governments and their departments. Poorer communities are
often as adept as rich ones at making that pressure felt.2 1 ' Moreover,
uncontrolled crime from poor neighborhoods can spill over into bet-
ter-off ones, and these communities will then themselves join the
political warpath.
Further, contrary to Stuntz's apparent assumption, removal of the
police from the hottest crime areas is not the only way-and, given
the likely public outcry over such a move, probably not the way de-
partments will choose-to reduce exposure to lawsuits over searches
and seizures. Better training and supervision are two obvious re-
sponses. Another sensible response departments are likely to prefer
over withdrawal is implementation of law enforcement modalities that
do not rely as heavily on actions that implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. Many of these can be as effective as investigative searches and
seizures.
Consider the following illustration. The classic "police presence"
in lower class neighborhoods is aggressive patrol.212 Although long
touted as an effective way of preventing and deterring street crime,2 13
this strategy in fact verges on being nothing more than a random stop
policy with racist overtones.214 It thus relies on precisely the type of
211. Historically, poor black communities have often received inferior law enforcement, un-
doubtedly partly the result of their political powerlessness. See Gershon M. Ratner, Inter-Neigh-
borhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1968). But modem day inner city communities that feel their law enforcement
needs have been ignored have organized to exert powerful influences on municipalities. See gen-
erally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1163 (1998) (describing how African American community groups have mobilized to
support community policing techniques, gang-loitering statutes, and antigang ordinances).
212. See generally James Q. Wilson & Barbara J. Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime,
12 LAW & Soc'y REv. 367 (1978).
213. See id.; SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 6-9 (use of traffic stops in Kansas); Law-
rence W. Sherman, Police and Crime Control, in MODERN POLICING, supra note 193, at 157, 197
(reporting a study in San Diego using "field interrogations"); id. (reporting a study in Houston
and Newark using antiloitering sweeps relying on an ordinance against obstructing pedestrian
traffic); id. at 201-02 (250% increase in patrol presence in selected "hot spots").
214. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 & n.ll (1968) (speaking of "[t]he wholesale harass-
ment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Ne-
groes, frequently complain" and the "[m]isuse of field interrogations as more departments adopt
aggressive patrol" (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967)); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspi-
cion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679-81 (1994) (finding
that "every person who works or lives in a high crime area and who avoids the police is subject
to automatic seizure, and to automatic search if the crime suspected involves drugs" and that
because of the disproportionately high number of African Americans and Hispanic Americans
living in those areas, "they are subject to this treatment much more often than are whites");
Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORD-
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search and seizure that will be the subject of suit under the proposed
regime; as suggested earlier, there is little doubt that an effective dam-
ages remedy (in clear contrast to the exclusionary rule) 215 will inhibit
such tactics. To many who are concerned about the interaction of po-
lice and citizens in these communities, this outcome is an acceptable
tradeoff for lessened police protection. 216 But the important point for
the purpose of addressing Stuntz's concerns is that no such tradeoff is
necessary; the end of aggressive patrolling does not have to mean the
police will disappear from the neighborhood.
Rather than evacuating the area, police can engage in other types
of proactive policing that do not require intrusive seizures and
searches, such as those suggested by problem-oriented policing the-
ory. This approach, which has become a prominent general crime pre-
vention strategy in the past two decades,217 is an attempt to move
away from incident-driven police work toward efforts to identify
global crime concerns and customize the police response to them. A
study of how one police department used this approach to deal with
three crime "problems"-burglaries in a housing project, thefts in
shipyard parking lots, and prostitution and associated robberies on a
particular street-is instructive:
[The] problem-solving efforts began essentially as directed patrol
operations designed to identify patterns of offending or known
offenders and to deploy police to catch the offenders. All gradu-
ally evolved into quite different efforts that involved activities
other than arrest and agencies other than the police. The attack
on burglaries in the housing project involved surveying tenants,
cleaning the projects, creating a multiagency task force to deal
with particular problems in the housing project, and organizing
the tenants not only to undertake block watches but also to make
demands on city agencies. The attack on thefts from cars eventu-
ally involved the inclusion of police officers in the design of new
parking lots to make them less vulnerable to theft. The attack on
prostitution and robbery involved enhanced code enforcement
HAM URB. L. 317, 365-73 (1996) (summarizing relevant studies). As Schwartz has cautioned,
however, it is not yet clear whether the differential treatment of blacks and whites is largely the
result of racism or whether instead it is primarily the greater involvement of blacks in crime.
215. See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters
and Beyond, in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW: ESSAYS FROM The Michigan Law Review 135,
154-57 (F.A. Allen ed., 1982) (speaking of the "hard realities" that the exclusionary rule is inef-
fective against racist abuses of the stop and frisk power). Indeed, one study suggested that the
advent of Mapp led to an increase in "preventive or aggressive patrols" as officers deliberately
engaged in illegal searches and seizures in order to confiscate dangerous weapons or drugs (with
no intention of prosecuting). See Effect of Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 6, at 99-101. The authors of
the study, although friendly to Mapp, concluded that the benefit of Mapp was undermined by
these techniques. See id. at 103.
216. See Harris, supra note 214, at 688; Maclin, supra note 163.
217. See generally CoMMUNrrY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALrrY? (Jack R. Greene & Ste-
phen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Herman Goldstein, Improving Policy: A Problem-Oriented Ap-
proach, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 236 (1979).
[Vol. 1999
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 414 1999
DUMPING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
against hotels and bars that provided the meeting places for pros-
titutes and their customers as well as decoy operations ....
These problem-solving tactics, which the study indicates were at
least as successful as an aggressive patrol strategy would have been,a19
obviously eschewed traditional searches and seizures. Other problem-
solving devices, such as finely tuned antiloitering and antigang statutes
that avoid vagueness concerns,2 20 do trigger Fourth Amendment
events, but in ways that involve so little discretion that suits are un-
likely after the first test cases.22' With options like these, police de-
partments sensitive to political pressures should have little incentive
to forsake the ghetto out of fear of liability from illegal searches and
seizures. Unlike Stuntz's municipal pool, for which there may be no
litigation-safe alternative, less invasive, equally effective law enforce-
ment techniques will often exist that are preferable to giving up on
ghettos altogether. If so, departmental liability for illegal searches and
seizures can even accelerate the transition.
The third, most fundamental assumption underlying Stuntz's sug-
gestion that a damages remedy might diminish law enforcement "writ
large" is that a sizeable number of illegal searches and seizures and
accompanying suits are inevitable; otherwise, of course, no compen-
sating adjustments by the department would be necessary. If individ-
ual liability works as predicted, however, there may be a reduction in
legal actions against departments as well. Whether a significant
number of actionable illegalities against the department remain will
depend, to some extent, on the applicable liability standards. The de-
partment will presumably experience more unfavorable verdicts under
the strict vicarious and substantive liability standards than it would
under a negligence standard, and even more adverse verdicts than
under the current liability structure. But even if a strict liability rule
produces an irreducible minimum of verdicts against police depart-
ments,2 22 its overall effect will probably not outweigh the political exi-
218. Moore, supra note 193, at 130.
219. Compare id. (reporting that burglaries in the housing project dropped by about 35%,
thefts from cars in the shipyards declined by more than 50%, and the number of prostitutes
working the targeted street dropped from 28 to six, with the number of robberies committed in
area declining by 43%), with SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 1-3 (reporting a 49% reduction
in gun crime as a result of aggressive patrolling), and Sherman, supra note 213, at 213 (13%
reduction in crime as a result of aggressive patrolling).
220. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 622-24 (1997).
221. In an article that makes similar points, but from a social organization perspective,
Meares argues that tough enforcement of drug laws harms law-abiding members of low-income
neighborhoods more than it helps them and that other law enforcement mechanisms relying on
police-citizen "partnerships" such as "reverse stings" and antiloitering statutes should be used
instead. See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 191 (1998).
222. Heffernan and Lovely estimate, based on their "testing" of over 400 police officers, that
"given the inescapable complexity of the rules of search and seizure, there is an uneliminable
20% to 30% margin of error among even well-trained officers as to the legality of intrusions
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gencies and professional pretensions that discourage police and police
departments from deserting their posts.
3. Underdeterrence of Police and Police Departments
The foregoing discussion assumed that public sentiment can
strongly influence police departments to enforce the criminal law vig-
orously despite other incentives that push them in the opposite direc-
tion. In some situations, such sentiment, or even the anticipation of its
expression, may lead police or their superiors to ignore altogether the
risk of damages and to pursue a criminal investigation in a manner
they know or suspect is illegal. Consider, for instance, the following
scenarios: a serial killer on the loose; a man suspected-but not at the
probable cause level-of molesting a child; or a gang terrorizing a
neighborhood. Strongly motivated to handle such cases expeditiously,
law enforcement officials might be especially willing to forge ahead
with highly questionable tactics if damages are the only possible pun-
ishment, comforted by the prediction that the public will ultimately
applaud their actions regardless of any financial penalty subsequently
incurred.
Note first that the exclusionary rule will not necessarily act as
much of a deterrent in such situations either. If the primary purpose of
the illegality is immediate incapacitation rather than conviction, as
might be the case in the gang example, the rule is an irrelevant consid-
eration. Even when conviction is the primary goal, the calculation may
be that exclusion will not prevent its realization because other means
of securing that verdict (attenuated confessions, inevitable discovery
of corroborating evidence, etc.) are likely to be available.223
Second, appropriately structured, damages can be a powerful de-
terrent here as well. The typical response of tort law to such situations
is punitive damages levied against the malicious offender. If the facts
suggest that the officer not only knowingly violated the Fourth
Amendment, but did so with the purpose either of obtaining evidence
governed by those rules." Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 6, at 345. Although they are undoubt-
edly right that some mistakes are inevitable, the mistakes they cite to bolster this point (i.e.,
participants did not understand the Fourth Amendment distinctions between luggage inside a
car and outside a car and between mobile and stationary homes, id. at 344) do not seem all that
ineradicable.
Further, an exception to strict liability should probably exist if the basis for liability is a
"new rule" rather than application of an existing rule. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 106 (1971) (setting out equitable guidelines for retroactivity in civil cases). In new rule situa-
tions, liability is most unfair and most unavoidable; training programs cannot teach rules that do
not yet exist. Cf. John C. Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Sig-
nificance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 101 (1989) (arguing against liability for "failure of presci-
ence"). The downside of such a compromise is the difficulty of determining whether a rule is
"new" or not. Cf. String v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 238 (1992) (attempting to define "new rule" for
retroactivity purposes); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (same). Further, such an excep-
tion would of course deny compensation to those who argue for the "new rule." See Lewis &
Blumoff, supra note 146, at 835-36.
223. See supra note 39.
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to be used at trial or of unnecessarily harming the target of the search,
such damages should be assessed. Additionally, a showing that the de-
partment hierarchy ratified the action, equivalent to the showing de-
manded by the policy and custom limitation in § 1983 actions, 2 4
should make the department liable for punitive damages as well.
As a further method of deterring knowing transgressions of the
Fourth Amendment, the department could be made liable for all
knowing and reckless violations (whether resulting in punitive dam-
ages or not) even when it is not complicitous, but with an escape
hatch. Analogous to the framework for fining corporations under the
federal sentencing guidelines, 25 the department could be permitted to
avoid such exposure if it could show that it cooperated with the inves-
tigation into the police action and that it made a meaningful post-
offense response to the culprit. At the least, the latter response should
include a refusal to indemnify (assuming indemnification has not been
prohibited), but it might often involve some type of administrative
sanction as well. This approach would force the department to choose
between paying twice (e.g., the indemnification and its own penalty)
and sending the miscreant officer a strong message that it does not
support the illegal action. The hope, of course, is that it would often
choose the latter option.226
If knowing and reckless acts are punished in such fashion, police
and police departments are unlikely to adopt the "bad man" tech-
nique227 of paying for their illegality in most of those cases where
outside pressures tempt them to do so. The previous discussion about
overdeterrence of police departments opened with the observation
that private corporations can pass on costs much more easily than po-
224. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
225. See generally Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts
About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 237-38 (1993) (stating that under the federal guide-
lines, "[i]f... the organization strongly signaled its intolerance of lawbreaking by voluntarily
disclosing the offense, fully cooperating with enforcement officials in the investigation, and/or
demonstrating acceptance of responsibility for the offense, it will receive a lesser penalty").
226. This scheme should also go far toward undermining the incidental reward phenomenon
discussed supra text accompanying notes 51-55. For further discussion of how the combination of
indemnification and departmental intransigence undermine deterrence under § 1983, see Patton,
supra note 79, at 767-94.
Note that the proposals in the text are contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981), which held municipal governments immune from
punitive damages under § 1983. The Court was concerned that such damages would overcom-
pensate the plaintiff, id. at 267, and be too costly, id. at 270-71. Punitive awards would not have
to go to the plaintiff (for instance, the agency could keep them to defray its costs), and the cost to
government can (and hopefully would) be diminished through the mitigation exception de-
scribed in the text.
227. Professor Walter Dellinger was the first to use this metaphor in connection with dam-
ages actions. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1563 (1972) (arguing that damages remedies might tempt the police "to
view the Constitution as Justice Holmes's 'bad man' viewed the obligation of contracts, which is
to say that they might view the amendment as creating a duty to pay damages if it is violated
'and nothing else"').
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lice departments.228 This distinction puts police departments among
the organizations most likely to respond to punitive damages, perhaps
even more so than they would to the threat of exclusion.
Let us assume, however, that even stiff punitive monetary sanc-
tions would not be as effective a deterrent as the exclusionary rule in
some few "big" cases in which police desperately want a conviction.
At some point, we perhaps should ponder: should police be prevented
from acting unconstitutionally if they have diligently explored every
legitimate alternative (a strategy a damages regime is likely to en-
courage) and they are willing to pay the price? I am not sure liberals
would or should sacrifice all such cases on the altar of the Fourth
Amendment.229
4. Underdeterrence of Magistrates
For reasons given earlier, a damages regime is better than the
exclusionary rule at balancing the influences that operate on trial and
appellate judges who construe the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the for-
mer remedy is less likely to generate either underenforcement or
overenforcement by those types of courts. However, magistrates
charged with administering the warrant process are faced with a dif-
ferent incentive structure. These judicial officers, like all others, are
immune from suit.23° Accordingly, if the exclusionary rule were abol-
ished, magistrates would face no formal disincentive for issuing invalid
warrants-knowingly, negligently, or otherwise-except dismissal on
the grounds of incompetence.
Of course, the scenario just depicted almost perfectly describes
the reality under today's version of the exclusionary rule. Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Leon v. United States,231 magistrates
know that, unless a warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," or
some other egregious error or obvious surrender of neutrality is evi-
dent, exclusion will not occur.23 2 Thus, from a deterrence perspective,
a damages regime without an exclusionary supplement would not rep-
resent a significant change from the system that currently exists.
228. See supra text accompanying note 210.
229. Later in this article, I note that if the government response is grossly disproportionate
to its interests in crime control (e.g., a flagrantly illegal search to obtain evidence for a misde-
meanor), the Due Process Clause might call for exclusion. See infra notes 345-54 and accompa-
nying text. That version of the rule is not based on an instrumental analysis, however, and in any
event would not result in exclusion in the serious criminal cases discussed in the text.
230. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978) (holding that judges have absolute
judicial immunity in § 1983 damages actions even when they take actions in excess of their au-
thority, or act maliciously or corruptly, so long as they have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and the acts they take in regard to it can be characterized as "judicial").
231. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
232. Id. at 923.
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To a liberal (who presumably disagrees with the Leon result),
that is not a persuasive justification for adopting a damages regime,
however. A better justification is that even if Leon were reversed,
magistrates would pay no more or less attention to the Fourth
Amendment than they already do based on their moral predilections.
While reversal by an appellate court might damage the judicial
pride,233 it probably has even less impact on the bungling magistrate
than it does on the blundering police officer. First, it is so rare, and
comes so long after the issuance of the warrant when it does occur,
that it falls far short of the "punishment" a behaviorist would seek.
Furthermore, because magistrates, by constitutional and practical def-
inition, are not "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out crime,''234 any loss of conviction resulting from a Fourth
Amendment mistake has no direct effect on them. Perhaps most im-
portantly, that result also has no direct effect on their superiors, who
have the ultimate task of ensuring that magistrates are competent.
Thus, it is not surprising that a noticeable number of "rubber-
stamping" magistrates exist.235
One solution to these problems, analogous to the proposal con-
cerning police liability, would be to abrogate judicial immunity for
magistrates and hold them personally liable for searches conducted
pursuant to an invalid warrant, at least when the magistrate has rea-
son to know it was invalid. A slightly less radical proposal is to main-
tain judicial immunity, but make the employing judicial entity liable
for such searches and seizures. This scheme would help ensure that
magistrates, who in many jurisdictions lack any formal legal educa-
tion,236 will be adequately trained to do their job and relieved of their
position if they do not. Further, imposition of liability on the judicial
233. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 355-56.
234. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[The Fourth Amendment's] protec-
tion consists in requiring that ... inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.").
235. Van Duizend and his coauthors found that
the majority of the search warrants in each city were reviewed by only a few of the magis-
trates. This was due, in part, to the location of the magistrate's court in a high crime area or
adjacent to the police headquarters, or to the duty hours of the judge or judges involved.
But this concentration was augmented by the police practice of selecting the judge with
whom an individual officer feels comfortable or who is perceived as less likely to raise
questions.
VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, at 47-48; see also Duke, supra note 63, at 1408 ("The
warrant practices described in the NCSC study are a litany of perversions of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Many of the magistrates regarded themselves as adjuncts to law enforcement."); Kamisar,
supra note 2, at 571 (suggesting that "rubberstamping" may be prevalent because of the time
pressures on most magistrates and because American judges are used to relying on the parties to
develop the issues, which does not occur in the one-sided warrant application process).
236. According to a study conducted in the 1970s, approximately 40 states allowed nonlawy-
ers to function as magistrates, and such magistrates numbered roughly 13,000 to 14,000 nation-
wide. See LINDA J. SILBERMAN, NON-ATtORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY 24-25 (1979).
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organization as a whole is unlikely to have the inhibiting effect that
individual liability would. Actual payment of damages would be a rare
event,237 but it would stimulate much more concern over judicial com-
petence than the exclusionary rule does.
The practical problems with such a scheme might be overwhelm-
ing, however.a38 If so, perhaps all that can be done to ensure some
deterrence in this situation is to maintain police and departmental lia-
bility. Personal liability for a warrant-based search based on reckless-
ness should be rare because the police are entitled to assume
magistrates will do their job,239 and because, as argued earlier, they
should be encouraged to obtain warrants. For the same reasons, strict
departmental substantive liability, although advisable elsewhere,
should not apply in this context; the department should only be liable
if the officer should have known the warrant was invalid (i.e., was neg-
ligent). Even so limited, a damages regime would discourage police
misuse of warrants at least to the same extent as the exclusionary rule,
for great deference to warrant-based searches existed even before
Leon was decided. 4 °
E. Conclusion: A Tort or an Administrative Remedy?
If it has demonstrated nothing else, the foregoing discussion has
made clear the difficulty of fashioning a legal framework that imposes
the optimal degree of deterrence on police, police institutions, and the
courts. That this problem is complex and perhaps not entirely solvable
is not an argument for the exclusionary rule, however. It is the rule's
relative impotence as a means of motivating constitutional behavior
that should be the starting point of the discussion. Instead of defend-
237. According to the NCSC study, which took place prior to Leon, only five percent of all
searches based on warrants result in suppression. See VAN DuIZEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 42.
However, it should also be noted that, under a meaningful damages regime, the percentage of
warrant-based searches found illegal would undoubtedly increase because people who are not
prosecuted would be able to litigate the issue.
238. For instance, a court levying damages against a judicial bureaucracy may create insur-
mountable conflict-of-interest problems. Further, every challenge of a warrant-based search in
which reckless behavior is charged might require joining three parties-the officer, the depart-
ment, and the judiciary.
239. In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a warrant does
not immunize an individual officer under § 1983 if a "reasonably well-trained officer in peti-
tioner's position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that
he should not have applied for the warrant." Id. at 345. As the majority stated, "[tihe officer
cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate." Id. at
346 n.9. But, as Justice Powell's concurring opinion in that case emphasized, "substantial weight
should be accorded the judge's finding of probable cause in determining whether [police] will be
personally liable." Id. at 346 (Powell, J., concurring).
240. See supra note 237. Such deference is appropriate because independent investigation
and internal screening by a police superior or a governmental lawyer usually precede a warrant
application. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 48, at 19-21. If such investigation and screen-
ing were not present, then a case of negligence (at least) might be made out. Cf Donald Dripps,
Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 932 (1986) (arguing that exclusion under Leon is appropri-
ate under these circumstances).
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ing the rule, liberals should be thinking about more effective ways of
regulating the police.
Toward this end, this part of the article has proposed a hybrid
system with components borrowed from both tort and administrative
law. The principal tort component, proposed to ensure that victims of
illegal searches and seizures have an incentive to sue and are compen-
sated for constitutional wrongs committed against them, is the dam-
ages remedy. Taken from the administrative law model are the
agency-as-litigator concept and the bench trial.
The defense of this proposal has focused on the deterrence issue.
Several other types of objections to it can be anticipated. For instance,
in addition to those objections that might be derived from the afore-
mentioned precedent construing federal damages statutes, 241 at least
two possible constitutional caveats might be raised against the hybrid
approach. The first is that any proceeding that exacts damages violates
the Seventh Amendment and analogous state constitutional provi-
sions if a jury is not involved in the decisionmaking.242 The second is
that, under separation-of-powers doctrine, an executive agency may
not have the authority to decide whether a constitutional claim is mer-
itorious; 243 yet that is the natural effect of giving an administrative
agency the power to screen Fourth Amendment cases.
Whether these objections would sink the proposed system, or can
somehow be accommodated with only minor adjustments, is un-
clear.2 " If they prevail, one obvious response is to provide for juries
241. See supra notes 145, 156 and accompanying text.
242. The Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial "[i]n Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
243. Cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) ("[W]e presume that justiciable constitu-
tional rights are to be enforced through the courts.").
244. The Supreme Court's cases suggest that a right to jury trial exists when damages are
sought in an action that existed at common law at the time the Constitution was drafted. See
CHARLES WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 609 (4th ed. 1983) ("The practice of the
common law in 1791, when the amendment as adopted, is made the standard .... "). Clearly,
damages suits alleging the equivalent of a Fourth Amendment claim occurred during colonial
times. See Amar, supra note 3, at 785-87, 818 n.228. But Professor Amar's assertion that such
cases "flourished" in those times, id. at 786, has been vigorously challenged. See Ronald J. Allen
& Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local v. General Theo-
retical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1149, 1176-77 (1998) ("No evidence for this proposition
has ever been produced .... "). Further, to the extent juries were involved, they played an
extremely limited role because the judge controlled the liability issue, the evidence the jury
heard, and the types of people who sat on the jury. See id. at 1178-81. It might also be relevant
that the regime proposed here conceptualizes "damages" exacted from police officers primarily
as a deterrent penalty obtained through suits brought by government attorneys rather than as
compensation; its purpose is thus substantially administrative. Cf Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm., 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (holding Seventh Amendment
inapplicable where the government sues to enforce "statutory public rights").
The separation of powers problem can probably be finessed by giving persons a cause of
action to enjoin the agency to act when they are dissatisfied with the agency's failure to bring
suit. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 560 (1975) (allowing suit in federal court
attacking agency's action as arbitrary and capricious).
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and opt for purely private actions.245 But, as already explained, the
cumbersome nature of the jury process, as well as its likely bias
against many of the plaintiffs who bring search and seizure claims, will
undermine the deterrent effect and law-making capacity of the system.
Leaving the screening process to private attorneys may also under-
mine the system's effectiveness, both because some meritorious claims
may not be brought despite the lure of liquidated damages and be-
cause frivolous claims might proliferate. Furthermore, to the extent
discovery and other time-consuming and expensive procedures are
important in a search and seizure case, a government entity is more
likely to succeed than a private attorney.246
If the Seventh Amendment and separation-of-powers objections
prevail, a preferable alternative would be a system fashioned more
directly on a pure administrative model, using administrative law
judges in addition to agency-based litigators.247 The money paid by
police and police institutions would be conceived of purely as penal-
ties, and would go to the administrative agency, not to the victims of
the search and seizure. Compensation of the latter individuals would
be left to the existing, separate civil system. Victims who experience
only "inchoate" injury, and who might therefore not make themselves
known to the agency, could be encouraged to come forward through
"bounty hunter" provisions of the type familiar to a number of admin-
istrative regulatory schemes.248
Indeed, the pure administrative model has several advantages
over the hybrid model. First, it does a better job of paying for itself,
since the money goes to the government instead of a private individ-
ual. The penalty model also finesses the unsavory spectacle of police
officers and departments paying criminals.2 49 And it avoids the sticky
distributive problems that arise in a civil action when numerous of-
245. See Amar, supra note 3, at 811-16.
246. Cf Patton, supra note 79, at 761-62 (describing difficulties of obtaining discovery in
§ 1983 litigation cases concerning use of excessive force).
247. For one example of this model, consider the administrative enforcement mechanisms of
the Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994).
248. See, e.g., Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1994) ("In the discretion of
the court, one-half of said fine [is] to be paid to the person or persons giving information which
shall lead to conviction."); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994) (encouraging whistle
blowing).
249. Some commentators have argued that people who abuse their rights to privacy and
autonomy for the purpose of committing crime sacrifice those rights. See Sherry F. Colb, Inno-
cence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456,
1491-95 (1996); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1248-56 (1983). On this view, remedial actions undertaken by or on
behalf of guilty persons could be conceived solely as utilitarian means of achieving protection of
society as a whole; they are not vindication of personal constitutional rights because such liti-
gants have none. If this position is correct, even a damages regime would not have to transmit
the money to those litigants who are convicted of crime.
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ficers or numerous victims are involved in an illegal search. 250 As an
efficient deterrent device, this system may be superior to any other.
However, it has at least two drawbacks. First, it adds still another
sanctioning system (in addition to damages, criminal, and internal po-
lice actions), which increases the chances of conflicting signals and
may create other practical problems.2  Second, as already indicated,
separation-of-powers doctrine may prohibit executive officials-in
this case administrative law judges-from construing the Constitu-
tion, 52 which presents an obvious obstacle to the entire concept of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment administratively.
Whether a tort model, an administrative model, or a hybrid
thereof is chosen, the final product will be a better deterrent of police
than the exclusionary rule if it ensures that most illegal search victims
(innocent as well as guilty) bring their claims and if it ensures that
police and police departments bear meaningful financial loss as a re-
sult. With such a system in place, and assuming it is not unduly costly
(an issue addressed in part IV), the liberal desiring effective police
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment should suffer no pangs of re-
gret at letting go of the exclusionary rule. What remains to be seen is
whether there exist any nonutilitarian reasons for hanging on to it.
III. NONINSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSION
The liberal defense of the exclusionary rule does not rest on de-
terrence alone. Indeed, some writers think the rule's instrumental ef-
250. For instance, if one officer illegally searches a house with multiple occupants, does each
occupant receive the liquidated damages sum or is it divided among them? If several officers
illegally search a person's house, does each have to pay the full sum, or is it divided among
them?
251. Issues concerning collateral estoppel, prioritization of causes of action, discovery, and
so on, would be complicated by an additional system. However, in areas such as those dealing
with environmental regulation, such a multiprong regime has worked relatively successfully,
partly because the EPA does a conscientious job of triaging, i.e., bringing or withholding the
administrative action depending upon other developments in the system. See generally David T.
Buente, Jr., et al., The "Civil" Implications of Environmental Crimes, 23 ENVTL. L. INST. 10,589
(1993) (discussing how EPA handles multiple proceedings).
252. See supra text accompanying note 243. An argument can be made, however, that pro-
viding Article III court review of the administrative tribunal's "factual and legal determinations"
would avoid the problem. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III:
Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 139 (1988) (mak-
ing this argument); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(reasoning that Article III courts are generally to decide cases involving "private" rights but
"public" rights that are creatures of statute can be decided by administrative agencies). In the
end, the separation of powers and Seventh Amendment issues may be directly related. Cf.
Granlinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) ("[I]f a statutory cause of action is legal
in nature, the question whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudi-
cation to a tribunal that does not employ juries as fact finders requires the same answer as the
question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a
non-Article III tribunal."); supra note 244.
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fects are irrelevant.253 The rule must continue, they argue, because it
is constitutionally mandated.
The Supreme Court has firmly disagreed with this position for the
past twenty-five years.254 The exclusionary rule, the Court declared in
Calandra v. United States,255 is not derived from the Constitution but
rather is merely a judicially created remedy that continues to exist
solely for its alleged deterrent effect.256 In a number of decisions, the
Court has made clear that in those situations where it believes deter-
rence is minimal, the rule does not apply.257 If one agrees with this
reasoning, and with the reasoning and proposals in part II of this arti-
cle, then one has to conclude that the exclusionary rule should be
abolished forthwith.
The liberal has several rejoinders to the Court's purely instru-
mental view, however, all of which rely on Court precedent that ante-
dates or ignores case law adopting the purely instrumental approach.
First, consistent with Court precedent over one century old,258 the lib-
eral might argue that the exclusionary rule explicit in the Fifth
Amendment applies not just to interrogations and the like but to
searches and seizures as well, given their compulsion of incriminating
evidence. Second, the strong property-protection orientation of some
of the Court's early decisions on the Fourth Amendment might pro-
vide a limited basis for excluding certain types of evidence.259 Third,
one can make a logical argument, based on decade-and-a-half old
Supreme Court law,26 that exclusion is required as a way of restoring
the parties to the status quo ante. Fourth, the rule can be seen as a
form of judicial review, mandated by Marbury v. Madison .261 Finally,
Mapp's insinuation that use of illegally seized evidence unconstitu-
tionally taints the adjudication process, together with the 1954 case of
253. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 2, at 658 ("I do not think the life of the exclusionary rule
should depend on an empirical demonstration of its effects on police behavior .... ").
254. At the Supreme Court level, the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule probably
made its first appearance in 1949, in United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 798
(1949), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It was also relied on in part in other cases. See,
e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Kamisar, supra note 2, at 598-99
n.210. However, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), decided a quarter century ago,
marked the first explicit acceptance of deterrence as the sole rationale for the rule.
255. 414 U.S. 338.
256. See id. at 348.
257. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-20 (1984) (holding that exclusion is
not mandated when officer reasonably relies in good faith on a warrant, because he is not deter-
rable in this situation); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980) (holding that ille-
gally seized evidence may be used to impeach because prohibiting such use would not add to
deterrence provided by exclusion in prosecution's case-in-chief); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 457-60 (1976) (finding exclusion not mandated in IRS proceedings because exclusion at
criminal trial is sufficient).
258. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
259. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-92 (1914); Boyd, 116 U.S. 616.
260. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
261. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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Rochin v. California,2 6 2 could form the basis for a broad due process
right to exclusion.
The following discussion briefly reviews each of these theories, all
of which have been treated at length elsewhere. Even from a liberal
point of view (which is the view taken in the discussion), the status
quo ante and judicial review theories are untenable. The Fifth
Amendment, property, and due process arguments, on the other hand,
might have some substance, but they only go so far. The Fifth Amend-
ment and property-oriented bases for the rule at most extend to
seizures of property the Court once labeled "mere evidence," which
today encompasses only a very narrow category of items. The due pro-
cess argument is only persuasive where the police acted so culpably
that they impugn the entire criminal process. In combination, the con-
stitutional arguments lead to an exclusionary rule that applies only
when government illegally seizes private papers or flagrantly violates
the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Fifth Amendment Theory
Any discussion of the exclusionary rule in American constitu-
tional law must begin with Boyd v. United States.26 3 In that 1886 case,
the Supreme Court held that a business invoice obtained through a
subpoena should be excluded from a forfeiture proceeding because:
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of
the owner of goods... is compelling him to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an
unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 26
Boyd was the first time the Court invoked the Fourth Amendment as
a basis for excluding evidence. But, as the quoted passage makes
clear, the Court thought that amendment needed support from the
Fifth Amendment to achieve the desired result of exclusion.
The Court apparently resorted to the Fifth Amendment because,
unlike the Fourth Amendment, it states an explicit rule of exclusion
with its pronouncement that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ' 265 Of course, with
its reference to "witness" and "criminal cases," this passage seems to
prohibit only use of testimony in a criminal proceeding, not inanimate
items obtained through a search and seizure. But Justice Bradley's
262. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
263. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
264. Id. at 634-35.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As Justice Black observed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971), the Fifth Amendment "in and of itself directly and explicitly commands its own
exclusionary rule-a defendant cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself." Id. at 498
(Black, J., concurring).
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opinion for the Court essentially ignored these potential limitations by
maintaining that "the seizure of a man's private books and papers to
be used in evidence against him is [not] substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself." '2 66 The Court's
rechristening of documents as "testimony" made possible its applica-
tion of the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the compulsory
process involved in Boyd.
This basis for the rule is a tenuous one, however. First, at most it
applies to seizure of documents; guns, drugs, and money are not "tes-
timonial" by any stretch of the imagination. Furthermore, Supreme
Court decisions in the last quarter of the twentieth century have deci-
mated Boyd's reasoning even as applied to written expression. In
1976, Fisher v. United States2 67 held that a subpoena generally compels
nothing of incriminating value: it clearly does not compel creation of
the contents of the document 268 and, although it does compel produc-
tion of the document, the act of production normally is not incriminat-
ing.269 Later that term, the Court's decision in Andresen v.
Maryland27' applied the same reasoning in holding that a documen-
tary seizure by the police does not implicate the Fifth Amendment;
such a seizure not only does not compel creation of the document, it
does not even compel the searched person to produce the evidence (in
contrast to a subpoena).271 Fisher and Andresen eliminated the Fifth
Amendment as a candidate for a constitutional basis for the exclusion-
ary rule.
Undaunted, the liberal might insist that Boyd was right in its
equation of subpoenaed documents with compelled testimony, and
contend further that all nonconsensual seizures of documents (includ-
ing those by the police) trigger the Fifth Amendment's protection
against compulsion. But this position is antithetical to liberal dogma
even more fundamental than exclusion. Most documents sought by
subpoena or search warrant are business records relevant to adminis-
trative and criminal investigations of business entities. The expansive
reading of the Fifth Amendment just described would mean the gov-
ernment could never obtain such documents unless they were volunta-
rily surrendered. In other words, as William Stuntz has pointed out,
266. 116 U.S. at 633.
267. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
268. See id. at 409.
269. See id. at 410-13 ("The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion
and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by
conceding that he in fact has the papers."). In any event, the government can usually immunize
the act of production.
270. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
271. See id. at 473 ("[Pletitioner was not asked to say or do anything.... The search for and
seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel.").
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such a reading pretty much ends the regulatory state,272 a conse-
quence most liberals would probably regret.
Even a "liberal" reading of the Fifth Amendment, then, leaves us
with a rule that excludes nothing but truly "private papers and let-
ters," to use Boyd's language. That rule would apply in an infinitesi-
mally small number of cases.2 73 Moreover, such a rule would always
be subsumed by the property-based rule that derives directly from the
Fourth Amendment.
B. The Property Theory
Although one would not know it from reading those pre-Calan-
dra opinions which cite Boyd approvingly when excluding items such
as alcohol and drugs,2 7 4 the Fifth Amendment theory of exclusion is
incoherent as a justification for excluding nondocumentary evidence.
Even if the witness/testimony language of the Fifth Amendment could
somehow be tortured to cover such evidence, doing so would elimi-
nate the state's ability to use any items discovered through searches
and seizures, no matter how legal the seizures were under the Fourth
Amendment. For the Fifth Amendment excludes all compelled testi-
mony, whether or not it was obtained by police who had probable
cause.
Perhaps this was why Weeks v. United States, 275 which adopted
the exclusionary rule in the federal courts, made only passing refer-
ence to Boyd 2 7 6 and appeared to be grounded solely on the Fourth
Amendment.277 In Weeks, the Supreme Court recognized a com-
pletely different theory of exclusion-one based on property rights.
The evidence suppressed in Weeks consisted of letters seized by police
who had neither a warrant nor, apparently, probable cause authoriz-
272. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 427-28 (1995) (reasoning that had Boyd been given its full scope, "the modern regulatory
state would have been dead almost before it was born").
273. Note that the verbal equivalent of private documents and papers-i.e., conversations-
are excludable under a Fifth Amendment rationale, but again only if coerced. Cf Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Conversations intercepted through surveillance-the typical
search and seizure issue raised in connection with verbal evidence-are not compelled, even in
the broad sense that the typical search for physical evidence "compels" the evidence seized.
Note further that the Fifth Amendment rationale does not require exclusion of private papers
seized from third parties because such papers are not self-incriminating. Cf Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (involving search of a newspaper office for evidence against perpetra-
tors of an assault).
274. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (liquor); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (drugs).
275. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
276. Boyd is mentioned in two ways, first as a source of information about the origins of the
Fourth Amendment, see id. at 389-91, and second for the proposition that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against illegal actions by both government and its individual officers. See id. at
394, 398.
277. Although the Court noted that the accused asserted both his Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment rights, id. at 393, it went on to speak solely of the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.
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ing the seizure. The Supreme Court justified suppression on the sim-
ple ground that, because the letters had been obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and the defendant had made "seasonable ap-
plication" for their return, the government could not retain them.278
The Court's strong language is worth repeating:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution.279
Like Weeks, Boyd had also contained a considerable amount of
discussion about the Fourth Amendment's protection of "private doc-
uments."28 0 Weeks's contribution was that the Fifth Amendment is not
needed to justify exclusion of such evidence when it is illegally seized.
At the same time, contrary to Boyd, Weeks strongly indicated that
papers that were legally obtained under the Fourth Amendment could
be used at a criminal trial.28' That difference between the cases fol-
lows from Weeks's unwillingness to rely on the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against using any and all compelled testimony.
The central issue under the property theory of exclusion is the
type of property the government must return. Although Weeks did not
address this issue, both Boyd and post-Weeks cases applying Boyd's
discussion of property interests did. For instance, Boyd stated that
"stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from . . . a
man's private books and papers .... In the one case, the government
is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not." 2
Gouled v. United States283 made clear that this type of distinction
would continue after Weeks's explicit adoption of a property-based
rationale for the rule. Gouled differentiated between private papers
278. See id. at 398 ("[Hlaving made a seasonable application for [the illegally seized letters']
return, which was heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing
the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and.., the court should have
restored these letters to the accused."). See generally BRADFORD WILSON, ENFORCING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT" A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 59-65 (1986).
279. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
280. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1886) (identifying the issue in the case as
whether "compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him
.. is... an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution?").
281. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390-91 ("[C]onsistently with [the] guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures [goods and pa-
pers] could ... be opened and examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation particularly
describing the thing to be seized.").
282. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
283. 255 U.S. 298 (1920).
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and other types of "mere evidence '2 4 that are entitled to special pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment, and property in which the pub-
lic may have an "interest" or right of "possession," such as "when a
valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property
by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken. '285 The
latter type of property could legitimately be seized because it did not
legally belong to its possessor.
Put within Weeks's framework, these cases stand for the proposi-
tion that the government has a superior interest in, and therefore does
not have to return,286 illegally seized property that falls within the
well-known triad: contraband (e.g., controlled substances); fruits of
crime (e.g., stolen property); and instrumentalities of crime (e.g., bur-
glary tools, betting slips). 287 Most items obtained during a search fit
into one of these categories. Thus, based on the Court's precedent,
there is very little scope to exclusion under the property theory.
A creative liberal might beg to differ with at least one aspect of
this analysis. While allowing a criminal to repossess contraband and
stolen goods is hard for even the most defendant-oriented person to
swallow, some types of instrumentalities are relatively untainted by
crime. Thus, it might be argued, they should be returned if illegally
seized. Indeed, that appeared to be the conclusion of the Warren
Court in the pre-Calandra decision of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania,288 which held that, because there "is nothing even re-
motely criminal in possessing an automobile," a car used to transport
liquor illegally could not be the subject of a civil forfeiture action.289
Plymouth Sedan's result cannot be sustained under a property
theory properly understood, however. The predicate question under
this theory, as Boyd and Gouled recognized, is solely whether the vic-
tim of the illegal search and seizure has a lawful interest in the item
284. See id. at 309-11. In Gouled, the Court excluded contracts and attorney's bills seized by
the government because they were of only "evidential value," in that it was "impossible to see
how the government could have such an interest in such [papers] that under the principles of law
stated it would have the right to take [them] into its possession to prevent injury to the public
from [their] use." Id. at 310.
285. Id. at 309. The opinion stated:
[A]t common law and as the result' of... Boyd ... [search warrants] may not be used as a
means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding,
but that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may
be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be
seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
taken.
Id.
286. Not surprisingly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that litigants can
only repossess items to which they are legally entitled. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
287. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1967) (summarizing precedent establish-
ing these three categories of seizable evidence).
288. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
289. Id. at 699.
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sought to be excluded. In the current world of wide-open forfeiture
statutes,ag the government has the right to virtually any property that
has been used for criminal purposes. To the extent these statutes are
"valid exercises of the police power," 91 to use Gouled's phraseology,
the government does not have to return any property it designates as
forfeitable items. Under the property theory, therefore, exclusion is
not mandated in such cases.a a
For similar reasons, other relatively benign instrumentalities may
not be excludable under the property theory. Consider business
records that are kept pursuant to statutory mandates. As the Supreme
Court's "required records" doctrine suggests,293 such records, if not
the outright property of government, are strongly imbued with a
"public interest" (again using Gouled's language). 94 In short, to the
extent it is valid at all, the property theory, like the Fifth Amendment
theory, requires exclusion only in a very small subset of cases.
C. The Status Quo Ante Theory
A theory of exclusion related to the property theory is that sup-
pression is a remedial device, mandated to restore both the govern-
290. See, e.g., Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act, which permits seizure of, inter alia, (1)
virtually any equipment, currency, or other items connected with engaging in illegal drug traf-
ficking, gambling, or controlled substances; (2) "[a]ny personal property, including, but not lim-
ited to, any vessel, aircraft, item, object, tool, substance, device, weapon, machine, vehicle of any
kind, money, securities, books, record, research, negotiable instrument, or currency, which was
used or was attempted to be used as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or
abetting in the commission of, any felony," and (3) "[any real property [or any interest in real
property] which was used, is being used, or was attempted to be used as an instrumentality in the
commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, any felony." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 932.701 (West Supp. 1999). See generally Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit:
The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 35, 42-56 (1998) (detailing the
breadth of today's forfeiture statutes). The Florida statute could encompass even many kinds of
items that have traditionally been seen as "mere evidence," including the "records" seized in
Gouled, see supra note 284, and the clothing ("personal property") seized in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), the case which rejected Gouled's absolute ban on seizure of mere evidence.
291. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). There are some limitations on the
forfeiture authority, but they are minimal. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 544
(1993) (holding that forfeitures are subject to analysis under the Eighth Amendment's excessive
fines clause); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1993)
(requiring an adversarial hearing prior to the seizure of real property under the federal forfei-
ture statutes). But see Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 290, at 56-100 (arguing for limitations on
forfeiture statutes).
292. Note that even Heffernan, a modern-day adherent of the property theory, concludes
that courts are only "obligated under the fourth amendment to grant a motion for the return of
legally held property when a person having a lawful interest in it can show that the government
seized it from her illegally." Heffernan, supra note 2, at 1254 (emphasis added). But see James
Boyd White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1273, 1283-
84 (1983) (arguing that the property theory justifies excluding all evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment).
293. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1948).
294. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309; see also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 68 (1968)
(describing the rationale of Shapiro's required records doctrine as based in part on the fact that
the records "have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public
documents").
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ment and the victim of an illegal search or seizure to the status quo
ante. As the most recent proponent of this theory explained it, the
exclusionary rule "is just and fair simply because it puts the parties to
a criminal prosecution back in the position they would have been in
had the Constitution been respected." '295 Precedential support for this
theory comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Williams,296
in which the Court sanctioned an exception to the exclusionary rule
when the government can show that the government would inevitably
have discovered the evidence through legal means. The basis for this
holding, Chief Justice Burger explained, is that without such an excep-
tion the government would be worse off than if the illegality had never
occurred.297 At the same time, he suggested, exclusion is fair when it
"plac[es] the State and the accused in the same positions they would
have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place. '298
If even a long-time opponent of the rule such as Burger can en-
dorse the concept,299 the status quo ante theory must have something
going for it. But while it does explain the inevitable discovery excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule, it does not explain as satisfactorily why
exclusion is mandated to begin with. Indeed, it is because the status
quo ante concept so successfully explicates why government should
not be deprived of illegally obtained evidence that could have been
legally obtained that it ultimately fails as an explanation for exclusion.
One response to the status quo ante argument is that exclusion
can't possibly restore victims of illegal searches to their presearch po-
sitions; it cannot achieve the return of (most) seized property, for rea-
sons explained in connection with the property theory, and it does not
effectively restore victims' "ruptured privacy," 3" at least when com-
pared to damages. But the status quo ante argument is more compli-
cated than that. The defendant's "position" prior to the illegal search
encompasses not just untrespassed privacy and possessory interests,
but also the fact that the prosecution did not possess the evidence in
question. The latter reality, so the argument goes, is the aspect of the
parties' relationship that exclusion is best at restoring.3"'
295. Norton, supra note 2, at 284; see also Schroeder, supra note 2, at 655,
296. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). An even earlier statement comes from Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219 (1968), although it was dictum in a footnote. See id. at 224 n.10 ("[Tihe exclusion of
evidence causally linked to the Government's illegal activity no more than restores the situation
that would have prevailed if the Government had itself obeyed the law.").
297. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 447.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (advocating replacing the rule with an administrative remedy).
300. This was the Court's phrase in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), in describing
why new Fourth Amendment rules should not be applied retroactively. The Court's full state-
ment was: "[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Repara-
tion comes too late." Id. at 637.
301. It has been argued that, even if the exclusionary rule does restore in this fashion, there
is no legal right to such restoration, just as there is no cognizable right to damages for erroneous
conviction and punishment. See Amar, supra note 3, at 795-96. The liberal's response, of course,
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 431 1999
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
In fact, however, the exclusionary rule rearranges rather than re-
stores, in a way that favors defendants. This is most obvious in those
cases, mentioned previously, where the Fourth Amendment violation
has to do with execution rather than justification." 2 Consider, for in-
stance, a scenario in which police with a valid warrant unnecessarily
search at night or use excessive force in carrying out the search. Had
these violations not occurred, the government still would have been
able to obtain the evidence legally; indeed, there will generally be no
causal link between such violations and the government's possession
of the evidence. Thus, were the evidence obtained in these situations
to be excluded,30 3 the government would be worse off (and the de-
fendant better off) than in their presearch positions. The same can be
said for a more central type of Fourth Amendment violation, where
police with probable cause fail to obtain a warrant when they should
have. Given the assumption of probable cause, the police could easily
have obtained a warrant (if obtaining a warrant were not "easy" then
exigency obviating the warrant would have existed).3° Thus, exclusion
in such a situation would prevent the police from using evidence that
could have been legally obtained; a true status quo ante regime would
allow the police to demonstrate, at the time of the suppression hear-
ing, that the warrant would have been issued.
This kind of reasoning unfortunately (for the liberal) extends
even to searches conducted on less than probable cause. At the least,
exclusion should not occur if the government can show that it could
have developed probable cause independent of knowledge obtained
from the search. Even if it cannot, exclusion is both overcompensatory
(to the defendant) and undercompensatory (to the prosecution) be-
cause it does not recreate the start-it-all-over-again scenario the status
quo ante theory demands. As Akhil Amar has stated, "[c]riminals get
careless or cocky; conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get
lucky; the truth outs. '3 5 One does not have to assume that these
events are inevitable (a liberal certainly would not) to acknowledge
that they could occur in a large number of cases (a liberal probably
would). If so, even in lack-of-probable-cause scenarios exclusion can
put the government in a worse position and the defendant in a better
position than they occupied presearch. The status quo ante, by defini-
tion, is a position in which anything might happen. The exclusionary
is that the status quo ante argument is an attempt to make restoration a cognizable right and that
exclusion is a more elegant (and probably less costly) way of achieving it than damages.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
303. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 168-70, the evidence often is not
excluded.
304. See Amar, supra note 3, at 794 ("The police could easily have obtained a warrant
before the search, so the illegality is not a but-for cause of the introduction of the [illegally seized
item] into evidence.").
305. Id.
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rule, on the other hand, is truly determinist; it acts as if the only possi-
ble scenarios have already been played out.30 6
D. The Judicial Review Theory
Some version of the "right" to judicial review has been firmly
established in this country since Marbury v. Madison.3 "7 One interpre-
tation of the right is that those who have suffered a violation of their
constitutional rights are entitled to a remedy; as Chief Justice Marshall
stated in Marbury, "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ... whenever that
right is invaded. '308 Under this theory of judicial review the exclusion-
ary rule is obviously deficient, because it grants relief only to criminal
defendants. A damages action, in contrast, can suffice as a "remedy"
for all victims; certainly it is the only significant remedy available for
violations of many other constitutional rights.30 9
Another version of the right to judicial review might be that
courts must provide, in Professor Albert Alschuler's words, "signifi-
cant opportunities" to adjudicate Fourth Amendment rights.31 0
Although the current damages regime is clearly inferior to the exclu-
sionary rule in this regard 3 1 one would be hard-pressed to prove that
these deficiencies are so significant they require exclusion, especially
because elimination of the rule would probably drive more litigants to
seek damages. In any event, for reasons given in part II, the remedy
proposed in this article would be far better than either the current
damages regime or the exclusionary rule at ensuring a fair reading of
the Fourth Amendment.
Professors Thomas Schrock and Robert Welsh have argued that
there is a third reason the right to judicial review might require the
exclusionary rule.3 12 Their theory is similar to the status quo ante ar-
gument in that both aim at nullifying the consequences of the illegal
search and seizure. But while the latter argument is remedial in focus,
the judicial review theory is structural. In Marbury, Marshall estab-
lished that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is
void '3 13 and that courts have the right and duty to make that finding
and implement it by refusing to apply the statute in the case before
306. Exclusion still might be justifiable under this theory when the defendant can show the
government could not have seized the evidence legally, but that occasion will be rare, given the
virtually limitless ways the government can, in theory, obtain probable cause.
307. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
308. Id. at 163.
309. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 104, at 182-83 (describing judicial attempts to
"[slecur[e] justice in and against the activist state" by resort to "the one readily available com-
pensatory channel: the remedy of official liability for damages," as well as to injunctive relief).
310. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 354.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
312. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 335-66.
313. 5 U.S. at 176.
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them.31 4 Based on this fundamental principle of our judicial system,
Schrock and Welsh have argued that the fruits of searches and
seizures repugnant to the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in court
because, as a matter of law, the search is a "nullity." '315 If the search,
like a void statute, is a nullity, then use of its fruits, like a conviction
under the void statute, cannot be countenanced by a court of law.3 16 It
is as if, for legal purposes, the search, like the invalid conviction, never
happened.
On the surface, this is a powerful argument. But it has a signifi-
cant flaw, alluded to by Justice Harlan in Mapp v. Ohio when he
stated that the Fourth Amendment is not a provision designed to en-
sure a "fair trial" but rather is focused on restricting actions of the
police.3 17 Many writers, including Schrock and Welsh, have taken is-
sue with this interpretation, principally by noting that the primary pur-
pose of a search and seizure is obtaining evidence to support a
conviction; accordingly, the search is, in Schrock and Welsh's words,
an "evidentiary transaction. '318 Although this article has argued that
evidence-gathering is often not the purpose of a search or seizure,3 19 it
cannot be denied that conviction ought to be the objective of most
such actions. That being the case, Justice Harlan may be wrong (and
the next section of this article argues he is wrong) to imply that
searches and seizures are never connected to the courtroom. But
Harlan's insight that illegal searches and seizures are fundamentally
different from most other unconstitutional events that might occur in
connection with a criminal case is correct.
314. See id. at 177-78.
315. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 356 (distinguishing between the rule as "sanc-
tion" and as "mere nullification"); id. at 359 ("[Tlhe Constitution as 'given force and effect' by
the Marshall of Marbury v. Madison in his role as judge requires only that unconstitutional
behavior of a governmental actor be declared invalid and void if brought before a court.").
316. See id. at 345-47 (drawing an analogy between invalidating a conviction under the
Smith Act on First Amendment grounds and exclusion under the Fourth Amendment).
317. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 683 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
reasoned:
I do not see how it can be said that a trial becomes unfair simply because a State determines
that evidence may be considered by the trier of fact, regardless of how it was obtained, if it
is relevant to the one issue with which the trial is concerned, the guilt or innocence of the
accused. [The rule is] an incidental means of pursuing other ends than the correct resolution
of the controversies before it.
Id.
318. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 302; see also William T. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement
of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 374-75 (1939) ("[When] the purpose of the search [is] to
obtain evidence, it is pure sophistry to declare, as courts frequently have done, that the search
and the subsequent use of the evidence are distinct transactions."); Schroeder, supra note 2, at
658 (reasoning that it is illogical to declare that a search and the later use of its fruits as evidence
are "distinct events" when the "purpose of the search is to obtain evidence"); Yeager, supra note
2, at 120 ("[All police investigation is so wrapped up in proof that locating the exact situs of
constitutional error is an unhelpful way of resolving whether we should throw out evidence in
criminal cases."). See generally Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 295-308.
319. See supra note 34.
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To see why this is so, first consider the paradigmatic case envi-
sioned by Justice Marshall-unconstitutional legislation. A court can-
not sustain a conviction based on such legislation because, in effect, it
no longer has jurisdiction over the case; the behavior at issue is not
subject to criminal sanctions. Similarly, a proceeding could not be
called "constitutional" if the defendant subject to it were deprived of
counsel, the right to cross-examine, or the right to a jury, given the
language of the Sixth Amendment,32 ° or were forced to testify, given
the language of the Fifth Amendment.3 21 More controversially, given
the Supreme Court's ambiguous precedent on the issue,322 courts may
act unconstitutionally when they permit admission at trial of evidence
known to be unreliable. In contrast to all of these situations, nothing
about admitting illegally seized evidence affects the fairness of the
court's process. The evidence is reliable and its admission does not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution, not even the Fourth
Amendment, because that amendment only regulates conduct outside
the courtroom. 323
In short, when viewed from the perspective of trial, an illegal
search is not a nullity. More accurately, unlike most other unconstitu-
tional actions associated with a criminal case, it does not transform the
court's process into a nullity. Thus, Schrock and Welsh's judicial re-
view theory does not dictate, or even plausibly support, exclusion.32 4
However, a second argument of theirs, addressed below, points to an-
320. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impar-
tial jury ... to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process of
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
321. "No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
.... " Id. amend. V.
322. Compare Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (establishing a "presumption" of
inadmissibility for hearsay not governed by a firmly rooted hearsay exception, which can only be
overcome by "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"), with Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ("A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be
proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."), and Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) ("We are unconvinced... at least as of now, that the adversary
process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about
future dangerousness .... ).
323. Whether other out-of-court violations-e.g., Miranda violations and violations of the
requirement in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), that counsel be present during post-
indictment lineups-implicate the rights associated with a fair trial depend upon a number of
factors too complicated and too tangential to address in this article. A key issue is whether these
violations affect the reliability of the evidence so obtained. Another issue, relevant only to Mi-
randa violations, is whether the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compelled testimony bars use
of statements obtained in the absence of warnings. See generally Arnold Loewy, Police-Obtained
Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Un-
constitutionally Used Evidence, 87 Mici-. L. REv. 907 (1989).
324. The same conclusion can be reached with respect to the analogous argument that intro-
duction of illegally seized evidence is a "second and distinct injury" from the illegal seizure itself.
See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 594-96. No injury can occur at the time of trial if the Fourth
Amendment violation is not a trial right.
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other way in which an illegal search and seizure may affect the consti-
tutionality of the trial.
E. The Due Process Theory
The central goal of Schrock and Welsh's article is to convince us
that admitting illegally seized evidence represents an unconstitutional
judicial condonation of the police action. As we have seen, the judicial
review argument fails to accomplish this goal because it requires that
we assume, contrary to both the text of the Fourth Amendment and
the reality of criminal trials, that an illegal search and seizure auto-
matically affects the fairness of the trial process. Schrock and Welsh
canvass two other arguments in this vein that ought to be considered.
The first argument is that the rule is necessary to maintain "judi-
cial integrity. '325  Although eventually soundly rejected by the
Supreme Court,3 26 this rationale for exclusion frequently appeared in
its opinions prior to the 1970s. Most prominently, one of the reasons
Mapp gave for the rule was the "imperative of judicial integrity., 327
Justice Clark's majority opinion in Mapp went on to assert, "Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own exist-
ence."32 As Schrock and Welsh themselves point out, however, this
version of the judicial integrity justification is purely instrumental in
nature (and worse, from their perspective, selfishly so, in that it uses
the criminally accused to achieve the courts' ends).3 2 9 It might be ad-
ded that, as an empirical matter, the rule probably does more damage
to public respect for the courts than virtually any other single judicial
mechanism, because it makes courts look oblivious to violations of the
criminal law and involves prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges in
325. Justice Brandeis was perhaps the first Supreme Court Justice to advance this rationale
for the rule. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that exclusion is necessary "to maintain respect for law ... [and] to preserve the
judicial process from contamination"); see also id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (speaking of
the use of illegally seized evidence as "dirty business" and of exclusion as a necessary way of
preventing "such iniquities to succeed"). Justice Brennan was the principal modem proponent of
this basis for the rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule ... [is meant to accomplish] the twin goals of enabling the
judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people...
that the government [will] not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seri-
ously undermining popular trust in government.").
326. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984) ("Our cases establish that the
question whether the use of illegally obtained evidence in judicial proceedings represents judicial
participation in a Fourth Amendment violation and offends the integrity of the courts 'is essen-
tially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose ....
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 n.35 (1976))).
327. 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
328. Id. at 659.
329. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 367 ("Instead of concern for the defendant's
right to have the government proceed constitutionally throughout the whole prosecution, we
find concern for the court's own integrity.").
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charade trials in which they all know the defendant is guilty. 330 If, as
legitimacy-compliance theory predicts,331 respect for authorities corre-
lates with willingness to comply with the law, the effect of the rule
might well be the opposite of Clark's prediction.
The instrumental version of "judicial integrity" is not the only
version, however. Schrock and Welsh develop a more nuanced expla-
nation of the integrity idea based on the Due Process Clause. Stated
simply it is that "the defendant has a due process personal right to
have the government observe its own laws, at any rate its own consti-
tution, in its prosecution of him-and therefore to have the court ex-
clude unconstitutionally seized evidence from his trial., 332 If the rule
of law is to be taken seriously, they argue, courts must abide by it at
all times, at least when that law is constitutional in origin.
Unfortunately, Schrock and Welsh's due process theory ends up
begging the central question. As Professor Daniel Meltzer, along with
many others,3 3 3 has pointed out, "whether the law must be applied in
a defendant's case depends upon whether he has suffered a violation
for which exclusion is an appropriate remedy. '334 None of the theories
reviewed so far-whether stemming from the Fifth Amendment, the
right to one's own property, the right to be restored to the status quo
ante, or the right to judicial review-provide grounds for concluding
that it is appropriate as a remedy in the typical case.
Nonetheless, the Due Process Clause may provide liberals with
one final chance at a constitutional basis for the rule, albeit a narrow
one. The Court has indicated that, where another amendment in the
Bill of Rights applies, due process is not controlling. 335 But the Clause
is still applicable where the particular amendments are not. In such
330. What John Kaplan said 25 years ago is even more true today:
The solid majority of Americans rejects the idea that "[t]he criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered." Indeed, this public dissatisfaction has recently become a ma-
jor political force. Public opinion polls have shown an extremely high rate of disapproval of
the courts for their role in "coddling criminals," and the prototype of these complaints is
enforcement of the exclusionary rule.
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 1027, 1035-36 (1974).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
332. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 2, at 369.
333. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 240, at 919 ("So long as the gravamen of the Fourth
Amendment is privacy, any essential connection between the wrong of the search and a subse-
quent official proceeding will remain somewhat mystical."); Heffernan, supra note 2, at 1227 n.87
(arguing that Schrock and Welsh's arguments "beg[ ] the question of whether courts, as well as
officers of the executive branch, are obligated under the Fourth Amendment not to use evidence
against an individual when that evidence was obtained through a violation of that individual's
primary Fourth Amendment rights").
334. Meltzer, supra note 79, at 270.
335. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) ("[Where a particular amendment
'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of gov-
ernment behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due pro-
cess,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims."' (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989))).
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cases, as Justice Harlan explained in Griswold v. Connecticut,3 36 the
Due Process Clause "stands ... on its own bottom., 337 Schrock and
Welsh's insight is that the Clause is implicated, "on its own bottom,"
when a government action invalidates the entire process (as opposed
to one facet of it). And a liberal could argue that such invalidation
sometimes can occur, when the action "shocks the conscience."
That phrase comes, of course, from Rochin v. California.3 3 8 There
a unanimous Court nullified a state drug conviction that relied on the
introduction of morphine capsules that had been obtained from
Rochin's vomit. That unappealing seizure occurred after police of-
ficers saw Rochin swallowing what appeared to be drugs, "jumped" on
him and tried to force his mouth open to extract the capsules and,
when that effort proved unsuccessful, took him to a hospital where
doctors forced an emetic solution through a tube leading into his
stomach.339 Despite the incoherency, noted earlier, of arguing that
physical evidence is "testimony," Justices Douglas and Black at-
tempted to make Rochin a Fifth Amendment case.3" The rest of the
Court treated it as a due process case, however. Justice Frankfurter,
who had just three years earlier written in Wolf v. Colorado341 that the
exclusionary rule is purely a matter of "judicial implication . . . not
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 342
said for the majority in Rochin that "[i]t has long since ceased to be
true that due process of law is heedless of the means by which other-
wise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. ' 343 Elsewhere he
stated, "the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes upon this Court
an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings
[resulting in a conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of jus-
tice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offenses. ' ' '34 Taken together, these statements mean
that, independent of the commands of either the Fifth or Fourth
Amendments, the Due Process Clause requires reversal of a convic-
tion obtained in egregious fashion, regardless of when in the process
that action takes place.
Although Rochin's due process analysis is sui generis among
Supreme Court search and seizure cases, the principle that the Due
Process Clause requires courts to nullify police actions so repugnant
336. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
337. Id. at 500.
338. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
339. See id. at 166.
340. See id. at 174 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
341. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
342. Id. at 28.
343. 342 U.S. at 172.
344. Id. at 169 (brackets in original) (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17
(1945)).
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that they impugn the entire process is not unique to that case. It is also
implemented in the Court's confessions cases excluding statements
made during unduly coercive or deceptive interrogations, regardless
of how reliable they might be.345 Additionally, it is recognized in the
Court's entrapment cases, albeit so far only in dictum, when the gov-
ernment's inducements to commit crime are so outrageous that a con-
viction cannot stand regardless of the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime.3 46 The difficult issue associated with due process
analysis is not whether it establishes a connection between evidence-
gathering and evidence-using, but how to operationalize the "shock
the conscience" language.
A liberal might argue that any Fourth Amendment violation
meets that test. Indeed, many have roundly criticized Frankfurter's at-
tempt to differentiate due process rights from other rights found in the
Constitution.347 But, as already explained, there is nothing about the
usual Fourth Amendment violation that requires nullification of the
criminal adjudication. Furthermore, making the scope of due process
coextensive with the Fourth Amendment and other amendments
345. See, for example, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), in which Justice Frank-
furter explained that "involuntary" confessions are excluded
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to ex-
tract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours
is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must estab-
lish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Id. at 540-41. Even with the advent of Fifth Amendment analysis (which occurred a few years
after Rogers in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), this due process test has independent
significance. Both in coercion cases where custody is not involved, see, e.g., Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) (applying due process analysis in a precharge, no-custody
case), and in deception cases, see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (leaving open
whether a police informant posing as an inmate violates due process), it is the only constitutional
basis for relief.
346. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, stated, "[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." Id. at 431-32. Along the
same lines, the Supreme Court recently rejuvenated the "shock the conscience" test in Sacra-
mento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 (1998), in the context of a civil rights suit. There the Court
held that where a police chase does not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure (because the
suspect eludes capture) but was intended to harm the suspects physically or "to worsen their
legal plight," then it would violate the Due Process Clause, see id. at 1720.
347. Francis Allen has observed:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had become embroiled in a semantic mesh of his own making. To
label a right as one "basic to a free society" is to say about as much as one can say of a
constitutional protection. The right of petitioner Wolf had been so labelled; and yet, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter for the Court had ruled in Wolf v. Colorado that the state need not
exclude the evidence from the criminal trial.
Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL.
L. REv. 1, 252 (1950); see also Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatu-
ral" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 80 (1978) ("Nor, as I see it,
can the reasoning of the court, by Frankfurter, in Wolf, be squared with its reasoning, by Frank-
furter, in Rochin ...."). These comments confuse substantive scope issues with remedial con-
cerns; this article argues that the remedy for an illegal search and seizure (admittedly a violation
of a "basic right") should only be exclusion if it is flagrant.
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would remove the rationale for its existence. If liberals are to salvage
anything from due process analysis, it is a rule that applies only when,
as Justice Frankfurter suggested, the government conduct "is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities."34 Worth noting in this regard is
that, of those countries that contemplate excluding illegally seized evi-
dence, all similarly reserve exclusion for particularly egregious
breaches of conduct.349
What type of conduct is outrageous, egregious, shocking to the
conscience or, to use the word I prefer, flagrant?350 This is not the
place to develop this difficult notion in depth,351 but as a tentative
matter, it might be said to refer to those actions that are grossly dis-
proportionate to the government's interest in procuring evidence. 2
348. 342 U.S. at 172.
349. In the United Kingdom, for example, judges have discretion to exclude evidence where
its admission "would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the
court ought not to admit it." Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.).
Exclusion is rare under this provision. See Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Con-
sensus as to Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171, 186-91 (1993). In Canada, exclu-
sion is permitted when admission "would bring the administration of justice into disrepute."
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I, § 24(2). One justice on the Canadian Supreme Court
has construed this language to mean that "[w]hat should be repressed vigorously is conduct on
[the authorities'] part that shocks the community." Rothman v. The Queen [1981] 12 D.L.R.3d
578, 622 (Can.) (Lamer, J., concurring). In Germany, exclusion occurs when the search is partic-
ularly brutal or when the invasion occasioned by the search is disproportionate to the crime
under investigation. See Bradley, supra, at 208-12. In Australia, the Australian High Court has
held that exclusion is dependent upon a number of factors, including whether there was "any
deliberate disregard of the law by the police ... a deliberate 'cutting of corners' [and] ... the
nature of the offense charged." Rosemary Pattenden, The Exclusion of Unfairly Obtained Evi-
dence in England, Canada and Australia, 19 Irr'L & COMP. L.Q. 664, 674 (1980) (citing Bunning
v. Cross (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54 (Austl.)). In New Zealand, although exclusion has never occurred,
it is possible where "a wholly unwarranted and lengthy detention involving a wholly unwar-
ranted search of a person and/or place" occurred. Queen v. Lee [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 481, 490
(P.C.). See generally Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heed-
ing Justice Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding
About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 56-66 (1994).
350. One definition of flagrant is "extremely, flauntingly, or purposefully conspicuous usu-
ally because of uncommon evil." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 862-63
(1993). Both come very close to Frankfurter's requirement that the conduct "offend hardened
sensibilities."
351. For one attempt, see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 290.2(2)-
(4), at 94 (Official Draft 1975) (requiring exclusion for a "substantial violation" of the Fourth
Amendment, "substantiality" to be determined by reference to, inter alia, "the extent of devia-
tion from lawful conduct," "the extent to which the violation was willful," and "the extent to
which privacy was invaded"). For other takes on this issue, see Havey Wingo, Rewriting Mapp
and Miranda: A Preference for Due Process, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 219 (1983) and Lane V. Sunder-
land, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 343
(1980).
352. This definition is probably equivalent to the types of actions that should (but normally
do not) lead to criminal prosecution. Cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Tlo declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal[ ] would bring terrible retribution."). Damages, both
from the individual and the entity, should accrue in these situations as well, so long as the officer
was acting as a police officer at the time of the illegal action. Cf Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (holding that imposing punitive liability on an insurance company
under respondeat superior doctrine for fraud of an employee does not violate due process so
long as the employee was acting as an employee at the time of the fraud).
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Shoving a tube down someone's throat to obtain drugs, breaking into
someone's house without a warrant and rummaging through bed-
rooms and personal papers to find obscene material,353 posing as a
suspect's attorney in order to obtain evidence about a routine felony,
or forcing a person to commit a serious crime might meet this test.354
More typical constitutional violations would not.
A practical advantage of a due process exclusionary rule limited
to flagrant violations is that it probably more closely captures the type
of misconduct the public at large would be unwilling to put up with
even at the cost of losing a conviction. In others words, it not only
reflects the category of evidentiary uses courts cannot constitutionally
condone but also protects against loss of judicial integrity in the in-
strumental sense. The majority of the public undoubtedly agrees with
Justice Cardozo that the criminal should not go free when the consta-
ble has "blundered." '355 At the same time, when clear proof exists that
the constable acted outrageously, even a citizenry invested in crime
control may want to ensure the government does not profit from its
wrong.
F. Summary
The debate about whether the exclusionary rule is constitution-
ally required is sometimes phrased in terms of whether the rule is a
"personal right" under the Constitution.3 56 If it is, then it applies to
suppress illegally seized evidence regardless of its instrumental effects.
If it is not, then it is only one method, among many possibilities, of
protecting against unlawful invasions, and should only be adopted if it
is the most effective in a cost-benefit sense.
This part of the article has argued that, even from a liberal's per-
spective, the exclusionary rule is a. very limited personal right. The
property theory (and the Fifth Amendment theory, if stretched) do
provide a personal right to exclude private papers that are illegally
seized. The due process theory might expand that right to include
searches and seizures that shock the conscience, which could be de-
.353. These are the facts of Mapp v. Ohio, more or less. Although Frankfurter joined
Harlan's opinion arguing that exclusion should not occur in this case, the thrust of Harlan's
argument was that exclusion should not be forced on the states, not that exclusion under the Due
Process Clause would not be appropriate on the facts of Mapp.
354. The nature of the intrusion is obviously an important variable in this analysis. But so is
the nature of the government's interest. The type of search conducted in Mapp might not be
flagrant if a murder were being investigated. The other police methods described here might
usually result in exclusion or dismissal of charges regardless of the suspected crime, but perhaps
in certain cases, involving particularly serious crimes (e.g., terrorism), such actions would not be
viewed as disproportionate.
355. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926).
356. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[T]he rule is a judicially cre-
ated remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."); see also Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 2, at 369.
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fined to include flagrant violations of Fourth Amendment rights. Be-
yond this, however, the personal right to exclude illegally seized
evidence does not go.357
If those conclusions stand, further expansion of the exclusionary
rule can only be justified if it effectively implements the Fourth
Amendment, a provision which protects the right "of the people" to
be secure, 358 not just the right of a particular criminal defendant. Part
II has already described the relatively meager benefits of the exclu-
sionary rule compared to various alternative remedies. After summa-
rizing that discussion, the concluding part of this article looks at the
relative costs of the rule and its competitors, and once again concludes
that, at best, the rule ends up in second place.
IV. OF COSTS AND BENEFITS: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The exclusionary rule has become a venerated symbol of the lib-
eral agenda. It is time to take it off its pedestal. A careful examination
of its impact on the police and its constitutional underpinnings sug-
gests that it is a fraud. It is not an effective way of preventing police
misconduct, nor is it mandated by the Constitution except in a narrow
subset of cases.
As part II demonstrated, if optimal deterrence of illegal searches
and seizures is the goal, the exclusionary rule is a poor solution.
Changing or suppressing behavior is a complex and difficult task. It is
especially difficult when, as is true with many types of illegal searches
and seizures, the behavior is implicitly or explicitly endorsed by peers,
superiors, and a large segment of the general public. Without a strong
disincentive to engage in such conduct, it will continue. Thus, a regime
that directly sanctions officers and their departments is preferable to
the rule. Although there are many versions of such a regime, it should
have several core components: (1) a liquidated damages/penalty for
all unconstitutional actions, preferably based on the average officer's
salary; (2) personal liability, at the liquidated damages sum, of officers
who knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment; (3) en-
tity liability, at the liquidated damages sum, for all other violations;
(4) state-paid legal assistance for those with Fourth Amendment
claims; and (5) a judicial decisionmaker.
That such a regime is a better deterrent than the rule does not
establish that it should be adopted, of course. The exclusionary rule
clearly does have some deterrent effect. If it proves to be considerably
357. Indeed, it can be argued that the due process right is likewise not a "personal" right,
because, as Schrock and Welsh point out, see supra text accompanying note 329, suppression for
the purpose of assuaging the judicial conscience and public outrage is using the defendant for
societal ends.
358. See Amar, supra note 3, at 813 n.206.
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less costly than a damages regime, perhaps it should remain the sanc-
tion of choice.
It is unlikely that the rule is significantly "cheaper," however,
whether one looks at financial or other types of costs. To many, the
primary "cost" of the exclusionary rule is the number of criminals who
escape conviction because evidence against them has been suppressed.
A conservative estimate is that approximately 10,000 felons and
55,000 misdemeanants evade punishment each year because of suc-
cessful Fourth Amendment suppression motions.359 Other costs of the
rule are more subtle. These include the threat to the Fourth Amend-
ment posed by judges and prosecutors concerned with freeing
criminals,36° the psychic and systemic costs of routine perjury by po-
lice officers,3 6 ' the distracting impact of suppression hearings on the
quality of defense representation on other issues,362 and the damage
to courts and government generally because of public outrage at the
huge benefit criminals receive when the cases against them are dis-
missed or damaged by exclusion.363
All of these costs would be reduced or eliminated under the pro-
posed damages scheme. Looking at the last four costs first, the latter
two would obviously disappear under a damages regime, and I have
argued that the first two (the dilution-of-Fourth Amendment and per-
jury harms) would likewise be minimized under such a regime.364 The
effect of the damages alternative on conviction rates is less clear. The
possibility that liability concerns will induce police to refuse to investi-
gate crimes when they have legitimate suspicion or lead departments
to abort the opportunity to do so should be minimal, for reasons I
have suggested.365 That still leaves the possibility that the 65,000 cases
359. Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am.
B. FoUND. REs. J. 611, 669-70. For various other estimates of this type of cost, expressed in
percentage terms ranging from 0.5% (of all felony arrests) to 7.1% (of all felony drug arrests),
see Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 998 n.6 (1984).
360. The effect on judges is described supra note 42 and text accompanying supra notes 173-
79. As to the effect on prosecutors, see Barnett, supra note 3, at 967 (asserting that, because of
the rule, "[i]nstead of prosecuting the police for their illegal conduct, the prosecutor's office
becomes an insidious and publicly subsidized source of political and legal agitation in defense of
illegal conduct. Refusal to consider the long run effect of this phenomenon on the stability of
constitutional protections would be dangerous and unrealistic").
361. See Slobogin, supra note 40, at 1039 (police lying "diminishes one of our most crucial
,social goods'-trust in government .... [Tihe loss of police credibility on the stand diminishes
law enforcement's effectiveness in the streets.... [T]o the extent other actors, such as prosecu-
tors and judges, are perceived to be ignoring or condoning police perjury, the loss of public trust
may extend beyond law enforcement to the criminal justice system generally").
362. Stuntz has argued that a major negative effect of the criminal procedure revolution has
been the extent to which procedural issues have distracted defense attorneys from guilt-inno-
cence issues. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 31-45 (1997). If he is right, relieving defense attorneys of
suppression duties should improve the overall quality of representation.
363. See supra note 330.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96 & 173-79.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 183-222.
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that are currently ended by suppression, as well as some proportion of
those cases that currently do not result in a motion to suppress, would
never even be initiated under a regime that deters police from engag-
ing in the necessary searches and seizures.
In this regard, a favorite liberal argument on behalf of the rule
has been to quote the statement from John Kaplan (himself a "con-
servative" on this issue) that the only difference between the exclu-
sionary rule and an effective alternative is that the former "flaunts
before us the costs we must pay for fourth amendment guarantees. 366
Put another way, the contention is that any alternative that truly
works will result in at least as many lost convictions as the rule. A first
response to this argument is that if we can avoid flaunting the costs of
the Fourth Amendment and still achieve its goals, so much the better.
More importantly, the assumption that an effective alternative pre-
vents us from catching any criminal the exclusionary rule prevents us
from convicting is wrong. The point of an effective deterrent is not
only to discourage unconstitutional actions but to encourage constitu-
tional ones. With an effective deterrent in place, police who lack prob-
able cause will not necessarily give up; the more reasonable
assumption is that they will simply get more cause. That is precisely
the behavior a damages regime would systematically induce and what
the exclusionary rule fails to encourage in any concerted way.
Other costs of the competing regimes are more prosaic, but at
least as important.367 There is no doubt that the proposed system
would be expensive; if it is "liberal" in no other way, it at least fits the
paradigm of a costly government program. Attorneys for both sides
would have to be paid and a special bench would have to be created.
Police departments would be accountable for damages and would in-
cur costs in improving training programs and increasing job qualifica-
tion requirements. Departments might also have to spend more on
salaries, if fear of liability drives some applicants away. At the same
time, suppression hearings should be rare events, which will result in
considerable savings, 368 and retrials of defendants who successfully
appeal convictions on Fourth Amendment grounds should virtually
disappear. Many of the costs would simply be transferred from one
system to the other. For instance, public defenders and suppression
hearing judges might well become agency lawyers and fact finders in
366. Kaplan, supra note 330, at 1037; see also Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility"
and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47 n.211 (1987) (citing
Kaplan); Maclin, supra note 2, at 56 (same).
367. Cf Paul R. Verkuil, On Making Government Pay, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1584-86,
1590 (1983) (reviewing SCHUCK, supra note 104, and taking Schuck to task for not considering
the costs of his proposal to adopt a respondeat superior regime).
368. In Chicago, 34% of court time is spent on hearing motions to suppress. See OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, supra note 82, at 615. According to another study, 32.6% of all federal criminal
defendants who go to trial file Fourth Amendment suppression motions, nearly all of which are
decided in formal hearings. See REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 6, at 10.
[Vol. 1999
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 444 1999
DUMPING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
damages actions. Police officers who once testified in suppression
hearings would now testify in damages proceedings. Costs to police
departments will be more difficult to defray but, if the premise of the
proposal is correct, expenditures on training and hiring should signifi-
cantly reduce damages payouts.
Assuming that the costs of the proposed regime are not prohibi-
tive and that its deterrent benefits outweigh those of the exclusionary
rule, the instrumental argument for the rule collapses. If the rule is to
survive, it must be as a personal right conferred by the Constitution.
As part III demonstrated, however, the most the Constitution requires
is exclusion in cases of flagrant violations and seizure of private pa-
pers. Thus, even the rule as it exists today, much less the rule in its
most liberal form, cannot be sustained. The upshot of these observa-
tions is that a damages alternative like the one proposed should be
adopted, with a mere vestige of the rule, at most, attached.
One last question remains: is such a regime politically feasible? A
few proponents of the exclusionary rule have argued that we must
keep the rule because a polity obsessed with crime control would
never adopt an effective alternative. 369 That argument-which in ef-
fect says that we should not bother pushing for anything better be-
cause we will fail-is too fatalistic for a true liberal.3 7 ° It also comes
perilously close to the very unliberal contention that the rule is prefer-
able because it does not fully enforce the Fourth Amendment.371
Further, the political unfeasibility argument minimizes the propo-
sal's strong selling points, points that should appease even many con-
servatives. First and foremost, the proposal should bring more
369. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 629-30; Maclin, supra note 2, at 49; Steiker, supra note 2, at
849-50. To the argument that the current political climate is antagonistic to change is often added
the (accurate) observation that no meaningful remedies developed before Mapp; similarly, the
contention goes, nothing will happen now. See Maclin, supra note 2, at 60. But, of course,
outside of the coerced confession context, there were virtually no remedies for any constitutional
criminal rights prior to the 1960s. Governments simply did not focus on the issue until the War-
ren Court made them. Now, however, Mapp has gotten people used to thinking there should be
a remedy for the Fourth Amendment. And now, unlike at the time of Mapp, a legislative re-
former can claim that all that is being proposed is replacement of an old remedy for a new,
better one.
370. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Pro-
cedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2302-03 (1998) ("It is wrong to criticize ... proposals that
are not currently politically feasible. Good legal scholarship can sometimes change what is politi-
cally feasible.").
371. Given the overt and covert support for illegal searches and seizures mentioned above,
perhaps our society does not want full enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. But liberals
should want full enforcement, not just because the Fourth Amendment is a constitutional princi-
ple, but because ignoring its limitations undermines the democratic state, could lead to major
upheaval, or both. Cf. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police,
in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962) ("All the other
freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, presuppose that arbi-
trary and capricious police action has been restrained. Security in one's home and person is the
fundamental right without which there can be no liberty."); Schwartz, supra note 214, at 360
("There exists a seething resentment of police practices ... in minority communities.").
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effective protection of everyone's Fourth Amendment interests,3 72
through greater police adherence to the law,37 3 simplification of that
law, 374 invigorated judicial review,3 75 improved hiring, training, and
supervision of officers,3 76 and the increased use of warrants.37 7 It
378 1 dwshould also reduce racial tensions, cut down on useless investiga-
tions of low-level victimless crime,3 7 promote innovative, problem-
solving police work,380 and encourage stronger departmental reactions
to rogue officers who ultimately cost the system money and respect.381
And, most importantly for the would-be lobbyist, the proposal would
virtually rid us of that great liberal demon, the exclusionary rule.
For the latter reason, many people may label this whole effort the
work of a right-winger. My hope is that the careful reader thinks
otherwise. Even if the reader is just unsure, this article has done its
work.
372. That conservatives support this proposition just as strongly as liberals is suggested by
research indicating that ratings of intrusiveness of search and seizures did not vary significantly
with the person's score on a Due Process-Crime Control Scale. See Slobogin & Schumacher,
supra note 41, at 772-74.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 79-110.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 162-79.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 122-61.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 212-16.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 217-21.
381. See supra note 203.
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